Changing universities and academic outreach

Simon Schwartzman

Abstract

1. Introduction

2. The evolving tensions between social relevance and academic autonomy

3. Transformations in the US: From local colleges to global universities

4. From imperial science to academic cooperation

5. The golden years of international outreach

6. The development of area studies in the US.

7. The impact on higher education in Latin America

7.1 The Reform Movement

---

1 This paper was prepared thanks to the support from the Fulbright Commission, through the New Century Scholar's program 2009-2010. The author is indebted to David Stark, Chairman of the Department of Sociology, Columbia University, for institutional hospitality; to Alfred Stepman, John Coastworth, Henry Levin, Thomas Trebat, Kenneth Prewitt, Richard Nelson, Miguel Urquiola and other colleagues at Columbia for illuminating conversations and insights about the changing roles of universities in these times of globalization; and to James Ito-Adler, Bolivar Lamounier, Claudio de Moura Castro, Daniel C. Levy, Mariza Peirano, Elisa Reis, Gabriel Restrepo and Bernardo Sorj for detailed comments and criticism to earlier drafts. Needless to say, none of them bears any responsibility for the ideas and information presented here.

2 Instituto de Estudos do Tabalho e Sociedade (IETS), Rio de Janeiro  simon@iets.org.br
7.2 Education as a channel of social mobility ............................................................ 34

7.3 Institutional differentiation and the introduction of research............................ 35

8. The crisis of international cooperation .................................................................... 40

8.1 Camelot: international research and the cold war ........................................... 40

8.2 The Rockefeller Foundation and the demise of the development university ................................................................. 44

8.3 The Ford Foundation: from academic research to social activism and human rights .................................................................................................................. 47

8.4 The World Bank and the dilemmas of international outreach .................. 56

8.5 Intellectual underpinnings: dependency theory and cultural criticism. 62

9. Epistemic communities, old and new ............................................................... 66

10. From economic development to human rights ..................................................... 70

11. Privatization, internationalization and mass higher education ..................... 78

12. The global universities ...................................................................................... 84

13. International Education, Brain Drain, Brain Exchange, Brain Gain............... 89

14. The search for alternatives ................................................................................ 92

15. Conclusions .................................................................................................... 97

References ......................................................................................................... 100
Abstract

Academic international cooperation between US and Western Europe and developing countries reached its peak in the 1960s and 1970s, through a combination of increased support for higher education, science and technology in the US and Europe; the economic development and modernization drives of former colonial and developing countries; and the foreign policy of the US and Western Europe during the cold war years. Already in the 1980s, however, it had lost much of its priority, due to a succession of failures of international cooperation, a growing skepticism about the promises of modernization, a growing concern with issues of poverty and human rights, and the expansion of private higher education and the priority given to globalization and international competitiveness by the major universities in the US and elsewhere. This essay describes this development with a special emphasis on the links between the US and Latin America, and discusses the issues associated with the current trends. It concludes that truly cooperative undertakings are needed, and require stable, competent and reliable patterns on both sides, recreating the global epistemic communities that could provide the basis for their permanence. Given the differences in wealth and competency, these North-South links will never be fully symmetrical regarding resources and knowledge transfer, but they should be as symmetrical as possible in terms of the genuine effort of each side to understand the needs, the conditions and the perspectives of the other.

1. Introduction

In this essay, I look at the way academic international outreach has changed in the last decades, with special attention to the links between the leading US universities and universities in the developing world, and more particularly in Latin America. The goal is to look at these relationships, with a special emphasis
on the shifting conceptions and ideas about their purpose and impact. This is a vast and very complex subject, and I will deal with it by using some cases and experiences, based on the existing literature and on the author's own experience and previous work on higher education in Latin America and particularly in Brazil (Schwartzman 1996a; Schwartzman and Brunner 1993; Tyler 1997). In the Fall of 2009, I was a visiting scholar at the Department of Sociology of Columbia University, thanks to a fellowship from the Fulbright New Century Scholar Program, and had the privilege of learning more about some of the ways this major institution is evolving and dealing with the present challenges of academic quality, relevance and global outreach. Since a large part of the international outreach of American universities used to be done with the support of major private donors such as the Rockefeller and the Ford foundation, we will also delve into the changing orientations of these institutions.

The challenge of the Fulbright Program was to “engage scholars involved in research and project initiatives that advance understanding of the university as innovation driver and knowledge center and contribute to advancing economic prosperity”. This was, precisely, the subject of a project I coordinated in 2008, looking at the ways research groups in Latin American universities in four countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico) were dealing with the barriers and needed links between academic, inward oriented, and applied, outward oriented research work (Schwartzman 2008). In that project, we looked at the research groups from the inside, through extended interviews, and interpreted their achievements and limitations in terms of their internal characteristics and the broader higher education, research and innovation institutions in their countries. Now, the idea was to add another perspective, that of international cooperation.

Following the European tradition, Latin American universities were organized as teaching institutions for the professions, with little or no space for research (Brunner, Balán, Courard, Cox D., Durham, Fanelli, Kent Serna, Klein, Lucio, Sampaio, Serrano, and Schwartzman 1995; Durham 2004; Levy 1986b; Schwartzman 1996b). When research and graduate education were introduced,
they tended to jump and adopt the academic model of the US research universities, with a strong emphasis on the academic criteria of scientific publications, peer review and competitive research grants, together with the requirement that the academic staff in universities should get a graduate education and a doctor’s degree. This was movement was particularly strong in Brazil (Balbachevsky 2004; Castro and Soares 1986; Velloso 2002) but also adopted with different degrees of intensity in other countries, such as Chile and Mexico (Didou Aupetit and Remedi Allione 2008). This model, when reinforced by rigid institutional rules and academic reward systems, makes it difficult for academic researchers to reach out and to increase the social and economic relevance of their work. Research groups and teams that are able to break these barriers have some institutional elements in common: a strong academic leadership, with established ties outside the academy; the ability to negotiate an independent space and autonomy in their institutional environments, for the management of their financial and human resources; and the ability to reach out for other sources of financing and support.

The development of scientific research and graduate education in Latin America was fostered in large part through interchange with academic research institutions in Europe and the United States, with students going to leading universities to get their advanced degrees, and through cooperation programs and research projects bringing together scholars from different countries, with support from private foundations or governments on both sides. The divide between academic and applied work has also existed in Europe and the US, but has been challenged and changed in recent years by the transformations brought about by what is being called “the knowledge society”. Compared with its European counterparts, US universities have a much stronger tradition of academic entrepreneurship, flexibility and of reaching out for resources and support, both from government and the private sector (Etzkowitz 2008). My initial question in this project was what extent these transformations appear also in the current cooperation projects between major US universities and research teams or institutions in Latin America. In other words, is international cooperation helping to make scientific research more relevant for Latin
American societies, or is it reinforcing the traditional patterns of academic isolation?

I soon realized, however, that international cooperation or outreach, the way it is understood today, is very different from what it was forty or fifty years ago, when universities the US and Europe worked to build, shape and transform their sister institutions in the developing world. Columbia University, like other similar institutions in the US, has multiple international and global activities, through some large institutes and programs such as the Earth Institute, the Global Centers Project, the School of International Affairs, the International Center for AIDS Care and Treatment Programs (ICAP) at Mailman School of Public Health, and many others, including the activities of units such as the Institutes for Latin American and African studies. However, I did not find the kind of international cooperative projects bringing together scholars and research centers in the US and other parts of the developing world that I expected to see. My question, which this essay tries to answer, is how to explain the changes that took place, and what are the consequences of these changes for the ideals, if not the reality, that existed in the past.

The ideals, which I share, are that universities are special institutions that bring together talented people working, to the best of their competencies and motivation, to foster knowledge and educate the new generations, in an intellectual environment of free inquiry and tolerance to opposite views. The sociologist Jonathan R. Cole, for many years the provost of Columbia University, described this ideal in terms of a core set of values and institutions which are not very different from what was proposed many years before by his mentor, Robert K. Merton, for the scientific communities: universalism, organized skepticism, creation of new knowledge, free and open communication of ideas, disinterestedness, free inquiry and academic freedom, the development of international communities, the peer review system, government by intellectual authority, and intellectual progeny (Cole 2009; Merton 1973).

Of course, as we shall see throughout this text, universities are many other things besides privileged centers of enquiry and intellectual freedom, and the purity of
these ideals are often challenged and jeopardized both from within the institutions, through isolation and institutional rigidity, and from outside, through the pressures and demands of supporters, challengers and opponents. To the extent that universities are able to keep the purity of their core values and institutions, they also run the risk of isolating themselves in ivory towers and losing relevance; to the extend that they respond to the external pressures and demands, they also run the risk of losing their core values and creative dynamism. Successful universities are those that can deal well with this ambiguity, and, when they do it properly, they play an invaluable role in providing their societies with the benefits of basic and applied knowledge, professional competence, the appreciation of merit, and personal freedom.

One of the most important activities of leading universities is international outreach, through which they expand and disseminate the central values of knowledge creation, advanced education and the use of science and technology for social wellbeing and economic development. These activities are seen and presented as part of the universities’ broader role as knowledge centers and innovation drivers, directed not only to the societies where they are located, but also to other countries and regions in need. They may be seen and presented also in a more selfish perspective, as responding to their own needs to increase their influence and sources of support in a globalized world; or a combination of both. As universities link out, they create what has been called “epistemic communities”, groups of people in different parts of the world sharing similar knowledge and values, who can act as bridges between countries and may shape and influence the way their societies and institutions evolve (Knorr-Cetina 1999).

In this essay, I start with an overview of the evolution of North American research universities from the 19th century local colleges to the current global universities. Then I look at academic international cooperation between US and universities abroad, from the beginnings in early 20th century to a period of expansion that some authors have called “the golden years” of international cooperation, which coincided with the great support provided by the US
government to US universities and research institutions after Sputnik in the late fifties. International cooperation was initially carried on by private foundations such as the Rockefeller Foundation, but expanded later to include the US government and that of other developed countries, as well as multilateral and private institutions such as Ford Foundation, and led to the growth of institutes of international studies (or area studies) in many of the largest US universities. A significant part of this cooperation was aimed at improving the quality and social relevance of universities in developing countries, and the next section gives an overview of the Latin American universities and the way they have evolved through time.

This golden period did not last long, however, and in the next section I describe in some detail the crisis that affected it, looking among other things to the experiences of the Rockefeller Foundation and Ford Foundation in Latin America. I discuss, among others, the expectations and frustration with the so called “development university”, which inspired a large international program of the Rockefeller Foundation, and show how the demise of this kind of international cooperation was associated with the changing intellectual and political climate within Latin American and US higher education institutions, particularly after the crisis created by the anti-war movements and the student revolts of 1968.

The next section deals with what happened with international cooperation in more recent years, and how US universities are adapting to these changes. I mention the experience of the World Bank, which tried to become an institution dedicated to the development of “social capital”, rather than just physical or human capital; the adoption of the human rights agenda as the main priority of international activities and cooperation; the entrance of the non governmental organizations in the international networks of cooperation; and the impact of the recent trends for globalization in higher education institutions.

In the conclusion, I argue that there are obvious benefits of this new agenda, which tries to deal more directly with the issues of extreme poverty, discrimination, and individual freedom and security that affects large segments
of the population in poor regions. But there are also many pitfalls, associated, to a large extent, to the dismissal of the old notion that poor and developing countries also need universities, with the same values and institutions that are present at the core universities in the developed countries, and in close contact and interchange with their peers throughout the world.

2. The evolving tensions between social relevance and academic autonomy

Universities have always played important roles in their societies, and, while doing so, had to wrestle with the tensions between autonomy and external demands and constraints, basic and applied work and local and international or global drives. The early universities in Europe were self-governing associations of scholars, linked across countries thanks to a common language, Latin, and teaching to a small elite the seven liberal arts, the “Trivium” (Grammar, Rhetoric, Logic) and the “Quadrivium” (Arithmetic, Geometry, Music, Astronomy), considered essential for the preparation of robust minds. At the same time, they were financed by their students, local rulers or the Church, and supposed to prepare the students for careers in the traditional professions of priesthood, law and medicine. Modern universities are called to do academic research, promote culture, educate the elites, promote social mobility and inclusion, qualify their students for traditional and new professions, develop technology for industries, maintain complex medical facilities and provide a large array of services to governments, firms and communities; which of course is not to say that all universities are asked to do all this, let alone that they actually do it. Still, the enlarged breadth of tasks is notable.

The way universities deal with these multiple requests have varied enormously through time, raising the question of what remains, particularly in the large “multiversities” of today, so named by Clark Kerr (Kerr 1972), of the tiny, aristocratic universities of the past, to justify their claim of being the same kind of institution. One answer may be that they share the “idea of university” that
Cardinal John H. Newman identified in the 19th century as liberal education (Newman 1959), and George Fallis elaborated recently in terms of the combinations of four main functions, liberal education for the elite, graduate education and research, professional education, and accessible education and applied research (Fallis 2007). These functions are often in tension or conflict, and universities vary according to the priorities they give to each; but they tend to share a common element, namely the belief that the university faculties should be autonomous in defining what is to be researched and taught, because they are the main depositaries and often the source of the knowledge they develop and impart, as scholars, researchers and teachers. Whatever shape and denomination the universities have, and whatever activities they carry, it is their role as knowledge institutions that gives them their distinctive identity.

One may ask how much of this distinctiveness remains in today's time of mass higher education, in which so many institutions, in different parts of word, have become purely teaching institutions, while research is concentrated in a few places and very often in government or private, non-teaching institutes. Still, studies on the academic profession in different parts of the work show that academics tend to give strong priority to their work as researchers, through which they ascertain their intellectual autonomy and professional prestige, even in countries with very extensive teaching-only institutions such as Brazil, Mexico, China and Malaysia.
When asked, most academics would say that their work has important applied implications and relevance; however, they would also claim the need for research freedom and the ability to pursue their intellectual curiosity unhindered by short or medium-term considerations of practical outcomes. There is a large literature dealing with this tension, which basically says that, in fact, there are different ways, or “modes” of doing science, related to the institutional settings in which the scientific activity takes place and the values and motivations that drive the scientist’s work. Two references would be enough to make this idea more explicit. One is the distinction between “mode I” and “mode II” of knowledge production proposed in a book by Gibbons and others, which draws two “ideal types” of research work. The first mode is more typical of classic universities, organized along scientific disciplines, with clear institutional separation between academic and applied work, assessed through disciplinary peer review, and based on an implicit assumption of a “linear sequence” of knowledge production, from basic do applied science, and from there to technological development and practical results. The second mode is more inter- or multidisciplinary, with no clear boundaries and barriers between basic and applied work, working under no assumptions about the sequence
between basic research and applications, and more typical of industrial laboratories and also university research institutions with strong linkages with external users and stakeholders (Gibbons 2004; Gibbons, Trow, Scott, Schwartzman, Nowotny, and Limoges 1994; Nowotny, Scott, and Gibbons 2003).

The other reference is the elaboration, by Donald E Stokes, of the idea of different “quadrants” of science, defined by the way the scientists combine the quest for fundamental understanding and considerations of use: the “Pasteur’s quadrant” (use-inspired, basic research); the “Bohr’s quadrant” (pure basic research) and the “Thomas Edison’s quadrant” (pure applied research). (Stokes 1997). The Bohr’s quadrant is probably the most prestigious in academic circles, while Thomas Edison is closer to the popular view of the lone scientist inventing applied gadgets in his garage. The Pasteur quadrant, however, is probably the most prevalent and easily identified in fields such as agriculture, medical research and engineering.

To say that science is produced according to one or another of these modes, or models, does not tell us anything about the relevance, validity or truthfulness of the scientific findings, theories and applications being produced, as the examples of Pasteur, Bohr and Thomas Edison illustrate. It tells us very much, however, about the way the scientific work is organized, both within the scientific institutions and in its relations with the broader society. Although “mode II” was presented by the 1994 Gibbons book as a big novelty, it is possible to show that, historically, this is the more traditional way of doing research, from ancient times in China through the development of medicine, engineering, industrial technology, weaponry and agriculture in the last several centuries; while the organization of scientific research as an academic endeavor, with all its assumptions of self-rule and shared knowledge, is a much more recent development (Ben-David 1971; Merton 1973; Polanyi 1997).

More specifically, it is possible to argue that the more academic, “mode I” type of research is very much a product of the modern research universities, whose origin is often attributed to the mythical Berlin University of Alexander Humboldt in early 19th century (Bertilsson 1992; Nybom 2007), but actually
came into being first in Oxford, Cambridge in England and later in the more prestigious American universities such as Harvard and Johns Hopkins, and was accompanied by the creation of specialized scientific associations, scientific journals and science foundation agencies, all under the control of the scientific community itself. In his book, Donald Stokes stresses the historical nature of this divide, dating back from the 19th century, and reinforced in the US with the famous Vannevar Bush’s report, *Science, the Endless Frontier* (Bush 1945).

In practice, this “modern” way of doing academic science has always coexisted, in the more developed economies, with the other, more “traditional” modes (Latour 1993). The renewed concern for making explicit this coexistence has been described more recently in terms of “innovation” systems, defined by the coexistence of a wide range of institutions – academic, industrial, governmental, public, private – which produces knowledge in different ways, with intense circulation of people, information and resources among different institutions and geographical areas (Branscomb and Keller 1998; Branscomb, Kodama, and Florida 1999; Gibbons 2004; Mowery and Rosenberg 1998; Nelson 1993). What is new in recent years is the pressure that has been built upon academic science and their institutions to confront the need to establish more direct links with the world of applications, to open spaces for interdisciplinarity, to be more entrepreneurial, to deal with the issues of intellectual property, and to link more strongly with external stakeholders.

It has not always been possible for the universities to maintain alive their central ideas of autonomy and self-rule, and, whenever they failed to do so, they risked losing their distinctive features and turned into something else, or to disappear. Today, it is common to use the expressions “higher” or “tertiary” education to refer to the large array of public and private institutions that impart some kind of teaching service for a growing number of students of all ages and motivations, while the pressure on many institutions to link their research with the demands of external clients has undermined to a large extent the traditional notions of academic autonomy and freedom of research. For some, this is the way it should be, with the old universities abandoning their pretenses and becoming efficient
service providers for its clients. For others, these are destructive tendencies, which are transforming the academic institutions beyond recognition, with great loss for society, which is being deprived from their irreplaceable centers of learning, independent thinking and knowledge creation. None of these extreme views, however, is usually correct. In fact, as the universities take up new roles, they have to find new ways to reassert and reestablish their nature as autonomous and independent centers of culture and learning, which is, after all, why different sectors in society look for their services and provide them with support in the first place.

3. Transformations in the US: From local colleges to global universities

American colleges began as small, localized, mostly religious institutions providing general education to local elites, did not change much until the 19th Century, but were powerfully transformed later on by an important innovation, the emergence of the land-grant agricultural colleges, as well as by the gradual development of a few institutions which later became what are known today as “research universities”.

The land-grant movement started with the Morrill Act of 1862, which donated about 17 million acres of public land to be converted in capital and used for the creation, in each US State, of colleges “to teach such branches of learning as are related to agriculture and the mechanic arts, in such manner as the legislatures of the States may respectively prescribe, in order to promote the liberal and

---

3 The term “Research University” was formally introduced by the Carnegie Classification of Institution of Higher Education, which identified 59 institutions in this category in 1994. Later, this classification was revised, but the expression remained to identify the select higher education institutions that, among other things, give high priority for research and grant doctoral degrees in most fields of knowledge. [http://classifications.carnegiefoundation.org/](http://classifications.carnegiefoundation.org/)
practical education of the industrial classes in the several pursuits and professions in life" 4. As described by one analyst,

Prior to the Land-Grant universities, the aristocrats of the world, including Americans, were schooled in theology, the letters, and law and in some few institutions patterned after German universities like Johns Hopkins University. The Land-Grant view of scholarship directly challenged the prevailing norms of scholarship at the time of their inception by making the work of cow barns, kitchens, coke ovens, and forges the subject matter of their investigation. In 1890, the Babcock test for butterfat content of milk was both a scientific advancement and a political/economic act necessary to rationalize markets for fluid milk. (Eddy 1957; McDowell 2003 p 34).

Most of these colleges became later universities, and, starting with 65 institutions in 1900, they are now more than a hundred, thanks to additional legislation, and include well-known public institutions such as the University of California, University of Illinois, Purdue University, Michigan State University, Cornell University and the University of Wisconsin at Madison.

The transformation of scattered small, local colleges into full-fledged network of research institutions is well described in Roger L. Geiger's sequence of books on the history of US research universities (Geiger 1993; Geiger 2004a; Geiger 2004b), and a review of their remarkable achievements is presented in Jonathan R. Cole's book on “The Great American University” (Cole 2009). An important watershed was World War I, which led to a large effort to strengthen university research and link it more closely to the needs of industry and the war effort. Still, a peculiarity of the United States was that this effort was not led by government, but by the private sector. This is how Geiger summarizes the organization of American science during this period:

The mobilization of American science during World War I, then, had the enduring effect of bringing industry, foundations, and universities into closer cooperation and of consecrating the direction of science policy to a private elite that represented the leadership of these institutions. The federal government, which the National

---

4 United States Code Collection Title 7, Chapter 13, § 304, http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/7/usc_sec_07_00000301----000-.html
Research Council had originally been meant to advise, was pushed into the background in the 1920s. (Geiger 2004b, p 100)

This situation would change dramatically during and after World War II, with the large increase in public investments in research and the growing role of the central government. Between 1945 and the 1990s, Geiger identifies four phases in the public discourse on the research universities. First, the optimism of the years following the Second World War and Vannevar’s Bush *Science, the Endless Frontier* (Bush 1945), which justified public investments in all areas of research, but led however to a growing concentration of resources in the military sector; second, the period following the Sputnik in 1957, which led to a new drive in public support for education and basic science in general, and for space science and technology in particular; third, the period starting in 1968, with the opposition to the Vietnam war, the search for alternative cultures and values, and a general mood of frustration against the university establishment; and four, the current concerns about the universities’ contribution to economic competitiveness and globalization.

Lewis Branscomb summarized the US science and technology policies in the period after Sputnik in terms of five basic assumptions (Branscomb 1995):

a) Basic scientific research is a public good. Investment in it, especially in combination with higher education, leads, through a sequential process of innovation to the creation of new technologies which in turn may spawn new industries.

(b) In fulfillment of the Government’s responsibilities for defense, space exploration, and other statutory responsibilities, federal agencies should aggressively pursue the development of new technology for use in these missions. The technological fruits of such a mission-driven, high tech strategy will automatically and without cost to the government "spinoff" to commercial uses, thus further stimulating industrial innovation.

(c) By refraining from direct investments in research to create technology specifically for commercial exploitation, and leaving to private industry the responsibility for tapping into these two sources of science and technology support,
the reliance on market forces to stimulate industrial competitiveness is not compromised.

(d) Complementing the centrally-directed, publicly-financed strategy for developing military technologies and the laissez-faire strategy for developing commercial technology, a third strategy for environmentally useful technology has relied on the use of regulation to force private investment - a strategy based on the idea that environmental costs have only a negative impact on the economy, which fails to reflect a huge future world market in environmentally useful technologies.

(e) U.S. science and the economy have been sufficiently strong that government viewed science and technology as assets to be deployed internationally in support of political goals and building alliances to contain the Soviet Union. Technologies such as rockets, nuclear fusion and fission, and surveillance from space were deployed in the interests of free world security; the "peaceful uses of atomic energy" program, the civilian exploration of space and the Landsat program were designed to make these military-driven technologies more acceptable to publics at home and abroad.

The military were not limited to their mission specific projects, but supported all kinds of research activities. Writing in 1995, this is the picture drawn by Branscomb:

U.S. military R&D was, in effect, the sole engine in the non-communist world for technological development of the emerging "high-tech" industries. Military procurement and government-funded R&D were big factors in the early post-war development of the U.S. electronics, computer, and aircraft industries. If the process of diffusion of military technology to commercial firms was slow, no foreign firms were seriously challenging the U.S. industrial lead in these markets. American universities were prolific sources of new science from which technologies evolved. In contrast with today's environment of Congressional distrust and confrontation in defense acquisition, defense agencies in the 1950's and 1960's took technical risks and enjoyed a healthier partnership with their contractors. Much of the stimulation given by defense to technology came through adventurous procurement, not through funding of R&D. A massive national science and technology enterprise was built, with many institutional innovations.

In this environment, the research university thrived, becoming what some observers called "cold-war universities", although the roots of their strong links
with the military, the civilian government and industrial establishments dated in fact from the World War II period (Chomsky 1997; Engerman 1966; Lowen 1997; Robin 2001; Simpson 1998). The failures of the Vietnam War and the raise of Japan as a global powerhouse in industrial technology, however, shattered this cozy coexistence. In this third period, according to Geiger,

Universities endured stagnation in research support, the end of enrollment growth in higher education, a crash in the job market for new Ph Ds, intrusive governmental regulation, and fiscal distress. Universities largely reacted to student rebellion and public chastisement by withdrawing to the ivory tower. Higher education rhetoric and university actions disdained entanglements with the defense establishment or the corporate world, extolling instead the role of unsullied social critic. Egalitarianism and social justice informed the new zeitgeist as a powerful campus policy sought to enlist the university in such virtuous causes as racial and gender equity, third world liberation, urban revitalization, and environment preservation. Beneath this tumult basic and useful research proceeded apace. However, by the late 1970s it was become increasingly apparent that there was too little research, academic or otherwise, reaching the productive economy” (Geiger 1993, p xv).

Withdrawing to the ivory tower, however, was not the only alternative. Writing in 1982, Harvard’s president Derek Bok proposed a much more positive response, which could preserve the core values of academic freedom, university autonomy and institutional neutrality, while dealing and making effective contributions on issues related to race inequality, technological innovation, the maintenance of ethic standards, and support for economic development in the third world (Bok 1982). As Bok himself predicted, however, these transformations were not enough to satisfy critics who saw in his proposals a movement toward privatization, deregulation and commercialization of science (Slaughter 1993).

These issues have not disappeared from the agenda, but, since de 1980s, a new, fourth phase became dominant, the need to bring universities to help their countries to become more competitive through technological competence and the qualification of its human resources. Throughout the world, but particularly in the US and other English speaking countries, most notably England and
Australia, this concern was associated with the notion that competitiveness should be developed by the private sector, that universities should enter the competitive markets for students, research support and partnerships with industry, and get organized as modern corporations to better compete for material and human resources. As noted by economists Nathan Rosenberg and Richard Nelson, this was not a new development, but the deepening of an established tradition of cooperation which dated from many years in the past (Nelson and Rosenberg 1994). They considered the contribution of universities to economic competitiveness a highly desirable fact, but warned also about its perils:

A shift in emphasis of university research toward more extensive connections with the needs of civilian industry can benefit industry and the universities if it is done in the right way. That way, in our view, is to respect the division of labor between universities and industry that has grown up with the development of the engineering disciplines and applied sciences, rather than one that attempts to draw universities deeply into a world in which decisions need to be made with respect to commercial criteria (Nelson and Rosenberg 1994 p. 347)

Geiger agrees that this is a danger, but does not seem to believe that the traditional division of labor has been maintained:

The marketplace has, on balance, brought the universities greater resources, better students, a far larger capacity for advancing knowledge, and a more productive role in the U.S. economy. At the same time, it diminished the sovereignty of universities over their own activities, weakened their mission of serving the public, and created through growing commercial entanglements at least the potential for undermining their privileged role as disinterested arbiters of knowledge (Geiger 2004a, p. 265).

A new phase may be in the making in the first years of the 21st century, with some paradoxical trends. First, an intensification of the efforts to link the universities more strongly with the global markets and the economy, captured by the themes of the “knowledge economy”, or “knowledge society”, competitiveness and globalization. The term “knowledge society” denotes the idea that, today, knowledge is the more valuable and scarce resource for the wealth of countries and regions, the same way that land, natural resources and
capital used to be. If a country has knowledge, embodied in a vibrant scientific community, well-equipped research laboratories, good universities and an educated population, then it should be able to acquire the other resources needed for the production of wealth. In an integrated and interdependent world, to be knowledgeable means also to be global – to be able to compete in the production of more sophisticated and efficient products, to harness the knowledge being developed elsewhere, to be physically present in different parts of the world, and to be able to attract the best talent anywhere, both as students, managers and researchers. In developed economies, the quest of globalization affects everyone, but the expectation is that the universities would be at the forefront of this trend. They became, indeed, as stated by a group from the Center for Studies on Higher Education in Berkeley, the “Globalization Muse”:

Universities and higher education systems, for both real and romanticized reasons, have become globalization’s muse: in essence, a widely recognized and worshipped route for full participation in the knowledge society. Research universities, in particular, are viewed as an unparalleled source of new thinking and artful innovation, the generator and continuing source of modern science, an unequaled generator of talent, a nearly required path for socio-economic mobility in the postmodern world, and an essential ingredient for participating in the global economy. Hence it is not surprising that building, shaping, nurturing, and sustaining globally competitive research universities, and higher education systems more generally, is now a major focus of national, regional, and local policymaking throughout much of the world (Douglass, King, and Feller 2009).

In spite of the “romanticized” side of these expectations, the authors believe these trends to be unavoidable; however, their book is mostly a demonstration of how American higher education is not meeting the requirements of the new globalization as expected, and what should be done to improve this situation.

What was the impact of these transformations in the way American universities reached out to their counterparts in the developing world? This is the subject of the next sections.
4. From imperial science to academic cooperation

After World War II, there was a general sense of optimism of a new era of progress and growing welfare in developing regions, fostered by the creation of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the end of the old empires and the expectations of the benefits that would come from the civilian adaptation of the new technologies developed for the war. These views were supported by a substantial literature on social and political modernization, developed mostly in academic circles in the US and adopted by students coming from other countries to get their doctoral degrees and returning to their universities with a strong commitment to these ideas (Almond and Verba 1963; Apter 1965; Eisenstadt 1966; Eisenstadt 1963; Germani 1970; Inkeles and Smith 1974; Pye 1962).

Much before the United States, France, England, Germany and the Netherlands were very active in exporting scientific and higher education institutions to their colonies, and, when the colonial empires disintegrated, to the countries that remained under their spheres of influence. Lewis Pyenson has written extensively on what he called “scientific imperialism”, documenting the cases of France, Germany and the Dutch in Indonesia up to World War II. His studies show how the spread of science was associated with the geopolitical interests of the colonial powers, but also fostered science as an independent intellectual endeavor, and created the seeds of national research traditions in the colonies (Pyenson 1985; Pyenson 1989; Pyenson 1990; Pyenson 1993a). Summarizing his findings, he notes that

Investigation revealed distinct patterns in the way that physics and astronomy served geopolitical interests of the European powers. Germans, left to their wits and wiles, focused on publishing original research; many of them obeyed no European master in the choice or execution of research programs, and all of them responded to military and economic needs reluctantly and resentfully. Dutch counterparts worked closely with commercial interests and diverse colonial offices - civilian and military - to carry out original research, much of which issued from colonial presses. French physicists and astronomers in colonial settings and in the New World
undertook independent research with reluctance, preferring to serve the interests of colleagues in Paris by collecting data (Pyenson 1993b p. 104).

In Latin America, Spain and Portugal shaped the academic institutions created in the region since the early 16th century. The Spanish, with the Catholic Church, were quick to establish universities in Mexico, Peru, the Dominican Republic already in the 16th century, followed by others in Argentina, Bolivia, Chile and other regions, as part of a brilliant but short-lived period of intellectual effervescence in Spain (Linz 1972). Portugal did not follow the same path, but had its own version of intellectual renewal in the 18th century, and, when the Portuguese court moved to Brazil in 1808, during the Napoleonic Wars, it established the first research and higher education institutions in the country, which later benefited from close cultural and intellectual ties with France (Carvalho 1980; Maxwell 1995; Schwartzman 1991).

Roy MacLeod analyzed the British case, from the glorious days of Imperial Science in early 20th century to the effort to establish a "science commonwealth" after World War II. Following Pyenson, he shows how British imperial science played multiple roles as a means of enlarging Western knowledge about the larger world; as a colonizing ideology; as an instrument of self-identity; as a dimension of colonial culture; and as a commonwealth practice:

Sustained by physicalist metaphors of diffusion, transplantation, and irradiation, colonial improvers drew upon the symbolic rhetoric of scientific method as the only sure route to the achievement of material improvement and public order. Whether sought or accepted, colonial realities encouraged a similar use of science as a moral resource: in Australia, the pursuit of reason was part of erasing the convict stain; in Africa, the doctrine of test and experiment was preached as a means of uplifting humankind from superstition. In Canada, the applications of science tapped resources and tamed the continent, while the language of science provided, in Suzanne Zeller's words, a "cultural adhesive" that linked people over vast distances, transcending differences of language and origin and making possible a common cause (Macleod 1993 p. 123-124).

MacLeod gives a detailed account of the efforts of British scientists, during World War II, to build a scientific commonwealth that could carry on this unifying role
after the war, and help to spread the benefits of scientific knowledge, first in the
Empire, and later throughout the world. A document from the Royal Society
recommended “the creation of an information service, permanent scientific
counselors at high commissions, a British Commonwealth Scientific
Collaboration Committee, and scientific exchanges.” (p. 144). In 1946, Sir Julian
Huxley, who participated in the first General Conference of the United States that
created UNESCO, proposed a new British Commonwealth Scientific Service
(BCSS), with ten regional centers in Africa, Australasia, India, the Caribbean, the
Middle East, the Far East, and Latin America, and with representatives at
UNESCO in Paris, at British embassies, and in the British Council. This would
coexist with the U.N. agencies, jointly serving research programs shaped by
graphy and environment, but dealing with what he called specifically
“colonial problems of science and its applications.” MacLeod concludes his
article writing that,

In retrospect, these discussions were significant for what was left unsaid. Tensions
between competing agendas were glossed over; this was a time for family harmony,
not for assertions of filial, let alone national, independence. Hand in hand with this
benign acceptance of the political status quo went the continuing belief, nowhere
clearer than in Huxley’s brief for UNESCO, that science currently served and would
continue to benefit the interests of cultural imperialism. There was no dissent from
the assumption that the interests of Britain and those of the world were identical.
Consistent with an age that held to the value-neutrality of science, there was no
political discussion, no mention of cooperation with the Soviet Union or, for that
matter, with the United States. Europe and Japan lay devastated; nothing was said
about defense, and the influence of multinational corporations lay well over the
horizon. Despite their omission, it would be these larger, less predictable political
elements that were to force their way into postwar British science policy, and to
relegate questions of colonial science and development to a subsidiary position (p.
146).

A similar development occurred in France, with the creation of the “Office de la
Recherche Scientifique Coloniale” by the Vichy government in 1943, as a way to
link French science with its colonies, changing its name to Office de la recherche
scientifique et technique outre-mer (ORSTOM) which was kept until 1999, when it
was renamed *l'Institut de Recherche pour le Développement* (IRD). These changes of names reflect, like in Britain, an evolution from the imperial ambitions of the past to the more complex world of today (Bonneuil and Petitjean 1996; Schwartzman 1995; Waast 1995).

The onset of the Cold War and the independence movements of the former British and French colonies did not erode the expectations around the benefits of science, higher education and modernization, but changed the way the policies of international academic outreach were to be carried on, particularly in the United States, whose influence rapidly overshadowed that of the former Imperial powers. The threats of authoritarianism and Communism where high in the agenda (Huntington 1968; Lipset 1960) and technical assistance and international outreach were deemed necessary to make sure that the counties would not take the wrong paths. International outreach became part of the cold war, as an effort of the US and other Western countries to conquer and keep the minds and bodies of the populations in developing countries away from the Soviet Union and communism. For its critics, this was perceived as neocolonialism, an effort of Western powers to perpetuate the dominance of local oligarchies and thwart the efforts for autonomy and self-determination of developing countries. In most part, however, the combination of fresh money and fresh ideas brought by international outreach was usually well received, as an opportunity for the countries to modernize their institutions and develop their economies. In the ideological debates of those years, modernization, as an alternative to Soviet-style socialism, was also a revolutionary perspective, challenging the traditional oligarchies that kept the developing countries poor. If fulfilled, it would bring industrialization, wealth, education reform, institution building, individual freedom and democracy. Old universities had to be reformed and new universities had to be created, and, for this, they needed international support and the cooperation of scholars from the US and other developed countries.

Compared with the main Western powers, the efforts of Soviet Union to create its own version of international outreach did not go very far. In the 1930s, the
perception that the Soviet Union was using science to create a better, more rational world attracted several important Western scientists, most notably the leading British scientist John D. Bernal, who argued for a close and explicit association of scientific research and social and economic development, as the Soviet Union was supposedly doing (Bernal 1939). The Moscow trials, however, and more particularly the violent attacks on “bourgeois science” following the Lysenko affair (Graham 1993), placed a limit on how far this cooperation between Western and Soviet scientists could go. During the Cold War, the most important Soviet initiative of academic outreach was the establishment of the Patrice Lumumba Peoples’ Friendship University for Third World students, mostly from Asia and Africa, some of which became famous as political leaders and militants on the left.

5. The golden years of international outreach

Historically, American higher education used to be inward-looking institutions, except when looking at Germany or England for models of high quality, research institutions some of its leaders believed they should emulate (Fincher 1996; Flexner 1968). As the American international presence increased in the 20th century, it was followed by initiatives to create American-like academic institutions abroad. Early examples are the Peking Union Medical College, established in 1906, and the American University in Cairo of 1919, both led by American religious missionaries. Since the early 20th century, the Rockefeller Foundation has been very active throughout the world, particularly in the area of public health and agriculture, supporting capacity building and research, providing fellowships for international scholars to come to the US, supporting American scholars doing “expatriate” work in foreign institutions, and engaging in institutions building. By 1960 it had active programs with 35 universities and research institutes in less developing countries. In 1961, the Rockefeller Foundation decided to concentrate its efforts of institution building in 10 universities in less developed countries, and in 1973 added three other universities, an experience which ended in 1983 (Coleman 1984; Coleman and
Court 1993). In Brazil, the Rockefeller Foundation established a close cooperation program with the Faculty of Medicine in São Paulo in 1916, and participated very actively in the campaigns for the eradication of yellow fever and ancylostomiasis in the country, helping to organize the country's public health institutions (Schwartzman 1991, chapter 7).

The Rockefeller foundation was not alone. The period of expansion of public support for higher education in the US after Sputnik, identified by Geiger and Branscomb, brought also very significant expansion of these early initiatives of international outreach. At the height of the Cold War, the early initiatives of the Rockefeller foundation became a generalized practice for governments, private institutions and foundations in the United States and Europe, all sharing the notion that it would be possible to develop local higher education and research capabilities in developing countries through international assistance, and that this would be a crucial input for their further development, protecting them from social and economic unrest and the temptations of Communism. Daniel C. Levy describes the 1960-1975 period as the “golden age” of international outreach for Latin America, with a special emphasis on the region's universities:

This was modern history’s most ambitious, organized, non-military effort to export progress -- to provide less developed countries with material resources, ideas, and expertise, for them to leap forward. This was the peak era of international assistance for large-scale institutional and national development. It was also a period of high hope for Third World domestic reforms. These reforms often contemplated a grandiose importing of progress. Domestic policy reformers wanted to import much of what the industrialized countries were eager to share, including through partnership projects explicitly designed for export-import linkage. And both the exporters and importers of assistance anointed no social institution more than the university to lead the great transformation to modernity (Levy 2005, p 1).

Regarding resources,

During that period the [Rockefeller] foundation expended over $135 million, but for the same purpose and starting early in the 1950s, the U.S. Agency for International Development spent more than $1 billion – Indeed, at one point it was assisting 75
universities; the Ford Foundation spent more than $250 million; the British government through the Inter-University Council for Higher Education Overseas was a vital source of support for an array of new universities in former British colonies; and as part of its billion-dollar-a-year aid program, the French government was providing virtually all support for new universities in francophone Africa (Coleman 1984 p. 183-184)5.

The US military became also very involved in supporting research abroad, as they did domestically. In Brazil, one of the most positive examples of the benefits of international cooperation is the Institute of Aeronautics Technology, ITA, still considered the best engineering school in the country, which gave rise to the successful Embraer airplane industry today. ITA’s origins are related to the interchange between the American and Brazilian air forces in World War II, which made it possible for a small group of Brazilian air force officers to come to study at MIT. In the 1940s these officers convinced the Brazilian government to create ITA within the Air Force but as an autonomous, civilian engineering school, and invited Richard Smith, formerly a professor at MIT, to become its first rector (Botelho 1999). Beyond ITA, the US Air Force developed a wide program of scientific cooperation with Latin American institutions in the period, which included different kinds of topics in basic research, such as the physiology of electric fish or the variations of the earth’s magnetic field (Bushnell 1965).

In his careful analysis of these “golden years”, Daniel C. Levy finds that, contrary to the views that came to prevail later, important and positive results came out of this cooperation. In many countries, international support was matched with local resources to build new institutions, send students abroad, create research departments and programs, and improve the quality of higher education. As stated by Levy,

---

5 In spite of being the largest donor, there is very little consistent information and analysis of the role played by USAID in international support for higher education in those years. Levy (2005, p. 246) rated the available data as very unreliable, and was at pains to try to draw a comprehensive picture. An earlier comment and criticism was written in 1969 by Gordon C. Lee, who worked as an AID consultant in Central Asia, in one of the largest AID education programs anywhere (Lee 1969) He described AID university-related activities as characterized by “the commitment to impermanence”, “the absence of flexibility” and “the non-academic orientation”, and presented suggestions to improve this situation.
Rarely could assistance wholly create change, but it was usually a vital facilitating partner, and promoted, bolstered, expanded, and accelerated change. (...). Assistance was thus crucial to creating a major portion of what would be best in Latin America higher education. It makes all the different whether we ask the common question - what is the overall state of Latin American higher education? Or we ask a different question - where are its leading parts and how did they emerge? Both questions are important. The fact that assistance did not do more to allow a positive answer to the first is a profound disappointment. The fact that it was crucial to positive answers to the second question is a profound achievement (which runs basically counter to dependency theory). Not key to the modal patterns of Latin American higher education, assistance has been key to much change and progress within the system (Levy 2005, p 235).

6. The development of area studies in the US.

The growth of academic international outreach was accompanied in the US by the development of a large number of centers and institutes of “area studies” for Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Soviet Union. In 2003 David L. Szanton, from the University of California at Berkeley, coordinated a broad overview of this experience, which is available on line (Szanton 2003)⁶. In the 1970s, Ford Foundation and other private and public agencies stimulated the creation of area studies in the leading US research universities, supporting research, graduate education and international exchange. Although the stimulus for this movement, like the growth of international outreach in the same period, had come from the Cold War, the way these area studies developed went much beyond these initial motivations, and represented, according to Szanton and collaborators, a genuine and valuable contribution to reduce American parochialism and, through interdisciplinary work, to break the institutional barriers that tend to keep the disciplinary departments isolated from each other in the American universities. For Szanton,

⁶http://escholarship.org/uc/search?keyword=szanton&entity=gaia.gaia_books
Within the universities of the United States Area Studies represents a major social invention. Area Studies research and teaching on Africa, Asia, Latin America, the Middle East, and the Soviet Union has repeatedly challenged the institutional and the intellectual hegemony of the US and Euro-centric social science and humanities disciplines. By generating new kinds of data, questions, and insights into social formations, political dynamics, and cultural constructions (e.g. Anderson’s “Imagined Communities,” The Rudolphs’ “Modernity of Tradition,” Geertz’ “Theatre State,” O’Donnell’s “Bureaucratic Authoritarianism”, Scott’s “Weapons of the Weak” Turner’s “Liminal Spaces”), Area Studies scholars have frequently undermined received wisdom and established theories, replacing them with more context sensitive formulations. By creating new interdisciplinary academic programs, and developing close collaborations with colleagues overseas rooted in different national and intellectual cultures, Area Studies scholars press the social science and humanities disciplines in the US to look beyond, even sometimes recast unstated presumptions and easy interpretations (p. 3)

…………………

Although it built on earlier initiatives, and other funders joined in along the way, the Ford Foundation was the single most important force and source of external funding for the institutionalization of multi-disciplinary Area Studies as a core component of higher education in the US. Other large and important programs followed. Precipitated by Sputnik, the variously amended National Defense Education Act of 1957 established the Department of Education’s program that now partially funds the primarily administrative, language teaching and public service (outreach) costs of some 125 university-based Area Studies units as National Resource Centers. The Fulbright Program for "Mutual Education and Cultural Exchange," was much expanded in 1961, ultimately funding 1000s of dissertation and postdoctoral research and teaching projects in selected countries around the world. Likewise, the National Science Foundation and the National Endowment for the Humanities developed national competitions to fund international research projects, workshops, conferences, exchanges, and related activities. Private foundations (e.g. Mellon, Henry Luce, Tinker), have also provided major support for Area Studies programs dealing with particular countries or regions of the world, while still others (e.g., The Rockefeller Foundation, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation), both funded and have drawn on numerous Area Studies scholars for their own topically focused international programs. But it
was the long term commitment and massive support of training and scholarship by the Ford Foundation at key research universities, and through the SSRC/ACLS joint area committees, that established Area Studies as a powerful and academically legitimate approach to generating knowledge about the non-Western world. Still today, the Foundation continues to play a major role in funding the continuing evolution of Area Studies, now in a very different international context (p. 8).

The review of the Latin American area studies was done by Paul Drake and Lisa Hilbink, he a distinguished political scientist who was among other things the president of the Latin American Studies Association (LASA), the main academic network that brings together scholars from the US and other Latin American countries (Drake and Hilbink 2003). In the same vein as the other reviewers, writing in 2003, they recognize that the area was going through a period of diminished support and credibility, but are very supportive of its achievements, particularly in terms of the symmetry it was able to create in the relations between North and South American scholars and institutions:

Latin Americanists have developed and/or contributed to some of the most important and influential theories and debates in the social sciences and humanities in recent history. From dependency to democratization, from studies on the state to research on social movements, scholars of Latin America have been at the forefront of theoretical development in a variety of disciplines. Despite these achievements, Latin American studies in the United States, along with all foreign-area studies, is suffering from a decline in intellectual and material support (p. 2).

..........................

Latin American studies has become a cooperative endeavor between U.S. scholars and their counterparts south of the border. That is, Latin American studies is something that North Americans do with Latin Americans, not to Latin Americans. Indeed, much of the knowledge production about the region has always come from the Latin Americans. This is as it should be, since the internationalization of knowledge production through dialogue with researchers around the globe is today a keystone of not only the social sciences and humanities but also the natural sciences and all scholarly pursuits. A reciprocal and free flow of questions, ideas, and information is essential to all scientific inquiries, whether in physics or anthropology. Perhaps due to the geographic, linguistic, religious, and historico-
political ties between the United States and Latin America, there have been fewer cultural barriers to such scholarly collaboration than there might be between U.S. and African or East Asian scholars. Moreover, many Latin American scholars have come to the United States either in exile or for education, and political obstacles have diminished over the years.

The area studies continue to exist today, mostly with the support from Department of Education, which administers a “National Resource Centers Program for Foreign Language and Area Studies” with a total budget of about 32 million dollars for 2008, with 125 awards. The stated purpose is to “support instruction in fields needed to provide full understanding of areas, regions or countries; research and training in international studies; work in the language aspects of professional and other fields of study; and instruction and research on issues in world affairs”. These centers are part of a broader program of international education from the US Department of Education, the “International Education Programs Service” (Title VI of the Higher Education Act, as reauthorized by the US Congress in 1998) with a total budget of 104 million dollars, which also includes about 30 million dollars for foreign language and area studies fellowships, and 12 million dollars for four Fulbright activities7.

The current emphasis placed on language marks a significant shift from the prevalence of the social sciences and comparative studies in the earlier years. Still, in the tense years following the US reaction to the 9/11 attacks, many area study programs, particularly those dealing with the Arab countries and the Middle East, suffered from threats from conservative groups and members of the US Congress, questioning their loyalty to American policies and values. These threats are described in detail by Jonathan Cole, who argues that “it would be in the best interests of the nation if members of Congress turned their attention away from whether or not the Title VI National Resource centers were producing advocates for American Democracy, and instead focus on how investments in these area studies programs could improve our understanding of other cultures, improve mechanisms by which we could build alliances with these other cultures

7 http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ope/iegps/index.html
through economic and social aid that was not tied to ‘nation-building’ “ (Cole 2009 p. 448).

7. The impact on higher education in Latin America

In his analysis of the “golden years” of international outreach, Daniel Levy noted that this movement was not strong enough to change Latin American higher education as a whole, yet was very influential in improving it at its best. To understand this statement, it is necessary to know a little of the history and characteristics of higher education in the region.

While US higher education institutions started locally, in Latin America most universities and higher education institutions were created by central governments or the Catholic Church. In the early 19\textsuperscript{th} century, as the Spanish and Portuguese empires fell apart, national governments in several countries started to create their own laic higher education institutions, very much along the French model of professional education, with little or no place for research (Halperín Donghi 1962; Schwartzman 1996a; Serrano 1994). In Brazil, the first higher education institutions in Engineering, Law and Medicine date from the early 1800s, but the first universities date from the 1930s.

7.1 The Reform Movement

In the early 20\textsuperscript{th} Century, Latin American universities were swept by what became known as the “Reform Movement”, which started as a student rebellion in Cordoba, Argentina, in 1918, and later spread out to other cities and countries, including Peru, Chile, Mexico, and Venezuela. The movement was part of the rise of a new, modernizing political and intellectual leadership in the region, and has been associated with personalities such as Victor Haya de la Torre in Peru; Ruan B. Justo, José Ingenieros and Alfredo Palacios in Argentina; José Carlos Mariátegui in Peru, and many others (Giorlandini 2001; Portantiero 1978; Silvert
Writing in 1969, at the height of the student rebellions in Europe and the United States, Richard J. Walter noted that

The repercussions of the Cordoba Reform of 1918 continue down to the present. From the reform dates the emergence of Latin American university students into the political scene as an organized, articulate, and often effective force. In recent years student activities have become the focus of increasing scholarly study and interest. The intellectual ferment in Argentina prior to 1918, emphasizing particularly the themes of social reform, idealism, nationalism, and educational reform, so clearly evident as influences in the reform, goes far to explain the nature and the orientation of the Argentine student movement (Walter, 1969, p. 252).

The reform movement may have been socially and politically revolutionary almost a hundred years ago, but did not contribute, and in fact may have hindered the development of modern higher education institutions in the region. Some of its main features were the adoption of open admissions in public universities for all students completing a secondary school; free tuition; and politicization, with different groups in the universities acting in association with political parties and movements. The universities were to be governed as “direct democracies” by their internal stakeholders; but issues such as professional competence, research, social and economic relevance, or the contribution of universities to general education, did not enter the reformist agenda.

The movement was very successful in most places, and its history helps to understand the combination of revolutionary discourse and political social and political conservatism that is so typical of the Latin American intellectual tradition. Given the high levels of social inequality in all countries in region, the reformed universities became protected heavens for the children of the richest sectors of the population, who could study for free, with little pressure or demand for academic achievement, while practicing the oratory and political skills needed for their future prestigious roles. In Mexico, the cozy coexistence maintained for many years between the Partido Revolucionario Institucional, PRI, the authoritarian party that ran the country between 1929 and the 1990s, and

---

8 There are many texts, particularly in Spanish, about the Cordoba Movement and its repercussions, but a comprehensive history of the movement is still to be written.
the *Universidad Nacional Autónoma* de México, UNAM, was aptly described by Levy as a kind of “reconciliation model of regime accommodation”, with the most authoritarian policies being directed against the masses, not the elites. This, however, was never an easy and full accommodation, and in 1968 this coexistence was dramatically broken by the Tlatelolco massacre, in which dozens or hundreds of students were killed by the military (Levy 1980; Or dorika 2003).

## 7.2 Education as a channel of social mobility

The socially regressive nature of most universities in Latin America still prevails, but many changes have occurred in the last several decades. As the countries developed, industrialized and became more urban, new middle classes started to grow and benefit from the opportunities opened by modernization, entering the new jobs created by the expansion of commerce, industry, services and the expansion of the public sector. Mobility through education was particularly important for the children of the millions of immigrants arriving from Europe and Asia in the early 20th Century, who populated the cities of Buenos Aires, Montevideo, Santiago, São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro and others. As the education institutions expanded, many of the immigrants’ children entered the teaching professions, and later joined the ranks of the universities that were being created, making use of the existing opportunities to continue to study in their countries and abroad. Thus, a new academic profession started to emerge, very different from the old professorate of the traditional faculties of law, medicine and engineering which had prevailed so far. A smaller part of this new professionals made good use of the opportunities provided by international cooperation to enter the world of scholarship and research; they were overwhelmed, however, by a much larger group of professional lecturers, neither professionally nor academically grounded, but well organized in trade unions and associations for the defense of their jobs (Gil-Anton, Kuri, Franco, López, and Alvarado 1994; Schwartzman and Balbachevsky 1996).

Education mobility and aspirations soon went beyond what the new institutions and job opportunities could absorb. In the 1950s and 1960s, as the number of
students entering higher education soared, universities such as UNAM in Mexico and Universidad de Buenos Aires in Argentina, with hundreds of thousands of students, became among the largest in the world, without, however, the academic staff and infrastructure to provide its students with significant, good quality education. A similar situation occurred in many other universities in the region, such as the Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos in Peru, the Universidad Central de Venezuela, the Universidad Autónoma de Santo Domingo in the Dominican Republic, and the Universidad de la República in Uruguay.

If, in the 1920s and 1930s, university life and political participation could be seen as a rehearsal, for the children of the elites, of their future roles of social and political power, in the 1960s and 1970s the situation had changed. Now, many students came from poorer or immigrant families, and did not have access to the political elites; the economies did not grow and diversify enough to accommodate the student’s aspirations for good quality jobs and income; and, with some exceptions, the kind of education they received in these engorged and over-politicized institutions did not prepare them for productive work or entrepreneurial initiatives. This situation became particularly dramatic with the economic downturns of the seventies and eighties, when inflation and public deficits soared and investments in higher education started to diminish. One consequence was the intensification of student political radicalism and, in many countries, the public universities became the breeding ground for guerrilla movements that were then repressed by the wave of authoritarian regimes that took over most of Latin America in those years (Wickham-Crowley 1992).

7.3 Institutional differentiation and the introduction of research

Since the 19th century, Latin American universities worked as licensing institutions for the professions, with strict governmental supervision and oversight. The reform movement changed their governance, but not their content or social role. Supported by public money according to their ability to press politically for resources, rather than to the quantity or quality of their products, they did not have to be concerned with the demands from the market place, except for student access. And, although all stakeholders agreed the
universities should play a central role in the implementation of national purposes, there was seldom a common understanding on what these purposes actually were, and Latin American governments seldom looked at their universities as sources for the implementation of their policies.

In the 1970s and 1980s, as the costs increased, resources dwindled, and political conflicts increased, higher education in many Latin American countries started to change. Mostly in Chile, Brazil and Colombia, but to some degree in all other countries, a growing private, market-oriented segment of higher education started to grow, initially through religious or community-based institutions, but more and more as essentially for-profit initiatives (Levy 1986a). In Chile, privatization was a conscious policy of the military regime in the 1980s, influenced by the liberal ideology of the Chicago economists, an institutional framework which was not altered by the succession of center-left governments that ruled Chile since 1990 (Brunner 2009). In the 1960s, Brazil introduced full-time contracts for higher education faculty in public institutions and, a few years later, created a system of graduate education and started to require advanced degrees for academics to be hired or promoted. This policy resulted in some important achievements in graduate and professional education in some institutions, but limited the expansion of the public sector, which was numerically overwhelmed by private institutions, particularly in the richest regions (Durham 2004), providing cheap and often questionable higher education credentials to large number of aspiring students. In other countries, such as Argentina, Mexico and the Dominican Republic, the private sector expanded mostly as alternatives to the over-politicized, ill-administered, mammoth national universities, catering to high-income students who could pay their fees.

Created along the European, mostly French model of independent professional faculties, Latin American universities were late to incorporate research and graduate education as significant activities. The values of modern scientific and research and scholarship only entered the region in late 19th and early 20th century in a few museums of natural history, public health and agricultural
research institutions, as well as in a few medical schools (Cueto 1989; Díaz, Texera, and Vessuri 1983; Schwartzman 1991; Stepan 1971). Graduate education started only in the 1960s in a few places, thanks in large part to the opportunities for international exchange and study abroad provided by international cooperation. The differences in culture, values and orientation between the modern science and technology centers and graduate programs and the main universities led, in many places, to isolation, with the smaller research groups finding refuge in protected niches within or outside the universities (Levy 1996). For the social sciences, isolation was also a way of protection from the authoritarian governments’ repression against university students and the more vocal faculty.

Until the 1970s, perhaps, the expectation was that, as the Latin American countries developed their economies and modernized, their universities would also evolve to fulfill the aspirations of their students and society. They would improve their quality, providing the students with good professional and general competencies and skills; their research and graduate programs would enhance the quality of undergraduate education and create a new segment of highly qualified experts, both for the universities and for the private and public sectors; and the universities would remain intellectually autonomous and free institutions, developing independent research and cultural activities. There was little disagreement on these broad goals, but large controversies and conflicts of interest on its implications: the autonomy of public and private institutions regarding the government; the role and extent to public and private subsidies and tuition charges; the different roles of public, non-profit and profit-oriented institutions; the quality, autonomy and mechanisms for quality assurance; policies regarding entrance examinations and student access; the legal and professional status of the academic staff; and issues of internal governance.

Writing on this subject in the early nineties (Schwartzman 1993b), I argued that it was very difficult for Latin American universities to deal successfully with these conflicting goals and demands, a situation that has not changed in the last fifteen or twenty years. As I wrote then,
The current policy problems for higher education can be summarized in two: given its current size and composition, how can higher education continue to be financed, in a context of dwindling public resources and unrelenting pressures for higher expenditures and increasing costs; how to assure its quality, whatever the meaning of this term; and how it could be geared to fulfill the roles it is expected to play to attend the economic, social and cultural needs of each country. There are other questions to be addressed in this process: how to distribute the benefits of higher education more equitably, how to correct for regional imbalances, how to make the use of public resources more efficient. These are not just "technical" questions, to be handled by a more or less competent administration. They imply deep differences in values and perceptions, and the way they are handled affect different social groups, and can have costly political implications. To deal with these questions, a host of interest group associations, negotiating arenas and regulatory agencies were established in all countries - teacher's unions, rectors' conferences, educational fora, councils of education at different levels, grant-giving agencies, ministerial departments. Most of the disputes on policies of higher education in the region are not actually about policy alternatives, but about the preliminary question of who is entitled to do what. These disputes have the effect of preempting some decisions, and of thwarting the development of managerial competence and administrative skills in agencies submitted to constant political negotiation and bickering.

Besides the policy-setting problems at the national level, the institutions themselves are often unable to pull themselves together to further their own goals. The establishment of stronger central administrations was a trend in all universities which tried to move away from the dominance of the traditional schools and to deal positively with the newcomers. Ideally, modernizing administrations should evolve from the reliance on professional schools to the reliance on academic communities, which are the mainstays of modern research universities, and responsible for the "bottom-heaviness" which should be, in Burton Clark's expression, the main feature of academic organizations. The problem for Latin American universities, however, is the weakness of their country's academic communities, and the strength of other sectors. As the administrations freed themselves from the professional oligarchies, they often fall prey to the students', teachers' and employees' unions. In many Latin American universities now the administrative authorities are elected by these groups, sometimes by a one-man-one-vote method, making the administrative seats thoroughly political positions.
This predicament is compounded by ingrained traditions of collective rule. The Cordoba Reform movement of 1918 established the principle of tri-partite government students, professors and alumni which in many institutions replaced the traditional professional congregations, and have recently been replaced, again, by assemblies of professors, students and employees. The problem with these collective bodies is not so much their composition, but that they go well beyond what one would expect from legislative bodies. They control the acts of the administration in their minimum details, and often at all levels departments, courses, institutes, schools, universities. Universities' administrators not only have to play politics to be appointed, but have also to play politics to have their acts approved and implemented on a daily basis, making everything slow and complicated.

Governance in private institutions goes often to the other extreme. Central administrators are appointed by the owners (or, in Catholic Universities, by the Church), and usually lack collective bodies to temper and compensate for the top-heaviness that prevail. Sometimes this is a blessing, giving the institutions much more freedom do innovate and to respond to changing conditions and demand of the education market. But, in many countries like Brazil and Colombia private institutions cater to the poorer and less demanding social segments, and their freedom of action usually leads to poor products to sell.

No wonder that governance in Latin American academic institutions is so often paralyzed, or unable to put forward policies that go against one actor or another. But the very existence of a plurality of interests and groups opens the space for institutional leadership. In some places more than others, it is possible to find researchers unhappy with their working conditions, students pressing for better education, professionals concerned with their standards, external sources willing to bring support to new projects and initiatives.

It was precisely in these spaces that international cooperation could work at its best, providing high-quality education to promising students, stimulating new fields of research, and creating new epistemic communities linking scholars in the developed and developing word. This is what Daniel Levy meant with his statement that, although international cooperation could not change higher education in broad terms, it provided important contributions to some of the best parts of the system (which was not a matter of pouring assistance into high
peaks as many of the favored targets were very modest in capabilities), with the hope that they could become the seeds for broader changes. This, however, was not what would happen.

8. The crisis of international cooperation

Already in the 1960s, the confluence of interests that brought together the American government, private foundations, the American universities, Latin American governments and important sectors of the emerging scientific community in the Latin American region, started to come under strain, and, in the 1980s and afterwards, international outreach had changed almost completely. In the following, we will look at some illuminating points of this transition.

8.1 Camelot: international research and the cold war

An early sign of the crisis was the so-called “Camelot affair” of 1965. This was an ambitious project supported by the US Department of Defense to study the dynamics of Latin American societies and to prevent the possibility of guerrilla movements to emerge, in a time when Fidel Castro and Che Guevara’s influence was growing in the region. The affair involved outstanding members of the US sociological scientific community, and generated a large number of publications analyzing its events and implications (Galtung 1974; Horowitz 1974; Jacobs 1967; Robin 2008; Silvert 1965; Solovey 2001)

According to its statement of purposes,

Project Camelot is a study whose objective is to determine the feasibility of developing a general social systems model which would make it possible to predict and influence politically significant aspects of social change in the developing nations of the world... The project is conceived as a three to four-year effort to be funded at around one and one-half million dollars annually. It is supported by the Army and the Department of Defense, and will conducted with the cooperation of other agencies of the government (...) Within the Army there is especially ready
acceptance of the need to improve the general understanding of the processes of social change if the Army is to discharge its responsibilities in the overall counterinsurgency program of the U.S. Government...9

As it was typical of the cold war years, the project had a clear military and strategic goal, and, given the amount of resources involved, it was also an opportunity for academic social scientists in the US and abroad to develop research and learn more about the social dynamics in the region. The project was elaborated by the Special Operations Research Office of the American University, with the cooperation of a panel of distinguished social scientists10, and in 1965 it started to recruit Latin American social scientists to participate, without necessarily explaining the project’s full nature and intent. Johan Galtung, a Norwegian sociologist then teaching at UNESCO’s Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences in Chile (FLACSO), denounced the project in public, leading to a storm of protests and criticisms that led to the project’s cancellation a few months later by the US government, after a thorough investigation carried on by the Special Investigation Committee of the Chilean House of Representatives. In the US Presidential order that closed the project, it was determined that "no government sponsorship of foreign area research should be undertaken which in the judgment of the Secretary of State would adversely affect the United States foreign relations."11

Camelot may have been peculiar and extreme in the way it was conceived and in the clumsiness of the way their promoters tried to implement it. The person in charge of recruiting Latin American social scientists for the project tried to hide its military sponsorship; so, when the true origin of the project was revealed, it became a scandal. This episode led to a flurry of texts and comments about what

---


10 The initial list of consultants for Camelot included well-known social scientists such as Jessie Bernard, Frank Bonilla, James S. Coleman, Lewis Coser, Theodore Draper, S. N. Eisenstadt, Gino Germani, W. J. Goode, William Kornhauser, Thomas C. Schelling, Neil Smelser and Gordon Tullock. For the full list, see Solovey 2001.

11 The best English source and discussion of the episode is probably the article published by Galtung himself a few years later in a book edited by Irving Louis Horowitz (Galtung 1974). Most references and quotations used here are based on this text.
happened, either commemorating the closure of the project, or deploring the loss of a golden opportunity to bring more resources and learn more about the region. An extreme reaction was that of Alfred De Grazia, writing an editorial for the *American Behavioral Scientist*, who described the episode as a case in which “A Norwegian pacifist named Johan Galtung egged on a Chilean communist paper to agitate South American antiyanqui jingoism among a few professors” (quoted by Galtung, 1974, p. 283); others commemorated the unmasking of American imperialism in its attempt to penetrate and control the social sciences in the region. For some, the project’s dismissal reflected a victory of the State Department in its turf war against the Pentagon, a regrettable outcome given the known largesse of the military. In the American academic context, Gabriel Almond criticized the project not because of its intent, but because of the disproportionate amount of resources provided by the military, which threatened the freedom of social scientists by restricting their possibilities of choice. A typical reaction was that from the anthropologist Milton Jacobs, who blamed the fiasco on the control of federal research funds and programs by Washington bureaucrats, and concluded that “it would indeed be tragic if the aftermath of Camelot prevents anthropologists and others from working with AID, the Peace Corps, and other agencies” (Jacobs 1967 p. 365). In a recent review of the episode, spurred by a strikingly similar project of recent years, the Minerva Initiative¹², Ron Robins writes that

> Almond argued that closed borders and gatekeepers — a by-product of restrictive defense related funding — was the antithesis of good science. Just as a thriving economy hinged upon open markets, science prospered within an open academic milieu.

Jessie Bernard, on the other hand, a well-known sociologist who was part of the original Camelot team, argued that the notion of a non-committed social science was a myth, but the presence of the social scientists in such a project could have important and positive effects. As summarized by Ron Robins,

---

The sociologist Jesse Bernard brushed aside those who criticized Camelot’s participants for selling their soul to the predatory designs of the state and its military establishment. As for the integrity of the social sciences, in general, Bernard had no patience for nostalgic reconstructions of a pristine academy. In fact, she argued that as far as the United States was concerned, an immaculate academic enterprise had never existed. The modern university was tied cheek and jowl to the nation state, and any suggestion to the contrary was either disingenuous or masterfully misinformed. (...) Bernard argued that the presence of competent social scientists embedded in military projects had an overtly benign effect as sociologists and their intellectual kin often offered alternatives to the military’s knee-jerk recourse to violence. Bernard argued that in modern conflicts research may actually contribute to conflict avoidance and resolution. Bernard and other key Camelot explained that “every example of violence in a conflict may be said to represent a failure in strategy. For when, or if, strategic solutions are available, strategy may supplant violence.”

Galtung’s article was an effort to see the problem from the perspective of the Latin American social sciences, and his conclusions and recommendations are very moderate. He did not see any problem, in principle, in the fact that research projects would have political purposes, or were financed by the military. But these political intents and source of financing should be presented openly, which was not the case with Camelot. A second requirement should be that the outcomes of the projects should be unclassified, and not appropriated by the sponsor. Less trivially, he makes a plea for more symmetry between researchers in the developed and the developing countries, and for more internationalization in the conduct of such projects. Social scientists in developing countries should have full participation in the development of the projects, the management of the data, and the authorship of published articles; research dealing with potentially conflictive situations should better not be done by the interested parties, but by researchers of non-committed countries.

These recommendations were never implemented, and the conflicting points of view of Camelot and its aftermath were never reconciled. One consequence, however, is that US social scientists willing to work in Latin America became much more aware of the needs and perspectives of their colleagues south of the
Equator, and much more critical of the traditional American lack of perception
and appreciation of other people’s cultures and points of view. This may have
facilitated their relationships with their counterparts in other countries, but may
also, on the long run, reduced the support international outreach received from
their own government.

**8.2 The Rockefeller Foundation and the demise of the development university**

_University Development in the Third World_, published by James S. Coleman\(^\text{13}\) and
David Court in 1993 but written several years earlier) is a precious post-mortem
of the efforts of the Rockefeller Foundation to foster the creation of
“development universities” in the Third World (Coleman and Court 1993). As
they described it, in 1961 the Trustees of the Rockefeller Foundation initiated a
major program to support selected universities in the Third World, the
University Development Program. This was an effort to build on the
Foundation’s previous decades of experiences of international outreach, and to
concentrate on what the universities thought they could do best, institution
building, described by Coleman as “the combination of its explicit long-term
commitment to specific universities; its field-staff operating mode, however
incompletely applied; its breadth of disciplinary engagement and the
concomitant concern, however insubstantially fulfilled, for the development of
the institution as a whole; and the close integration of its fellowship program
into a particular institution-building commitment” (Coleman 1984 p. 184).

In the following years, the Foundation concentrated resources on twelve
universities in Latin America, Africa an Asia. What happened with these
universities depended on the way they were approached, but also on events that
went much beyond what the Rockefeller Foundation could do, as in Africa.
Overall, Coleman and Court are able to point out four main achievements of
these efforts. First, the establishment of academic communities, research
traditions and scholarly values in the supported universities; second, the
advanced professional training of more than one thousand able individuals who

\(^{13}\) James Smoot Coleman, the political scientist, not to be confused with James Samuel Coleman,
the sociologist who became famous as the author of the Coleman Report on American education.
returned to build these academic communities and to play national and international leadership roles, both in universities and in public office. Third, the catalytic role that led to the involvement of other international agencies projects of international outreach. Fourth, through the visiting faculty program, the internationalization of American scholarship. On the negative side, Coleman and Court note the absence of an equity dimension in the programs, the failure of the attempts to promote interdisciplinarity, and the failure to develop regional centers of excellence. At the end, say the authors,

Perhaps the most disappointing outcome of the UDP [University Development Program] was the failure to generate an identifiable intellectual product – a new way of thinking about universities in developing countries, a new way to conceptualize development studies, some headway in reconstructing approaches to interdisciplinary research and training. (...) This issue became important when the Foundation, with its change of title from UDP to EFD [Education for Development Program], appeared to endorse and join the historical search for a new type of university – the development university (Coleman and Court 1993 p. 339).

One of the most striking failures of the Rockefeller Foundation was the investment it did on the Federal University of Bahia (UFBA), in the city of Salvador, Brazil. Bahia is one of Brazil’s poorest states, and the city of Salvador, Brazil’s first capital, contains the largest black population of any city outside Africa, ruled by a small white and mixed-blood elite. It has some of the oldest higher education institutions of the country, the faculties of Medicine and Law, dating from the early 19th century, which were incorporated to the new Federal university when it was established in 1946. The decision to invest on UFBA, instead of doing it in one of Brazil’s leading universities in other states, was based on the idea that, with appropriate support, this regional institution could become a truly development university, and contribute to reduce the development imbalances among Brazilian regions. Between 1974 and 1983, the Foundation invested about 10 million dollars in UFBA, with very little results (about US$ 33 million in 2009 values).

What went wrong? From the detailed analysis provided by Coleman and Court, it is clear that the decision to make this investment was taken without a proper
understanding of the social and institutional nature of Bahia and its university, and was based on illusory ideas about what a “development university” should be like. Looking back, they note that “Bahian politics are reputedly vicious and vendetta-prone. Such a system, in which no authority can succeed alone, clearly is inimical to stability, predictability, or institutionalization of innovation or change, particularly where sate-university collaboration (as in health and agriculture) is so crucial” (p. 77). The resources were channeled through the university rector, who established a special outfit for their use, PROPED (Program for Research and Educational Development), which was supposed to house two new programs, a Master’s in Community Medicine, and a Master’s in Economics, that however never engaged the university faculty and never got proper accreditation. At end, they note that the experience “demonstrated the consequences of members of an external donor agency becoming evangelical proponents of a nostrum-like formula and set of objectives, as well as direct-participants in their pursuit, in a little-understood foreign culture and situation” (p. 79).

Beyond the specific problems of implementation, the failure of UFBA challenged the whole conception of a “development university” the Rockefeller Foundation was trying to put forward, together with other foundations and government agencies engaged in international outreach in those golden years. As described by Coleman and Court, the assumption at the time was that universities in the Third World had something central and special to contribute to the destiny of new nations that set them apart from established universities in the industrialized world:

Universities should continue to improve the relevance of teaching and research and contribute to manpower development. They role however should go beyond these traditional functions and incorporate an expanded sense of purposes for their realization. Universities were to take responsibility for such things as increasing food production, addressing the poverty of rural populations, advising governments on housing construction, as well as social engineering to improve ethnic balance and national integration. The new touchstones of university quality were its vocational
and service contribution and its social commitment (Coleman and Court, 1993, p. 295).

The problem with this view, however, as the authors reflected on this experience, was that it neglected the need for the universities to develop as well-established and esteemed institutions in terms of their more classical functions, before they could perform broader roles. A crucial component in this process would be the incorporation of research, associated with a strong faculty committed to the values of education and scholarship. In the conclusion of their assessment of the Rockefeller experience, Coleman and Court write that

The developmental contribution of universities resides not in their precise impact upon particular material goals but in the successful accomplishment that things which universities alone are capable of offering, including the creation of knowledge, understanding and intellectual integrity. In this sense a university is as much a measure of development as a vehicle for it. The things that the universities have shown that they can do well are teaching and research. The measure of its success lies less in their effectiveness as extension agents than in the quality of the intellectual life which they provide for their transient students (p. 308).

After twenty years the University Development Program, renamed midway as “Education Development Program”, came to an end. The reasons for it were not the eventual mistakes committed, which could be corrected after a proper evaluation of the experience of twenty years, but “had to do with the fact that it run out of intellectual steam. The long-term commitment and original vision could not reproduce themselves”. “With the phasing out of the program in 1983 the Rockefeller Foundation entered a period of several years when its international activities lacked rationale, coherence and conviction” (p. 350). Times had changed, beliefs on the benefits of international outreach had waned, and it was difficult to see what to do next.

8.3 The Ford Foundation: from academic research to social activism and human rights

Ford Foundation played a very important role in the creation of academic and research institutions in different countries in Latin America, and in providing the
social sciences community with support in the years of authoritarian repression. Daniel Levy, compiling data from different sources, showed that Ford Foundation spent about 73 million dollars in support for Latin American universities between 1959 and 1984. He also shows how these investments decreased dramatically, from a peak of 26 million dollars in 1965-1969 to a little more than two million in 1980-1984, a pattern also followed by the US Agency for International Development, AID, and, as we have seen, by the Rockefeller Foundation. Most of the support was given to universities in the more developed countries in the region, with Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico as the largest recipients, places where the chances of having a strong impact in introducing institutional change and fostering research was believed to be stronger.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Ford Foundation investments in Latin American universities, 1959-1984 (millions of US dollars)</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Country</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brasil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>other countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Levy 2005, Appendix H

Levy discusses the reasons for this drop in support, and lists, among other things, the growing belief in the US and in agencies such as the World Bank that universities were elite institutions, that investment in higher education was socially regressive, and that, in any case, they were not fulfilling the “development” role that they were expected to play. There was also a clear link with the political changes in the region. In Chile, where Ford Foundation supported a major cooperation program between the Universidad de Chile and the University of California, most of the support was withdrawn after Pinochet’s intervention in the universities. In Argentina, support dwindled rapidly after the General Carlos Ongania’s coup against the Humberto Illia government in 1965 and the violent intervention in the Universidad de Buenos Aires, causing hundreds of academics to resign (Morero, Eidelman, and Lichtman 2002; Rotunno, de Guijarro, and Garcia 2003). In Brazil, where the universities were less affected by the 1964 military took-over, support remained until the early seventies, but also dropped later on.
Besides the misgivings on the donor’s side, these changes were also a consequence of the growing identification of Ford Foundation officers with the Latin American scientists they supported, and who were victims of political repression by the new military regimes. The way these perceptions changed can be followed by an examination of internal documents of the Ford Foundation archives in education in Brazil which this author had a chance to study for an article written on the occasion of the Foundations’ 30th anniversary of activities in Brazil (Schwartzman 1993a)\textsuperscript{14}. 

It is probably not by chance that the first of these documents, written in 1960, dealt with the universities, the second, in 1965, with secondary education, and the third, of 1970, with basic education. This sequence may reflect an evolution from an initial concern with elite reform, to an effort to reach broader and broader social groups, expressing a growing skepticism about what elites could actually do to improve the lot of the underprivileged.

The 1960 report was signed by Oliver C. Carmichael (no references to other names or institutional affiliations), who wrote it on behalf of the "Foundation Committee," which visited 17 Brazilian universities in that year.\textsuperscript{15} The image they got from Brazilian higher education was not very flattering:

> Based on U.S. standards, higher education in Brazil is unorganized, confused, if not chaotic, and generally of low quality. This does not mean that it is hopeless. In most instances, progress is being made (...). Interest is focused mostly on science and

\textsuperscript{14}The section that follows is based on excerpts from this chapter. It refers only to activities on education, but the Foundation played very important roles in the strengthening of the fields of economics, political science, anthropology and others in the region. For disclosure, I benefited from a Ford Foundation fellowship for my doctoral studies in political science at the University of California, Berkeley, in the years 1967-1968. The fellowship was associated with the support Ford Foundation was providing to the newly created Department of Political Sciences at my Brazilian alma mater, the Federal University of Minas Gerais. In 1964, with the military coup, I had been forced out of the university, and had to leave the country. The expectation was that, with democratization, I would be able to return to the university and join my former colleagues in the new department. However, this return became impossible after the recrudescence of authoritarianism that followed the "Institutional Act 5" of December 1968. In Rio de Janeiro, I worked since 1969 with the Instituto Universitário de Pesquisas of the Cândido Mendes institute (IUPERJ) and the Brazilian School of Public Administration of the Getúlio Vargas Foundation (EBAP), both private institutions that also received support from Ford Foundation in those years. \textsuperscript{15}Report to Ford Foundation on Universities in Brazil and Suggestions for Possible Aid for Brazilian Higher Education.
technology. The conception of a complete university with humanistic-social studies, general scientific instruction for the non-scientist, undergraduate and graduate curricula, such as we take for granted in the United States, is not exemplified in a single university in Brazil. The notion of a university library ( . . . ) is practically absent from educational thinking."

The closest they found to the American model were the Faculties of Philosophy, Sciences and Letters, established in Brazil in the 1930s side by side with the traditional professional faculties, as places for secondary school teacher training, undergraduate education in the sciences and the humanities, and whenever possible (in fact, only at the Universidade de São Paulo, and, to a smaller degree, in Rio de Janeiro), places for graduate education and research. The Committee’s main recommendation was to use the Faculties of Philosophy to create the real universities Brazil needed.

For the report, the main reason why Brazilians did not turn their Faculties of Philosophy into the seeds of real universities was because they did not know how to do it, did not have a pattern to follow. Thus the main recommendation: to take one of the most promising faculties, invest resources on it, and turn it as a pattern for the whole country. Two things could do the trick in "three to four years." First, to create a central library, based on "a trained librarian gifted in promoting interest in books, in making the library a popular place, with a browsing room and attractive displays of new books"; and second, to groom in the U.S. a small group of young university people, spending "as much as two years studying university administration with particular reference to liberal education and its relation to undergraduate, technical and professional education" to lead the institution. The consequences if such small investments would be enormous:

"(1) It would demonstrate what constitutes a real university with its undergraduate and graduate programs of humanities, social sciences and natural sciences, coordinated in such manner as to produce the highest quality of teaching and research in the most economical way; (2) it would also point the way to the development of the Faculties of Philosophy as the coordinating element in the
university structure (. . .); it would provide a pattern for the development of university libraries."

It would be difficult to find a better and more naïve example of what would be called, a few years later, "cultural imperialism." There is no reference, in the document, to the ideas of the people involved with Brazilian higher education. The mission was well impressed, however, by the rector of the Universidade de São Paulo, Antônio Barros Ulhoa Cintra: "he has been in the United States three times (. . .). He speaks English, a little slowly at times, but very well. He appears to have great respect and admiration for the American university system."

The committee did not notice, or did not care, that Brazilian higher education was patterned on the European, Napoleonic model, and could not be transformed by a simple demonstration into the American one; no attempt was made to understand why the old notion that the Faculties of Philosophy, Sciences and Letters should become the coordinating center of the universities had failed in the previous thirty years; no mention was made to the role of government in the regulation of the professions and of higher education, to the history of political activism among the university students, or to the roles the universities played in granting professional credentials to a small section of the population. They were certainly unaware of the irony implicit in their suggestion that the Universidade de São Paulo should provide the model for the rest of the country; in the 1930's, the Brazilian government tried to make the Rio de Janeiro university (then called the Universidade do Brasil) to play this role, and the Universidade de São Paulo was created precisely in opposition and resistance against this drive toward centralization and standardization (Schwartzman 1991 p. 105-136).

Thankfully, the Ford Foundation did not follow these recommendations, but a much more cautious path, dealing with secondary education at first, supporting the development of materials for science teaching, teacher training and a pilot project in basic education, as well as some selected graduate programs, particularly in the social sciences.
In 1965 another mission arrived, headed by the President of the University of Minnesota, Meredith Wilson. Differently from the previous one, this mission tried to be very perceptive about Brazilian realities, and provided much better advice. The report starts, patronizingly, by stating that "the mission originated no new ideas; Brazilians know their problems, and many have bold solutions." Talking about rote learning and high dropout rates in primary school, they hasten to add that "Brazilian children are a delight; their spontaneity and enthusiasm even in formal classroom conditions is wonderful indeed." The problems of overcrowding in inadequate schools were couched by the statement that "Brazilians are very efficient in the use of space." Their evaluations and recommendations, however, were very perceptive, and were not affected by these peccadilloes. Looking at primary (four year) education, they observed, with premonition, that "Brazilians perhaps tend to place too much emphasis on bricks and mortar. One senses the feeling that no building is better than one which is not of the latest design." They noted the lack of books and teaching materials in the schools, and thought that this could explain the predominance of root learning, which would explain in turn the high dropout rates they saw in the statistics they were given. They accepted these data at their face value, but challenged the dominant assumption that students left the school because they had to work, and looked for alternative explanations. Lower and upper secondary education (5-8 and 9-11) was seen as an antiquated, elite oriented system based on discriminatory admission exams at the entrance and a "dark cloud" at the end, the university entrance examinations. Looking at the content of secondary education, they observed how the legislation allowed for much more flexibility and innovation than were actually practiced, and how teaching was distant from reality:

"... little effort has been made to adapt the curriculum to local condition, and it seems to the mission members that insufficient attention is given to making the curriculum relevant to the interests and needs of the students. One would like to see

---

16 Ford Foundation Report on Secondary Education Mission to Brazil, August 1965. Meredith Wilson, Chairman, President of the University of Minnesota; John O'Neil, Dean of Graduate School of Education, Rutgers University; Melvin Barnes, Superintendent of Schools, Portland, Oregon; Alden Dunham, Director of Admission, Princeton University.
much more attention paid to current events, social problems, and the meaning of
democratic government.

Most of the comments and recommendations dealt with the preparation
of secondary school teachers. They noted that teachers received too little general
education, and that "in some instances study in depth goes further than the
realities of secondary teaching suggest it should." They were skeptical about
general pedagogy ("just as this course is suspect in the United States, so
Brazilians might as well take a look to see if the content is sufficiently rigorous"),
educational psychology ("Brazilians are especially taken by the importance of
psychology") and school administration. They were also appalled by the teacher
employment picture ("atrocious") and could not see beyond the haze of the
educational bureaucracy: "school administration in Brazil is a real can of worms.
By North American standards there is none." They noted that "the tone and
atmosphere of a school is set by the principal who heads it," and tried to put
forward some suggestions which were probably in the wrong direction, like
strengthening the state departments of education, and reducing the freedom the
private schools had in hiring their teachers. Finally, they noted the absence of
reliable statistics, a hindrance to the realistic planning they deemed necessary to
put in place. For the Ford Foundation, the mission recommended that it should
help to increase Brazil’s awareness to the need to increase expenditures in
education (from 2 to 4% of GNP), assistance to the development and distribution
of curricular materials, the reorganization of the university entrance
examinations, support to the development of educational statistics, and a more
active role in teacher training and the establishment of experimental secondary
schools associated with the universities. The final recommendation was that the
Foundation officers should follow up the meetings held by the mission with key
Brazilian leaders: "an investment in men might be as good a handle as any that
can be found for educational improvement."

The third document, of 1970, was prepared after a Conference on the
educational experience of convened by the Ford Foundation in May, 1970, in
Buenos Aires.17 In those years, dependency theory was on the rise, and many countries (including Brazil, Chile, Argentina and Peru) were under military dictatorships. The Latin Americans bombarded the Ford Foundation officers with the dangers of cultural and philanthropic imperialism and the need to take ideologies and social class considerations in their activities. The policy statement draft was very precise in reproducing the Latin American views on these matters, while stressing that they were the Latin Americans', not the North Americans' point of view. "It was stated clearly," said the draft, "that the task of combining methods and resources to gain educational development is not only technical in nature; it is also ideological, ethical and moral." "Some felt," the document goes on, "that most efforts to 'modernize' education are, in the main, importations of educational trends in developed countries which further economic, technical and cultural dependency." Agreeing or not, the document emphasized that the Foundation must be sensitive and responsive to these themes shared through the region, and was glad to notice that the Foundation was accepted as a partner in the process of development and change, and that more Latin Americans must be involved in the process of developing its programs. The document conceded, furthermore, that "education is a creation of a society as part of the general socialization process," and as such it was not neutral, but could play either a conservative or an innovative role, depending of the group and sector promoting it. More to the point, the report concluded that, "while debate and consideration of ideology and educational goals are urgently called for and desired ( . . .), there is a cold, hard reality that must be faced. It may be that the education which is actually received by those lucky enough to gain the opportunity has little to do with the goals and plans set by the policy makers. The system has little capacity to respond to their dictates."

The basic recommendation of the report was that educational change in the region could only come about as a fruit of the labors of Latin Americans, and that the Foundation could help supporting the creation of a competent, modern leadership. Educational research and development should be strengthened, and the decision-making capacity of key institutions should be increased. The research component should not be limited to specialists on education, but "based upon the disciplines of the social and behavioral scientists"; and should include practical, as well as conceptual and analytic components: "not only must the purely epistemological issues be confronted; we must also be concerned with the problems of implementation, including feasibility and outcome"; "there should be some leverage effect [in research activities], in the sense that findings should reflect existing resource allocation decisions." There was also a recommendation not to use the Foundation's resources to establish some kind of new, large and multi-functional regional institution, as suggested by some participants in the conference. Instead, the policy should be to work with the existing institutions, and, because of the training component, there was also a "clear bias toward the university base in whatever form may be possible and consistent with the type of research to be stressed in a given situation".

In those years, officers of the Ford Foundation in Latin America were involved in protecting former grantees from the military repression, providing them with fellowships in the country and abroad, and finding ways of providing support for private institutions where they could continue to work away from the universities from where they were expelled, and in protecting human rights in general (Puryear 1991; Puryear 1994). One example was the endowment provided to CEBRAP (Centro Brasileiro de Análise e Planejamento), a think tank created in São Paulo by Fernando Henrique Cardoso and other colleagues who had been expelled from the University of São Paulo by the military.

In the seventies and eighties, Ford Foundation continued to support education and other applied fields, but became ever more involved with issues of human rights and social promotion (Sikkink 1993). The table of contents of a celebratory book published on its 40th anniversary in Brazil, in 2002 summarizes
the story of its transition: chapter 1, from agricultural production to sustainable development; chapter 2, from science teacher training to education reform; chapter 3, from population studies to reproductive health; chapter 4, from public administration to democratic participation; chapter 5, from social analysis to human rights (Brooke and Witoshynsky 2002). In 2004, for the first time, the Ford Foundation office in Brazil stopped providing support to education, putting all its weight on issues such as race-based affirmative action, environment protection, the strengthening of civil society and sexuality and reproductive health.

8.4 The World Bank and the dilemmas of international outreach

The best illustration of the transformations and dilemmas of international outreach by the end of the 20th century was the World Bank under the leadership of James Wolferson, who headed the institution between 1995 and 2005 (from Bill Clinton to George W. Bush) and was the subject of a lively study by Sebastian Mallaby (Mallaby 2004).

The World Bank was created after World War II, as as part of the Bretton Woods agreements, as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, to make loans to governments in order to rebuild railroads, highways, bridges, ports and other infrastructure that had been destroyed or damaged by the War (see Kapur, Lewis, and Webb 1997 for an authoritative history of its first fifty years). In 1968, under Robert McNamara, the Bank made a dramatic shift on its priorities, placing the issues of poverty at its core (Ayres 1983), and, at the same, invested heavily in transforming the bank into a world-class “intellectual actor”. With around 800 professional economists and a budget of about 25 million dollars a year for research, the Bank became the world’s largest economics research institution, mostly dedicated to applied economics and development studies, but including also specialists in sociology, political science, demography, statistics, education and other related disciplines (Stern and Ferreira 1997).

To deal with poverty, the Bank increased its investment in the social sector (education, environment, population, water supply and sanitation), and shifted
its priorities from Europe to middle-income developing countries that had the ability to contract its loans (the graphics below are based on Kapur and others, 1997, table 1-1, p.6).

Education, according to the economic theories of human capital, was considered to be, at the same time, a direct investment in the well being of individuals and in productivity of the economy as a whole. In the 1970s and 1980s, the World Bank had concluded, from estimations of rates of return, that it was necessary to give priority to basic education, where the returns were higher, and reduce public investments in higher education, which should be supported as much as possible by those who benefited from it (Psacharopoulos and Hinchliffe 1973; Psacharopoulos and Patrinos 2004). In the late 1990s, the Bank realized the importance of science, technology and higher education for development, producing a series of documents supporting this view (Chen and Dahlman 2004; De Ferranti, Perry, Gill, Guasch, and Schady 2002; World Bank 1994; World Bank 1998; World Bank 2002). A comprehensive overview of the initiatives in the areas of science and technology showed that the Bank had lent $8.6 billion dollars to directly support S&T activities through 647 projects for the 1980-2004 period, corresponding to 11% of all Bank's projects at the time (Crawford,
Yammal, Yang, and Brezenoff 2006 p. 10-12). Most of these resources went for projects in the agricultural sector, but there were also projects to support the development of science, technology and higher education.

In their review, Crawford and others note how support for science and technology fell in the early 1990s, and their views of the experience are not very flattering: “maybe with the exception of long-term support to agricultural research, the analysis of S&T projects over the last 25 years reveals no consistent approach or strategy on the part of the Bank toward developing S&T capacity in its client countries”. (...) “Regarding nonagricultural projects in general, the Bank’s approach has been ad hoc, experimenting with different mechanisms for different circumstances as they occurred.” (pp. 27-28). In 1990s, the Bank started what was called the “Millenium Science Initiative”, a project to support a small number of high quality scientific research centers in some African and Latin American countries. This was a decision taken at the Bank's high levels of authority, without significant involvement of its own technical staff, and its benefits do not seem to have been very significant.

As described by Mallaby, James Wolferson took office in Madrid while street demonstrators demanded the closure of the Bank, shouting that “fifty years is enough”. They charged the Bank with being an arm of the International Monetary Fund in the implementation of adjustment policies that were forcing the poor countries to cut their budgets, dismantle their welfare systems, privatize public companies and open their economies to international capitalism; and also for providing support for corrupt dictatorships which happened to side with the West in the cold war. The image of the World Bank economist travelling first class from Washington to a third world capital, carrying a case with money for corrupt dictators, became engraved in the public image, and the structural adjustments being forced upon the countries were perceived as products of a deleterious pact between the bureaucrat and the autocrat.

To a large extent, this situation had developed as a consequence of the Bank’s alignment with the United States foreign policy during the cold war, and also with the structural adjustment policies implemented worldwide by the
International Monetary Fund as a response to the debt crisis in the 1980s. The adjustment policies sponsored by the IMF were not helping most countries to reactivate their economies, and the Bank's association with these policies collided with its efforts to become a champion of policies against poverty. The criticisms that the Bank could have to the adjustment policies, clearly expressed in the writings of Joseph Stiglitz\(^{18}\), referred mostly to the way these adjustments were implemented, but not about their need from a macroeconomic point of view. The problems seemed to be associated to the questions of good governance, but were broader than just the issues of political corruption. In the years of the cold war, the World Bank had supported the Suharto regime in Indonesia, for instance, believing that the priority was to help the economy to grow and to keep the country aligned with the West, even if, in this process, some people got unduly rich and the democratic principles were violated (Bastiaens 2009). The adjustment crisis showed however that, when the time came to reduce public expenditures, privatize public companies and improve the quality of social spending, the fact that the government was acting with competence and responsibility or just interested in keeping power and distributing benefits to its cronies made a big difference. Countries that were well governed at the time, such as Uganda, China and Chile, found ways to put the international resources to good use and overcome the crisis, while others, such as the Philippines, Indonesia and Bolivia, did not. The Bank's technical staff were aware if this situation, but, being a multilateral agency, it was impossible for the institution to act against the wills of its members and independently from its main shareholder, the United States.

Wolferson worked to change this situation, creating or recovering the Bank’s image as a caring institution, concerned about poverty and the environment, and intolerant with corruption. To care for the environment, the Bank introduced strict requirements for environment impact assessments of its projects, and reduced support to the construction of water dams that could lead to the dislocation of populations, threats to native species and lead to environment

\(^{18}\) Stiglitz was Senior Vice President and Chief Economist for the World Bank between 1997 and 2000, when he was fired because of his criticisms to the adjustment policies.
degradation. To stay away from corrupt governments, the Bank started to provide resources directly to the populations in need, rather than to governments or public bureaucracies, or to tie its loans or donations to mechanisms and institutions that could assure that they would be properly used. Reform of the public sector in developing and transition countries, with the creation of modern and efficient institutions, became a priority.

Thus, he tried to give new life to the project of Robert McNamara to make the fight against poverty the first priority, but with one important difference. While McNamara was the quintessential technocrat, building the Bank's research capabilities and trying to find the best ways to deal with the issues of poverty, Wolferson considered that the Bank had to hear and respond to the demands and criticism coming from non-governmental organizations, and to be as radical as possible on its commitment with the poor, bypassing if necessary its own experts and their views. In this process, he also came often in conflict with the banks' staff, who saw their established practices questioned and often overruled by the shifting ideological changes at the top (Castro 2002)

Perhaps the main criticism that Mallaby makes of Wolferson's period was about his attempt to make the Bank to attend to contradictory demands of all its clients, and to be everything to everybody. It was an impossible balancing act. Politicians and activists in non-governmental organizations, who depend on the constant mobilization of its supporters and exposure in the mass media to survive, tend to see and interpret the world in black and white, and their ties with their local constituencies are more important than the eventual complexities of the real world. Mallaby is particularly harsh, in his book, on his criticism against the US-based non-governmental organizations which he calls "the Berkeley mafia". He examines in detail an extreme case, the polemics created around a proposed loan to build a dam in Qinhai, China, in the Tibet region. This project was considered by the Chinese and many experts within the bank as of high interest of the population in the region, but was violently contested by non-governmental organizations in England the United States. At the end, the pressures from the local NGOs prevailed. As Mallaby describes it, the
The siege of the NGOs, visible in the streets around the World Bank headquarters in Washington, was introduced within the Bank itself. To placate the opposition from the missionaries, the Bank hired some of their representatives, created rules that reflected their values, and swore to obey them. The outcome was a development organization that gradually lost its contacts with the developing countries, being more influenced by the political agendas of the activists in the North, than by the difficult circumstances of its poor clients.

As the Bank embraced the readjustment policies in the 80s and the new social agendas of the 90s and later years, it may have lost some of its credibility with the broader the "epistemic community" of economists and policy specialists within and outside the bank who provided intellectual guidance to its policies in the past, but was never able to assure the trust of the new constituencies based on non-governmental organizations involved with the issues of human rights, poverty and the environment. In 1983, when Bank started to move to include "social pricing" considerations in their projects, a study showed that the changes were strongly resisted by Bank's technical staff, because, among other things, they were perceived as lowering their professional and technical standards. As stated by the author,

I have argued that the viability of a development objective or strategy to be implemented through the World Bank depends not only on the acquiescence of the obvious international actors - the nation states through their formal institutional representation and their various pressures - but also on its congruence with the professional role models of the relevant staff. If the staff perceives the strategy or objective as a "decline in standards," as requiring them to become more "political" vis-a-vis the borrower governments, as requiring yet-to-be-perfected techniques, or simply as clashing with their principles, its viability is doubtful unless altered role models can be quickly inculcated, new incentives provided, or rapid staff turnover undertaken (Ascher 1983)

Adler and Haas have interpreted this situation in terms of the shifting epistemic communities within the Bank and its consequences:
The involvement of new epistemic communities caused the World Bank to lurch from support of one series of development goals and policies to another, varying from building infrastructures to eliminating poverty to encouraging export-oriented growth. Throughout this episode, the development-oriented food aid epistemic community sought to promote its own preferred economic policies, in competition with other epistemic communities and subject to the strong institutional pressures within the World Bank. When an epistemic community loses its consensus, its authority is diminished and decision makers tend to pay less attention to its advice (Adler and Haas 1992 p. 385).

During the Wolferson period these tensions intensified, among other things by the introduction of new actors in the external interactions and in the very institutional fabric of the Bank, the non-governmental organizations and their representatives. In a detailed review of the extensive research activities of the World Bank through the years, Stern and Ferreira note that, among the persons interviewed for their review, few of them “saw the Bank as having a major role of intellectual leadership in the economics profession” (p. 597). They believe, however, that this is as it should be, given the Bank’s characteristics as a project-oriented agency, and not an independent research institutions or university.

Being a large and complex institution, the Bank continued to develop analyses, publish reports and implement projects both in the new and the more traditional sectors, sometimes with good results, sometimes with less – but it never became the world champion institution for economic development and poverty reduction, as dreamed by Robert McNamara and James Wolferson. Meanwhile, the new emphasis placed by the Bank on issues of poverty, human rights and climate change were also adopted by other international organizations, private foundations universities and research centers in the US and other parts of the world, replacing the old agenda of economic development and modernization.

8.5 Intellectual underpinnings: dependency theory and cultural criticism.

In their text on the Latin America area studies, Paul Drake and Lisa Hilbink mention “dependency theory” as one of the important theoretical contributions of Latin Americans to the social sciences, eagerly adopted by many US Latin Americanists in the 1970s and 1980s. US social scientists became aware of this
theory through Cardoso and Faletto’s book on “Dependency and Development in Latin America”, published originally in 1969 in Spanish and with many later editions in English and other languages (Cardoso and Faletto 1979). The idea of interpreting the relations between countries through the notions of domination and exploitation that Marx has developed for the relations among classes, in fact, was not new, and can be linked back, among others, to V. I. Lenin’s book on imperialism, to the French anthropologist Georges Balandier writings on the impact of colonization in Africa, to the theories of Raul Prebisch on the problems of economic development in third-world economies, and to the writings of Andrew Gunder Frank on underdevelopment (Balandier 1951; Frank 1967; Lenin 1937; Prebisch 1950). Cardoso and Faletto’s book has been strongly revised and criticized both by supporters and opponents (Cardoso 1973; Cardoso and Font 2001; Frank 1978; Frank, Chew, and Denemark 1996; Furtado 1974; Henshel 1979; Kahl 1976; Packenham 1978; Packenham 1992), and Cardoso himself produced a thoughtful interpretation of the origins and impact of his book in the US (Cardoso 1977). More significant than the origins and conceptual validity of its propositions, perhaps, is the welcome it received among Latin American specialists in the US, where it provided the basis for opposition to the US foreign policy and a common language between these specialists and many of their colleagues in the South. Thanks to dependency theory, to be a Latin Americanist did not require anymore to endorse the US foreign policy, or its support to Latin American authoritarian regimes, or the war in Vietnam. Now, it meant to help Latin Americans in their nationalist and anti-imperialist struggles for economic development and national independence, and to be placed at the left of the US government in the ways to approach the issues of the Cold War.

Beyond dependency, a new, more radical ideological revision was taking place, less among social sociologists and political scientists in the South than among anthropologists and language specialists in the North, associated with the broad fields of post-modern literary critical theory and cultural studies. It would be impossible to attempt an overview of these trends, derived from the works of the Frankfurt School (Theodor W. Adorno, Walter Benjamin, Erich Fromm, Max
Horkheimer, Herbert Marcuse) and French intellectuals (Jean Baudrillard, Gilles Deleuze, Jacques Derrida, Michael Foucault, Félix Guattari, Jean-François Lyotard) and their entrance in the North American academic circles since the 1960s.

In Latin America, some of these ideas came out in *Prospero’s Mirror*, a small book by Richard M. Morse, a US historian and Latin Americanist who had written some well-known books on urban history and the city of São Paulo, and worked as a consultant for the Ford Foundation in 1958–64 and again in 1973–75 (Needell 2001). In this book, published in Portuguese and Spanish, but never in English (Morse 1982; Morse 1988), Morse proposed a radical revision of the history and interpretation of Latin American culture and civilization. It is possible to trace the core of Morse’s ideas to those of his mentor, Louis Hartz, who had tried to explain the failures of American liberalism for its lack of a feudal past (Hartz 1955), and, more broadly, to the romantic, irrationalist thinking that prevailed in the German academic circles in the years after World War I and led ultimately totalitarianism and fascism (Ringer 1990).

Fascinated with the Western developed countries, Morse argued, the Latin Americans do not perceive that liberalism, representative democracy, rationalism, scientific empiricism, pragmatism, all these ideals propagated by the rich countries in the North are not only incompatible with the deeper roots of Iberian America, but also manifestations of the decay and lack of meaning of the very capitalist bourgeois society that created these ideas (Morse 1989; Schwartzman 1997). However, if Latin Americans looked at their own roots, they could find a much more significant tradition, which could help them to transcend the individualism and lack of meaning of their attempts to mimic the Western societies. These roots had two parts. One was the civilizational project of the Spanish conquerors, which had successfully brought together State and Church and had, therefore, a strong moral and ethical component that provided an external and firm point of reference for the individuals. The second was some kind of native sense of communal identity and participation derived from the

---

19 What follows is a summary of two articles I wrote criticizing Morse's book, published initially in Estudos CEBRAP and republished in Schwartzman 1977. See also Morse's (Morse 1989).
pre-Colombian civilizations, which emerged in some episodes of popular insurrections and were captured in the writings of authors such as the Peruvian José Carlos Mariátegui. The problem with Latin America was that its leaders forgot these authentic roots and tried, vainly, to copy the model of the modern, liberal and decadent societies of Western Europe and the United States.

From these premises, Morse derived a devastating attack on all the attempts to build Western-type universities and academic research in Latin America, which have engaged so many Latin Americans and cooperation entities such as the Ford Foundation in previous years. His strongest criticism goes to the, in his view, bogus intellectuals in the South that attempt to monkey the decadent universities of the North, and to develop, through academic professionalization, a better knowledge of their societies. The condemnation of the Latin American social scientists – their institutions, their research, their data, their methods of empirical research, their academic congresses, their journals – was not just because of their inability to make proper copies of the Northern models, but of the inadequacy of the very models they were trying to copy. Only through the literature, on one extreme, and through social movements that could resurrect the unconscious roots the authentic Latin American civilization, on the other, would it be possible to understand the meaning and find a sense of direction for the region.

Very few, if any, of the officers in the main international cooperation foundations and agencies endorsed or even understood the full implications of Morse’s ideas.

Still, in the seventies, Morse’s ideas expressed well the irrationalist and post-modernist outlook that became so fashionable in the literary and social science circles in the US, Europe and Latin America (Beverley, Aronna, and Oviedo 1995; Brunner 1988), and helped to put an end to the golden years of attempts to export progress to the third world, paving the way to other approaches and trends.
9. Epistemic communities, old and new

Both for Levy and Coleman, in their assessments of the experiences of international cooperation with universities, the best outcome was the creation of a new generation of academics in different countries who shared a common set of ideas and values that, given appropriate conditions, could play important roles in the development of their societies and in linking them with the developed world. Thanks to international outreach, academic and research disciplines were established or strengthened and new networks were created, bringing together not only persons in third world universities but also researchers in the area studies centers and institutes in the United States and Europe, as well as experts in international organizations and private foundations who had learned to know, trust and cooperate with each other.

Positive expectations about the beneficial roles of networks of international experts are not new (Eide Galtung 1966). The notion that scientific knowledge is based on social communities, with values and motivations that transcend local limitations, has existed for many years (Merton 1973; Polanyi 1997), and have been empirically challenged and tested in recent years by the growing literature on the academic profession.

In his analysis of the Rockefeller experience, James Coleman compares Zaire and Thailand, and points to two main limitations for the creating and maintenance of such communities in those countries, namely receptivity and equity. In both cases, well-qualified academics were sent abroad and returned to their countries. In Zaire, they found an inhospitable environment, from the lack of stable employment opportunities to the resentment and hostility of other colleagues who did not have the opportunity to study abroad. In Thailand, they were much better received, the problem being the high costs of creating the appropriate conditions for their work, which could not be assured on the long run. The second limitation was that in both countries the beneficiaries of the programs of international outreach were recruited by meritocratic criteria, among the local elites, and so the programs reproduced the local stratification of
power and privilege, instead of contributing to mobility and social change (Coleman 1984).

In Brazil, the investments from international cooperation agencies and foundations (including the World Bank and the Inter American Development Bank) were matched and surpassed by Brazilian government resources provided by, among others, the Ministries of Science and Technology, Education and related agencies such as the National Research Council (CNPq) and the Coordination for Graduate Education (CAPES), as well as by the São Paulo State Foundation for Science Support (FAPESP) and similar institutions in other states. These agencies were and still are mostly managed by representatives or officers recruited from Brazil’s scientific community, using established procedures of peer review, and, thanks to their work, Brazil has today the largest graduate education and research establishment in Latin America, with about 10 thousand PhDs graduating every year in all major disciplines, and a growing presence of publications in the international literature. Although in a smaller scale, other Latin American countries, particularly Mexico and Chile, have also developed their academic communities and science support institutions, which are important assets for whatever they have to do now and in the future to improve their economy and society (Schwartzman 2008).

A central assumption for the national and international investments in these scientific communities is the belief that science and science education are inherently good, and scientists and their institutions are a central and indispensable component in the processes of modernization the countries need. Scientists, of course, always like to promote this assumption, which justifies the support they get from society, and this was also the assumption behind the “development universities” fostered by the Rockefeller Foundation in the golden years. There is little disagreement, in general terms, about this assumption, but there many different ways in which this idea can be implemented. In the thirties and forties, there was an intense controversy in some scientific circles about the best way to develop and foster the development of science and technology, whether linking it as strongly as possible to the needs of society or allowing the
scientific community to flourish. On one side, scientists such as J. D. Bernal in England and Jean Perrin in France, inspired by the Soviet Union, argued for strong links and integration between science, technology and governmental planning; on the other, Robert K. Merton and others, afraid of the ideological and political interventions occurring in Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, argued for the need for free, non-ideological, non-politically committed scientific communities. In practice, as we have seen, science and education are never fully autonomous and isolated from the demands and expectations of non-scientific sectors such as the military, the business sector and society as a whole. (Altbach and Finkelstein 1997; Altbach and Lewis 1996; Clark 1997; Enders 2005; Enders and Weert 2009; Musselin 2004). Beyond the polarized debates on whether social sciences should be purely independent and academic or tied up with applied and practical interests, there is a strong literature showing how the modern social sciences are, indeed, part of a broader trend of modernization and democratization, and not less relevant or valid because of that (Desrosières 1990; Wagner, Weiss, Wittrock, and Wollman 1991; Wagner, Wittrock, and Whitley 1991). However, science and education suffer when their institutions lose their autonomy and are forced to respond directly to outside demands and constraints, and one of the main achievements of the American research universities throughout the years has been their ability to maintain their autonomy while, at the same time, trying to respond to the aspirations, demands and sources of support coming from outside.

One of the main casualties of the credibility crisis of international cooperation described above was the belief in the strategic importance of these epistemic communities of scientists and experts in national and international agencies, leading to the emergence of other epistemic communities and networks, as a new set of priorities emerged – human rights, equity, poverty, competitiveness, environment protection, globalization. In this process, the very notion of epistemic communities changed, to include not just scientists, professionals and academics, but many other actors, such as non-governmental organizations and social and political movements.
The expression “epistemic communities” has been used recently in the international relations literature, in this expanded sense, to refer to networks of people and organizations that have been very active providing the basis for important global initiatives, from the old nuclear non-proliferating treaties to the current climate change movement (Adler and Haas 1992; Gough and Simon 2001; Haas 2002; Haas 1992). In their 2001 paper on the epistemic communities of climate change, Gough and Schackley show how non-governmental organizations participated in the networks that elaborated and prepared the main policy propositions for the Kyoto treaty. Working side by side with established research institutions, the NGOs performed three important roles, developing creative policy solutions, coalition building and pressure or lobbying (Gough and Simon 2001 p 334). The positive roles of such coalitions of technical and non-technical actors are part of the more general formulation proposed by Haas and Adler on the role of epistemic communities in international affairs, transcending national and international organizations:

Epistemic communities play an evolutionary role as a source of policy innovations and a channel by which these innovations diffuse internationally. As most of the articles in this volume indicate, the policy ideas of epistemic communities generally evolve independently, rather than under the direct influence of government sources of authority. The impact of epistemic communities is institutionalized in the short term through the political insinuation of their members into the policymaking process and through their ability to acquire regulatory and policymaking responsibility and to persuade others of the correctness of their approach. In the longer term, the institutionalization of epistemic community influence occurs through socialization (…) (Adler and Haas 1992 p. 374)

The main criticism one could make to this formulation is that it is post hoc, based on a series of case studies of successful experiences, and does not give much consideration to situations in which the expansion of epistemic communities leads to disruption, as the case of the World Bank discussed above illustrates.
10. From economic development to human rights

The tumultuous transition from economic development to poverty reduction and human rights in the agenda of international cooperation and outreach had profound effects not only in agencies such as the World Bank, but also in the universities involved in cooperation activities in the United States and other parts of the world, as well as in the epistemic communities that give them support.

One of the oldest human rights academic units in the United States is Columbia University's Center for the Study in Human Rights, established in 1978.20 Like most similar centers created afterwards, it is not an academic department, but a coordinating center that promotes events, publishes documents, offers a summer course and a combination of undergraduate and graduate degrees through the universities’ different colleges, including Barnard College, and academic departments such as the School of International Public Affairs, the Mallman School of Public Health and the School of Law. The Center, as stated on its Website, is “committed to three core goals of providing excellent human rights education to Columbia students, fostering innovative interdisciplinary academic research, and offering its expertise in capacity building to human rights leaders, organizations, and universities around the world”. One of its flagships is the Human Rights Advocacy Program (HRAP), through which a number of human rights activists from different parts of the developing world come the university. According to the site,

The intensive HRAP curriculum is defined by academic coursework, skills-building workshops and networking opportunities with the human rights communities in New York and DC. By the time the Advocates complete the Program in mid-December, they will have acquired the knowledge, skills, and connections necessary to further develop themselves as human rights professionals and their organizations back home.

20 http://hrcolumbia.org/
For the year 2009, the program had advocates coming from Uganda, Afghanistan, Georgia, Thailand, Kyrgyzstan, Kenya, Nepal, Mexico and the United States, most of them associated with non-governmental organizations and think tanks.

At Harvard, human rights programs started later, with the Carr Center for Human Rights Policies at the Kennedy School of Government, established in 1999, the Human Rights Program at Harvard Law School (1985), the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative (2005) and the François-Xavier Bagnoud Center for Health and Human Rights (2008), all loosely coordinated by a University-wide Harvard University Committee on Human Rights Studies. As in Columbia, undergraduate and graduate education is provided through the academic departments, and the Committee and associate centers organize seminars, provide fellowships and opportunities for students to go abroad, and have also a small program of fellowships to support academics at risk of political harassment in different parts of the world.

Similar developments occurred in other universities, and an incomplete list includes the Lowenstein Human Rights Project at Yale’s Law School (1981), the Human Rights Center at the University of California, Berkeley (1994), the International Human Rights Law Program at UCLA, the Center for Human Rights and Global Justice at the New York University School of Law, the Human Rights program at the University of Chicago, the Center for Civic and Human Rights at the University of Notre Dame Law School, and so forth. These new initiatives did not replace the old centers and institutes of area studies, that, however, had their relevance diminished; they either had to change their priorities, bringing the human rights issues to their core, as it happened with Harvard’s David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies, or to become more involved in foreign languages and literature, making use of the support provided by the US Department of Education under Title VI.

Compared with the traditional regional and area studies program, an obvious difference is the preeminence of law schools and law specialists in most of the

21 http://www.humanrights.harvard.edu/
human rights initiatives, in replacement of economists, political scientists and sociologists. Another important difference is that the main partners and beneficiaries of international work and cooperation are no longer universities, research centers, researchers and education authorities in developing countries, but non-academic non-governmental organizations and activists.

With limitations, the cooperation activities carried on in the past helped to establish modern social sciences and economics in different parts of the world, and social scientists from other countries also helped to shape the work of American regional experts, as exemplified by the impact of dependency theory in the US. Economics, political science, sociology and anthropology, in spite of the local biases of their different schools and research traditions, aspire to be universal, and have led to strong traditions of international comparative studies. In contrast, a review made recently of fifty years of efforts to build comparative law as an academic endeavor in the US has shown no significant results. According to the reviewer,

While comparative law has been a considerable success in terms of producing a wealth of knowledge, it has been a resounding failure with regard to its more general development as a field of inquiry: it has failed to mature into an up-to-date, well-defined, and coherent discipline. Comparative law has rarely shown itself capable of generating broad and deep insight of general interest, e.g., into the structure and development of legal systems or into the relationship between law, society, and culture on a regional or worldwide basis. As a result, it does not have the intellectual prominence nor enjoy the academic recognition one would expect in our international age. In some quarters, especially in the United States, this has led to an identity crisis, triggering much soul-searching as well as attempts to find new directions (Reimann 2002 p 685).

Reimann tries to explain this failure for reasons related to law as an academic discipline (“the absence of a sound theoretical framework that can hold the pieces together” and “the continuing lack of an understanding of what it really means to compare”), and to the fact that the intellectual issues of today are the same as of fifty years ago: “its main focus on nation state legal systems of Western capitalist societies, its obsession with the common-civil law dichotomy,
and its preoccupation with private law rules and doctrines, may have been adequate at the time but is now in dire need of a major overhaul” (p. 685); no attempt is made to link this situation with the ways the law specialists in the US relate and interact with their counterparts in other countries.

It is interesting that, in this detailed and erudite review of comparative law, there is no reference to human rights. A possible explanation is that, although the field of human rights, in practice, has been dominated by lawyers, it has been mostly as a discourse developed to protect the individual rights against the harassment of governments or groups (Freeman and Ert 2005), less than a theoretical concern or a research topic. Efforts to establish the normative principles of human rights have come mostly from political theory, philosophy and economics, as in the works of John Rawls and Amartya Sen (Rawls 1972; Sen 1990).

Between the general principles of justice on one side, and the legal defense of individual rights on the other, lies a very complex set of systemic and historical explanations for the development of different human rights regimes or their violations which are preferred subject of political scientists (Landman 2005). However, there is a clear trend, mostly among the young generation of social scientists, to conceive social research as basically an effort to measure the extent to which human rights are being violated or upheld in different societies, and issue the corresponding moral verdicts on the outcomes. This trend has been favored by the emergence of a series of indexes of human development, corruption, freedom and other rights published periodically by international organizations, such as the UNPD Human Development Report and the Corruption Perception Index of Transparency International.

The replacement of social scientists by lawyers and activists, and of social analysis and interpretation by rankings and moral condemnation, have had some unexpected consequences, one of them being the incorporation of the post-modern, anti-scientific and anti-Western perspectives in the human rights movement. The other, paradoxically, was that the intensification of Western biases, opening the human rights movement to criticism from those resisting the implementation of its core values.
It is possible to see the first consequence by following the tendency of many human rights movements to favor direct participation over representative democracy, traditional cultures of indigenous populations over Western culture and education, small-scale economy over large-scale industry and agribusiness, and even traditional over Western-type medicine.

One example are the policies regarding the indigenous populations in America. There is a long and black history of genocide and neglect of the native populations in the region, dating back from centuries of colonization and extending in many places to the present day. In some countries, as in Argentina, the indigenous population was wiped out long ago; in others, like Brazil, the remnant population remained isolated in far-off regions, living in poverty and decimated by disease. In others, like Ecuador, Bolivia, Guatemala, Paraguay and Peru, most or a large part of the population is indigenous, speak their own languages, but are to a large extent excluded from the benefits of modern society and the modern economy, dominated by the white or the assimilated populations. The simple recognition that the natives should have full rights as citizens is not enough to solve this situation:

Electoral democracy dominates the hemisphere, yet theorists of democracy must note that access alone fails to provide adequate rights to marginalized Indian majorities or sufficient protection to distinct ethnic minorities. Beyond regime type or institutional configuration, it is the relationship between state and civil society - the terms of citizenship - that has become the critical component of consolidating and deepening democracy. At the normative level, indigenous peoples remind us that social and cultural rights interact with institutional guarantees and that truly universal citizenship is plurinational. Citizenship is not equal or meaningful when access to state services depends on residence, color, class, language, and literacy. A universal system of property rights that treats land as simply a factor of production denies the cultural reproduction of some communities of citizens. Self-determination is the legitimating rationale of democracy, which modern republics provide through indirect representation in national decision-making bodies. But if such representation is systematically inadequate for distinct nationalities within the state, democracy must provide supplementary forms or face chronic delegitimation (Brysk 2000 p. 285).
This carefully worded text brings us back to a classic topic, the limitations of formal democracy, and a very new and contentious statement about the recognition and separate rights of nationalities within the modern nation-states. It seems obvious that different ethnic groups in a state should have the right to speak and learn their own language, to benefit from policies to help them to overcome past discriminations, and keep their own local cultural and even legal institutions. At the same time, the author himself warns against the risk of turning this concern for pluralism and affirmative policies into identity politics: “identity politics empowers victims of oppression and politicizes cultural domination and ideological hegemony. Identity politics can also enshrine victimization, obsess over discourse, impede alliances, and impose a totalizing counter-hegemony” (p. 298-9).

A good example of this situation is today’s Bolivia, where President Evo Morales, of Indian ancestry, presents himself and is supported by many as a representative of the native population, and uses this support to weaken the country’s established political institutions and strengthen his own personal power, in alliance with the “Bolivarian” revolution of Hugo Chavez in Venezuela. Another example is the effort of local and multinational ONGs to introduce legal racial classifications in Brazil, as the basis for affirmative action programs in support of the descendants of African slaves of the 19th and earlier centuries. In all these cases the reality is immensely more complex. Morales is a very modern leader of coca growers; the Bolivian Indians have been organized in strong trade unions and political associations for many decades; and most Brazilians are of mixed blood, and do not see their main identity as race-based (Fry and Maggie 2007; Schwartzman 2007; Schwartzman 1999).

Still, it is true that the indigenous populations in Bolivia and the descendants of African slaves in Brazil are worse off than the whites of recent or not so recent European origin, and that the cultures and ways of life of these populations, if any, should be supported and enhanced. The tragedy of the racial and cultural conflicts that became endemic after the Cold War is that it is too easy to pass from the careful and undeniable statements about the need to improve the
existing democratic regimes and their social and economic policies, such as the ones by proposed by Brysk in her book, to the politics of identity, which tends to simplify all situations in terms of black and white, good and bad, and end up providing comfort and support to Chavez, Morales, Daniel Ortega, Rafael Correa and other Latin American populists of the 21st century. This tendency to simplify and to embark in the politics of identity is not just a mistake, but follows from the way many human right movements operate, making extensive use of the mass media, and translating conflicts of interest into moral issues.

The human rights movements can and should be criticized for their shortcomings, which is very different from the opposition they get from those against their core values. Michael Ignatieff identifies three main sources of resistance to human rights today, coming from Asia, challenging the value of formal democracy; from Islam, challenging among other things the rights of women; and from Western postmodernism, challenging the values of economic freedom and individualism. To these challenges, Ignatieff responds by saying that, indeed, freedom and individualism are part of the Western democratic tradition, and “that is precisely why it has proven an effective remedy against tyranny, and why it has proven attractive to people from very different cultures” (Ignatieff 2001 p 114). For him, the essence of human rights is the defense of the individual, very much in the best Western liberal tradition, rather than the defense of traditional cultural, national or collective identities. The proper role for human rights advocacy, he argues, is, while respecting the differences in values and social organization of different cultures and societies, to work to give people more and better choices. If one wants to learn Quechua or Aymara to strengthen his identity with the Andean native populations, it is a right that should be supported; but if one wants to learn Spanish and English to participate better in the modern side of one’ society and the world, it is also a deserving right. The best policy is to create new options, and let the persons choose; it should not be role of the State, the tribe or the local or international NGO to make the decisions for him. The central point, emphasized by also by Anthony Appiah, is that groups and communities are formed by individuals, it is the
individual who should define whether he belongs or not to one or to different groups (Appiah 2001).

Another problematic effect of the recent prevalence of human rights is its impact on the ways public policies are implemented when they are converted into domestic practices (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 2000). When public bureaucracies are inefficient and corrupt, and the political process is subject to the influence of big money and the manipulation of public opinion through the mass media, there is a strong temptation to replace established institutions with voluntary action. There are many examples of this, like the efforts to provide education through social movements, rather than through regular schools, or to replace the usual procedures for budget allocation by some kind of participatory budgeting process.

However, social policies based on the ability of specific groups to mobilize for their interests and motivations risk leaving aside the interests and needs of those less able to get organized, or to give too much power and authority to nongovernmental organizations that proclaim to speak on behalf of the powerless. By turning the attention and energy of society away from and against the established institutions, human rights activism can weaken them still further, and make them less able to fulfill their roles, than if they were under the pressure and oversight of social movements and public opinion.

Is the human rights, “ideal interest” orientation, more appropriate for policy implementation than the rational, “material interest” approach preferred by economists? Varun Guari discusses this question, regarding the implementation of education and health policies in developing countries, and strikes a conciliatory note:

With regard to practical policy consequences, rights advocates and economists are not far apart in their approaches to health care and education. Claiming that there are rights to education and health care is consistent with the belief that the rights cannot be realized at once, that social rights are goals and not constraints, that the financing and provision of services can be public or private, and that defending
social rights requires local institutions, information, organization, and advocacy. A modern economic approach to health care and education in developing countries also emphasizes the need to strengthen accountability, sectoral governance, transparency, and access to information. Both approaches would recommend greater parental participation in school management, more patient input in health care decision-making, more effective local and civic organizations for monitoring service delivery performance, more transparency in and clearer rules for budget allocations, and a simplification of management and governance in the health and education sectors. In both approaches, the goal is to strengthen the position of service recipients (Gauri 2003).

However, one important consequence of the human rights approach to policy-making is the emphasis on general rights and their enforcement through court procedures, rather than the reliance on the technical work of the public administration. Brazil is a good example. The 1988 Constitution, written after 20 years of military autocracy, has a very detailed list of individual rights and the obligations of authorities to fulfill them, without any consideration for priorities or the means necessary to implement them. The power of the judiciary to interfere and obstruct public administration on behalf of perceived rights, however, cannot be minimized. One example, in Brazil, are the myriad of individual decisions taken by local judges ordering the health authorities to provide expensive medical treatments which are not part of the established health administration procedures, draining the resources needed for general care. These decisions are based on the constitutional principle that all persons are entitled to free health care, and the prevalence, among judges, of the view that it is their role to uphold the individual rights, without consideration of broader financial or administrative public constraints.

11. Privatization, internationalization and mass higher education

The consolidation of the human rights agenda in the US universities was concomitant to two other trends, sometimes described in terms of
“globalization” and “privatization”. These trends have been subject to extensive analysis (Altbach 1999; Bjarnason, Cheng, Fielden, Lemaitre, and Levy 2009; Brunner 2009; García Guadilla 2005; Slancheva and Levy 2007), and the opportunities and threats they represent were very clearly stated sometime ago by Frank Newman, founder of The Futures Project (Policy for Higher Education in a Changing World) and former president of the University of Rhode Island:

Over the last half-century, higher education grew in size, resources, and importance. All the while, it maintained a remarkably stable structure. Now, powerful changes are under way, driven by the entry of new providers, rapid advances in technology, demographic shifts, and the globalization of markets and institutions that typically has been open only to indigenous institutions. As higher education’s environments become increasingly competitive, the reins of government are loosening worldwide in favor of market-driven decision-making - a trend that alone would disturb the tranquility of a stable, confident system. As market forces grow in importance, there is a chance for significant gains or setbacks. There is, for example, the possibility of greater access to education, new modes of learning, improved productivity - even lowered cost. But there is also the danger of losing some of the important attributes of higher education. These could include its commitment to providing the less advantaged with an opportunity for education, its tradition of taking a long-term view of both student and societal needs, and its emphasis on learning and scholarship apart from maximizing revenue streams (Newman 2000 p. 17).

The reference to a time when universities lived with “the tranquility of a stable, confident system” under the protection of governments is probably more appropriate to Western Europe than to the United States, were universities always had to strive in a competitive market for students, talent, research contracts, public support, foundation grants, philanthropic contributions, and even football players. Still, there is a broad consensus that, today, even in the US, universities are much more driven by market forces than by governments or by the internal preferences of their academic communities than in the past (Clark 1983; Geiger 2004a).

The most important change that led to the current situation was the transformation of higher education from elite to mass institutions, an almost
universal phenomenon of the last decades that multiplied the demand for higher education and had a dramatic impact on the ways universities used to be conceived and to operate (Trow 1973). In many countries, this expansion was met by the creation of a second tier of higher education institutions geared to vocational or general education, as in the American community colleges, or the technical education institutes in France and Germany. Some of these institutions are public, but, in many cases, they tend to be privately run, and very different from what a classical university is supposed to be. The novelty is not just that these institutions are run by private, autonomous corporations, like many of the best known US universities such as Harvard, Columbia, Stanford, Princeton and Yale, or by religious orders, like the several hundred Catholic universities throughout the world, as they always had; but the emergence of a new generation of privately owned, profit-oriented institutions competing with the traditional universities for the provision of higher education, creating a new scenario that challenges the more traditional assumptions of what a university should be.

In Brazil and Chile, today, more than 70% of the higher education students are in private institutions, most of them for-profit; in Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Peru, and Venezuela, it is about 50%22. In Asia, Indonesia, Japan, Philippines and Korea have more than 70% of enrolled students in private institutions. The largest higher education institution in the US today, with almost 500 thousand students, is the for-profit University of Phoenix, owned by the Apollo Group, catering mostly to part-time students and making extensive use of face-to-face and on-line teaching methodologies. Other large companies include the Argosy Education Group (the American Schools of Professional Psychology); DeVry, Inc. (DeVry Institutes of Technology); Education Management Corporation (the Art Institutes International); and Strayer Education (Strayer University) (Breneman, Pusser, and Turner 2006; Ruch 2001). The estimation is that there are, today, about 700 for-profit, degree-granting higher education institutions in the United States alone.

An interesting example is the State of São Paulo in Brazil. This is Brazil's richest region, concentrating 21% of the country's population and about a third of the GNP. It has some of the best and more prestigious public research universities in the country, the Universidade de São Paulo, Universidade de Campinas and the Universidade Estadual Paulista, which are supported, by law, with 9.57% of the state’s main tax revenues, and also a significant network of vocational schools. Being the richest region, however, this is also where demand for higher education in highest, and 87% of the enrollment in state takes place in private institutions.

Typically, private institutions avoid engaging in doctoral education and research, which require highly paid, full-time staff and heavy investments which could not be provided without public subsidies; but the quality of the undergraduate and professional education they provide is not necessarily worse than that of public institutions. The space occupied by private institutions depends very much on what happens with the public sector. If public institutions are of good quality and highly selective, the private sector will tend to provide low-cost education to less qualified students, or evening and distance education to those that want to study but have to work. If public institutions are under-supported and over-politicized, the private sector will be in a better position to offer better quality education for those who can pay for it. As private institutions get larger, more profitable, and professionally managed, they become interesting investment targets for national and international private funds and education companies.

This, however, is just part of the story. In practice, at least in Latin America, foreign investors entering the higher education market seldom bring academic or institutional innovation to the institutions they acquire, beyond the establishment of financial control. And while commercialization is a central theme, notes Altbach, many scholarship and exchange programs have few, if any commercial or direct political motivations, including the Rhodes scholarship program, Marshall scholars, Rotary International programs, the Ford Foundation international fellowship scheme, the Soros Foundation’s Open Society Institute and related programs, the programs sponsored by the German Academic
Exchange Service (DAAD), the Japan Foundation for the Promotion of Science, the Fulbright program, the Colombo Plan, and many others. In his recommendations, Altbach emphasizes, first, that “…the public good must be at the center of all academic collaboration. There is a place, of course, for private institutions and for the possibility of earning money as part of some international academic relationships, but the dominating principle must be the public good”; and second, that “Academic programs that link, on the basis of as much equality as possible, institutions in several countries and provide training and scholarship programs that enable students to study in more than one country, deserve consideration”.

Still newer is the establishment of multinational universities, of which the best example is probably Laureate Education Inc., which controls 45 accredited institutions in 20 countries (North America, Latin America, Europe, and Asia), with about 500 thousand students in undergraduate, master's and doctorate degree programs in a number of career fields including engineering, education, business, health care, hospitality, architecture, and information technology23. United States, Japan, Australia, New Zealand and the European Union have been working for the liberalization of the trade of international education services in the context of the World Trade Organization and the General Agreement on Trades and Services (GATTS), generating a large and heated controversy on its potential benefits and dangers (Barblan 2002; Larsen and Vincent-Lancrin 2002; Robertson 2003; Sauvé 2002). To a large extent, it is an ideological debate of competing “discourses”, placing on one side those who argue that liberalization would increase the opportunity to transfer knowledge and extend the educational opportunities throughout the world, against those that are afraid of what this could mean as a threat to local cultures and national self-determination. As summarized by Joel Spring,

> Global educational discourses on the knowledge economy, lifelong learning, and human capital education are influencing the decisions of national policy makers. Research shows that most IGOs and NGOs, in particular the World Bank and OECD,

are also supporting educational plans tied to the knowledge economy and human capital development. (...) Neoliberal discourses and the GATS have stimulated a push for global privatization of educational services, in particular in higher education and the sale of information services and books by multinational corporations. Brain circulation might also contribute to a growing uniformity of global educational practices because of local pressures to ensure an education that will help graduates participate in the global economy. The growth of English as the language of global commerce is making the teaching of English a fixture in most national curricula.

There is considerable criticism of the growing global uniformity in education. World systems theorists argue that it is part of a process for legitimizing the actions of rich over poor nations. Those using postcolonial analysis criticize the trend by arguing that it will ensure the hegemony of global elites. Along with many culturalists, postcolonial analysis supports alternative forms of education to those geared for the knowledge economy and human capital, such as progressive and Freirian educational methods. Research done by culturalists concludes that local populations adapt educational practices to local needs and culture, and therefore, rather than uniformity, there is developing hybrid educational practices combining the local and the global. NGOs, in particular human rights and environmental organizations, are supporting an agenda of progressive human rights and environmental education. And, in sharp contrast to dominant global trends, indigenous groups are demanding the right to use traditional educational practices. Also, some groups are concerned about the loss of local cultures and identity with the trend to making English the global language. These disputes are reinforcing the importance of global educational practices while, at the same time, ensuring possible changes in their current development (Spring 2008 p. 353).

The threats represented by private and international education for the institutions and culture of less developed, non-western societies are probably overstated in the ideological debates. They provide education opportunities for millions who would not have access to national, public institutions; the introduction of rational management practices, in a competitive market, can lead to better organized institutions, more responsive to the student’s needs, and more attentive to the demands of the job market; and, in most cases, they try to adjust as much as possible to the local values and culture, to be able to compete with the public institutions.
There are, however, problems related to equity in educational opportunities and to the need to preserve and strengthen academic institutions dedicated to long-term, scientific and cultural activities that would tend to disappear under strict, short-term economic considerations. There is no assurance, however, that state-owned institutions, protected from market competition and international influences, would necessarily provide good quality, equitable and culturally relevant education. These problems have less to do with the legal nature of the institutions, and more with the way the public sector acts to regulate the higher education sector, public and private, creating mechanisms of quality assurance and allocating public resources for clearly stated goals of social equity, academic quality, academic freedom and social relevance.

12. The global universities

The effects of privatization and internationalization are not restricted, however, to the second tier of new, mass-oriented higher education institutions, but impact also the main research universities throughout the world. As stated by Justin Lin, senior vice president and chief economist of the World Bank in the foreword of a recent book by Jamil Salmi on “world class universities”,

As the global environment for tertiary education expands—encompassing not only the traditional student exchanges and scholarly sojourns but also such issues as cross-border investments and market-type competition among institutions—stakeholders in tertiary education must re-evaluate their priorities and expectations. Historically, tertiary education institutions were cultural landmarks for their home nations. They educated their own students, trained their own academic staffs, and stored the cultural and local histories of their regions. International pressures, largely the result of global flows of tertiary education resources — funding, ideas, students, and staff — have forced institutions to re-examine their missions. Moreover, these pressures have forced governments, by far the largest funding sources for tertiary education, to re-examine their commitments to and expectations from their tertiary education institutions. One prominent outcome of these debates has been the rise in league tables and rankings of various
sorts and, subsequently, the growing desire to compete for a place at the top of a
global hierarchy of tertiary education (Salmi 2009 p i.)

The two best-known league tables are the ones produced annually by the Times
Higher Education Supplement and the Shanghai Jiao Tong University, based on a
combination of objective data and subjective evaluations of experts. The
methodological limitations of these rankings are well-known (Salmi and Saroyan
2007), but still, they coincide in placing Harvard University at the top, and a large
number of American universities among the first 20: 12 in the THES for 2007
(with high rankings given to the best British institutions), and 17 in the Shanghai
rankings. The highest non-American or European in the Shanghai ranking is the
University of Tokyo, #20, followed by the Australian National University, # 59.
The highest in the developing world is the University of São Paulo, Brazil, in the
101-151 ranking group. In the Times ranking, the Australian National University
comes 17, the University of Tokyo 22, and the University of São Paulo, the first in
the region, comes at 207, below the University of Indonesia, 201, the best from a
developing country.

These rankings are clearly biased in favor of universities with high-prestige
research achievements (i.e., Nobel Prizes) and reputation among the English
speaking academic communities. The substantive issue they raise is whether it
makes sense to place so many different institutions in different countries in the
same ranking, and use the American universities as the benchmark that all
should try to emulate. To control for size and focus, the Times Higher Education
supplement created an additional classification of universities, separating large,
comprehensive, research-intensive universities from focused and specialized
institutions, with more or less emphasis on research. It is obvious that not all
institutions should or could try to become like Harvard or Cambridge, but there
is a clear movement, in many countries, to select a few institutions to play the
global role that high-ranking institutions are supposed to have (Altbach and
Balán 2007). In Germany, for instance, as reported in Science, “the federal
government launched an ‘excellence initiative’ that would boost at least a few
universities to world-class status - a German Ivy League. Schools around the
country have applied for the €1.9 billion ($2.38 billion) budgeted to the
initiative, and the first results of this competition, announced last week, give Munich major bragging rights: Two of the three universities singled out as potential topflight schools are the Technical University Munich (TUM) and the Ludwig Maximilian University (LMU), also in Munich. The third is the Technical University (TU) Karlsruhe, in Southwest Germany. In a surprise, Heidelberg didn’t make the cut - at least this time” (Vogel 2006). China, Singapore and other Asian countries are also working hard to make their best universities to meet these new international standards.

Among the leading American universities, there is a clear drive to build upon their international prestige and become truly global universities, without, however, jeopardizing their more traditional academic core. Harvard University has a new site, Harvard Worldwide24, where it brings together the information of its global activities – worldwide research, worldwide curriculum, worldwide extracurricular activities. According to the site, 20% of the students in the University are from outside the United States. It is an impressive list:

- Harvard's academic activities - from research to study abroad to executive education programs - touch more than 130 countries around the world.

- Harvard Worldwide has more than 1,600 international activities in its database -- not including academic courses or individual faculty members -- ranging from faculty research projects to executive education programs to grants for student travel abroad.

- Harvard, its schools, and its research centers have offices in 8 different countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, France, Greece, India, Japan.

- In 2007-08, 1372 Harvard College students traveled to 93 different countries for study, research, internships, and other activities.

- In 2010, Harvard faculty are leading 27 study abroad programs to 19 different countries, via the Harvard Summer School.

- The research of Harvard faculty, the curriculum of Harvard’s schools, and the extracurricular activities available to Harvard students touch almost every country in the world.

http://www.worldwide.harvard.edu/iws/facts/index.jsp
Columbia University, which boasts the highest number of Nobel Prizes of any institution in the world, and is placed among the best ten universities in both rankings, also has been strengthening its international presence. One of the most recent initiatives is the creation of a network of "global centers" scattered in different parts of the world – starting with Beijing and Amman, to be followed in 2010 by Paris, Mumbai and perhaps Africa. These centers are not being conceived as satellite campuses, but as legally independent and self-sustaining institutions, created in collaboration with local partners, which could provide support for Columbia university scholars doing research in these countries, extension activities, and eventually also for Columbia undergraduate students interested in getting an international experience.

Another major global initiative is the Earth Institute, a very complex network of research units and programs within Columbia University and in partnership with outside institutions, to deal with global issues related to the environment, poverty, climate change, energy, nutrition, and others, headed by economist Jeffrey Sachs. “Network” is the key world to understand how the Earth Institute operates. It is mostly a light coordinating body led by a small management team, which can list scholars, research and teaching activities carried on in different university departments, and from that basis, can develop specific programs and offer global consulting and technical assistance activities such the ones performed by its “Earth Clinic”. Both the Global Centers initiative and the Earth Institute are, in essence, instruments to expand the reach of the academic departments into the global realm, both physically and substantively, without changing the notion that these departments, and more particularly the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, are the basis from which all the university’s achievements derive.

In this sense, they are similar to Harvard Worldwide, and very different from the School of International and Public Affairs, another major global arm of Columbia University. Public policy schools and careers emerged in the US in the 1960s,

---

25 http://cgc.columbia.edu/
26 http://www.earthinstitute.columbia.edu
27 http://sipa.columbia.edu
largely influenced by the writings of Harold Lasswell, in replacement of the more traditional course programs in public administration (Farr, Hacker, and Kazee 2006). SIPA also originated in those years, with the peculiarity of being international from the beginning, which allowed it to participate very actively in the globalization trends of the recent years. SIPA works today mostly as a professional public policy school at the MA level, with about 1,200 students every year, coming from about 100 different countries. SIPA provides seven different MA degrees (in international affairs, public administration, environmental science and policy, in partnership with the Earth Institute), and has its own building on campus. Many of its core faculty have joint appointments with the academic departments, particularly in economics and political science, and it brings also lecturers and academics from other institutions and the private sector to teach. SIPA houses the universities’ several regional institutes and centers (of African, Brazilian, Iranian, East Central European, and Latin American studies, among others), and research centers such as the ones on International Conflict Resolution, for the Study of Democracy and Toleration and Religion, for the Study of Human Rights, and others. Each of these centers and institutes has its own resources, and SIPA is financially profitable thanks to the tuition paid by its students.

This financial and institutional autonomy has allowed SIPA to challenge its academic links to the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences; at the same time, it is planning to move from the current building in the main Morningside campus to another location, Manhattanville, in West Harlem, where a new university campus is being planned. The physical and institutional separation from the university core is being proposed as a step to increase the autonomy and the working conditions for SIPA and its staff, but some professors are afraid that “accompanying SIPA to Manhattanville would entail more than just spatial distance from their colleagues who stay in Morningside. Removed from the influence of other departments, the deep-seated connections between SIPA and these departments could trickle down to affect the undergraduate and graduate students they serve” (Levi 2009). More broadly, it is possible to look at this
transition as part of the broader trend to strengthen the market orientation of the university, at the cost of weakening its academic core.

13. International Education, Brain Drain, Brain Exchange, Brain Gain

One important aspect of globalization is the growing number of students going from developing to developed regions to study, very often never to return. By far, the main recipient is the United States, with 671 thousand foreign students in 2008, and the main providers, China, India, Canada, Japan and Mexico. For American universities, foreign students are an important source of income and, for the country, an important source of talent and qualified manpower. According to the Institute of International Education, “each year, international students contribute billions of dollars to the U.S. economy through their tuition and fees and living expenses. In 2007/2008 the net contribution to the U.S. economy by foreign students and their families was $15,543,000,000.00”.28

Once their get their degrees, some of these students return to their country of origin, while others look for employment in their destination. Summarizing the results of a recent study on migration of qualified human resources in Latin America, the International Organization for Migration notes that, between 1990 and 2007, the stock of qualified immigrants in the OECD countries increased by 111%, reaching 25.9 million, more than the increase in less qualified immigrants. The growth of immigrants from Latin America and the Caribbean was the largest, of 155%, reaching 4.9 million, most of them going to the United States. In the US, there were 4.1 million immigrants from Latin America with 13 years of more of education, of which 1.7 million had university degrees, and 146 thousand doctoral degrees.

The effects for the sending countries is more controversial, depending in large part on the country's ability to bring their students back and provide them with significant opportunities to work and make use of their talents. For many countries, study abroad is part of a larger movement of international migration of skilled persons, for the lack of employment opportunities in their own country and other reasons. For these countries, their investment in higher education, instead of being a benefit for their societies, becomes a subsidy that helps their skilled students to migrate and use their acquired competencies elsewhere. Still, once working abroad, the remittances of money to the student’s families can become a very important source of income for the country of origin.

This situation is particularly serious for countries that subsidize advanced studies abroad with fellowships, only to see that, once the students get their degree, they never return, a situation that affects also students going abroad through cooperation projects paid by international donors. Whether the student returns or remains depends on the balance of incentives the students have to do one thing or another. Usually, a foreign graduate will be in disadvantage in the competition for jobs in the receiving country, which may also have restrictive legislation for foreigners, and would prefer to return to their country of origin with the newly acquired skills and prestige of an international degree. This requires, however, the existence of qualified jobs, as well as receptivity from the former colleagues who did not go abroad and may be occupying the existing positions in national universities and research centers.

In the past, international migration of talent used to be seen only in negative terms, as brain drain, and many countries tried to stop it by restricting the support for studies abroad and requiring the students going abroad to pay back the fellowships or other public they may have received for their studies. Now, there is a growing realization that, while the international flow of talents is part of broader trend which cannot be changed by the education or science and technology authorities alone, it also creates many opportunities for keeping the country in touch and at the frontier of technological development and the
business opportunities that often comes with it. It is not by chance that China, South Korea and India are, at the same time, the largest providers of foreign students to the US and Western Europe, and among the more dynamic economies in the world today.

Compared with the Asian countries, Brazil seems to be going in the opposite direction. For many years, Brazilian and international cooperation agencies have provided support for Brazilians to abroad for advanced degrees, and most of them returned to work and take leading positions in an expanding national graduate and research establishment. However, in the last ten years or so, there is a clear trend to reduce this flow, both by limiting the number of fellowships to study abroad and by giving priority to short-term activities rather than full doctoral programs, and moving them away from the United States29. This policy may reflect the belief that the country does not need to sponsor studies abroad any longer, now that its universities are granting about 10 thousand doctoral degrees a year; but it may also reflect a disbelief on the value of international cooperation and interchange, a paradoxical situation in a period where other countries try to maximize their access to the main international centers of advanced education and knowledge production.

---

29 Data from Brazil's Ministry of Science and Technology, [http://www.mct.gov.br/](http://www.mct.gov.br/)

14. The search for alternatives

In the changing landscape of globalization, commercialization and stress on human rights, international organizations have tried to redirect their programs of international cooperation and outreach. In 2005 the Netherlands Organization for International Cooperation in Higher Education (NUFFIC) organized a conference on “A changing landscape: making support to tertiary education and research in developing countries more effective”, which brought together representatives of private and public institutions involved in international academic outreach, as well as of institutions in developing countries.30 In the summary document (Holtland and Boeren 2005), the authors list the usual challenges and concerns of higher education in developing countries (issues of access, massification, privatization, commoditization, quality assurance, relevance, digital divide, brain drain), the different types existing of

30 The documents from the Conference at available at http://www.nuffic.nl/international-organizations/news-events/past-events/landscape/Downloads
international support, and a list of complaints about the way the aid is often provided: too few resources, lack of coordination, rigidity.

The best kind of international support, for the document, is the one that takes place through institutional cooperation and joint projects between universities. It notes that Northern institutions, while well suited to provide support to Southern counterparts, “have fewer and fewer of their own resources available to do so. Core funding for research has been reduced over the last decade, available funds per student are under pressure and the culture of accountability means that much energy has to be devoted to management issues. Universities have to rely increasingly on external funding, both for research programs and for cooperation programs” (p. 8). The recommendations are mostly related to increase partnerships and assure that the aid provided by donors is not wasted. It includes the need for quality assurance mechanisms, partnerships and networking, the creation and maintenance of Centers of Excellence, better donor coordination, increased levels of funding and flexibility. Finally, there is a list of challenges to be met: to make the links between support for higher education and poverty more explicit; creating a balance between quality and quantity; demonstrating the impact of support to higher education and research; resolving ownership issues at program and project level; and forging a shared vision of internationalization, development cooperation and knowledge production.

These recommendations are clearly at the core of Sweden’s strategy of international academic cooperation. As noted in their paper to the Nuffic Conference, “Sweden has been one of few donor countries that have acknowledged the need to strengthen research capacity at an institutional level, rather than granting training of individuals and research project support. Recently major actors in the donor community have rediscovered the significant role of science and technology for development” (Kjellqvist 2005). The paper recognize the failures of past efforts to build good quality higher education institutions in developing countries, but expresses the belief that they could overcome if they with aligned with national policies and research strategies both at national and university levels. The problem, of course, is that most developing
countries lack well-defined national policies and research strategies, and, when they do, they tend to be top-down, formal and bureaucratic, and with weak links at that actually take place at the level of institutions (Sutz 2000).

One could interpret this summary as an effort to improve on the traditional patterns of international cooperation that existed in the seventies, bringing new components such as accountability, the concerns with poverty and the need for a “shared vision” on internationalization, without changing the original assumptions about the role of universities and the need for international cooperation. However, there is a clear contradiction between the dwindling resources for international cooperation and the new challenges and recommendations presented at the end. By reading some of the contributions to the conference, one can see that change in the cooperation landscape is much more profound than the summary paper may suggest.

One clear rupture with the past is in the replacement of the old goals of academic and international cooperation by human rights activism. The best example is the Ford Foundation, which, in the year 2000, created an ambitious International Fellowship Program with an endowment of 280 million dollars, the Foundations’ largest program ever. According to its director, Joan Dassin, writing in 2005, “the program expects to award a total of 3,325 fellowships for postgraduate study to students from Russia and 21 other countries and territories in Africa, Asia, and Latin America over the life of the program, to extend through 2012. 1,544 IFP Fellows have already been selected in 74 competitions held since 2001. 256 IFP Fellows have successfully completed their fellowships, and 840 Fellows are currently enrolled at 327 universities in 40 host countries” (Dassin 2005).

A 2009 publication gives an overview of the program’s rationale and achievements (Volkman, Dassin, and Zurbuchen 2009). In an introductory chapter, Dassin writes about the importance of higher education for social and economic development, and praises as “an important paradigm shift” the more recent emphasis of the World Bank and Unesco on higher education and the needs of the knowledge society. She also mentions the role of private donors and international cooperation:
Private donors and universities have been sponsoring programs to build higher education institutions in developing countries. International cooperation is a vital element in these efforts. A recent example is the Partnership for Higher Education in Africa, a $350 million initiative sponsored by seven of the largest American foundations to improve higher education in seven African countries. In another example, Washington University in St. Louis recently established a program of scholarly exchanges, training and researching with fifteen leading research universities in Asia” (Dassin 2009 p. 21).

This is not different from the old Ford and Rockefeller cooperation projects of the 1960s and 1970s. To this, however, the program adds a new equity dimension. While recognizing that the expansion of higher education in developing countries has increased social mobility, the text also notes that these benefits have been appropriated mostly by middle and upper sectors, and it has remained difficult for persons belonging to poor and deprived minorities to get the best benefits that higher education can provide. What the program seeks to do, therefore, is to select promising candidates from these segments, and give them resources to work for advanced degrees in their own countries or abroad. A promising candidate should have the potential to perform well academically, and, at the same time, to be socially committed and willing to return to his community to help it to fight poverty and isolation. There is also the expectation that program will help to revert the risks of brain drain associated with traditional fellowship programs, which do not seek to link the fellows back to their origins.

There are no traces, in this program, of the old attempts by Rockefeller and Ford Foundation to build or strengthen specific universities or fields of knowledge, to build epistemic communities; instead, the drive is to build community bonds and social commitment. Many fellows do not have the necessary academic and language requirements to attend the most demanding universities, and one of the innovations of this program is to involve the fellows in communal activities and preparatory work. For this, the program developed special links with university and non-university institutions willing to provide support for this kind of activities. One such institution is the East-West Center in Honolulu, a US facility established by the US Congress in 1960 “to strengthen relations and
understanding among the peoples and nations of Asia, the Pacific, and the United States”. One of the co-authors of the 2009 book, Toby Alice Volkman, talks about what she saw in a visit:

At the EWC, the sense of community among the Fellows, when I visited in 2006, was striking. They live in a common residence, cook together in large collective kitchens with views of surrounding mountains, and participate in social and academic activities together. Many of these Fellows take the HELP intensive English course together, and often they share struggles over language and other adjustment issues. Some choose to room with another Fellow (often from another country, to practice English). And, although every student has his or her own rice cooker, some set up cooking partnerships where they alternate nights and get to sample cuisines from other countries (Volkman 2009 p. 210).

For the fellows, the program has been an important opportunity they probably would not have had otherwise. The broader impact of such program, with at most a few hundred fellows in each country, is more difficult to ascertain, and there is no evidence, beyond individual experiences, that the program’s broader expectations regarding its impact on higher education and social equity is being fulfilled. The program review ends by saying that “… in five to ten years we will have a clearer idea of how IFP Fellows are able to influence the course of development in their home countries and regions. Undoubtedly, some of them will become players on a larger international stage, contributing to broader debates about the major issues of our time—and theirs. (...) A significant portion of former Fellows continue their studies, and a majority—whether at home or abroad—are engaged in volunteer activities. Despite some short-term problems and having to face deep-seated discrimination and other continuing social pressures, the IFP alumni are delivering on their promise of improving the lives and livelihoods of those around them. Although these results are still largely incipient, their communities — broadly defined as both communities of origin and communities of reference — are beginning to realize the ‘returns’ of the IFP fellowship” (Volkman, Dassin, and Zurbuchen 2009 p. 246).
15. Conclusions

It is difficult to summarize, in a few paragraphs, the main conclusions one could draw from this narrative of international cooperation and outreach. In the new context of globalization and privatization, higher education will continue to grow and to thrive, and universities will continue to expand their role as knowledge centers and innovation drivers, in ways, however, that are very different from what they used to be. They will have to compete with other public and private research institutions in the leadership for knowledge production, and with other providers for the delivery of professional, general and vocational education. They will broaden their reach, getting ever more involved in international activities and networks, without, however, losing their strong national identities, even in a context such as the European Union, in spite of all its efforts at academic integration (Musselin 2004). To play their roles, they will continue to rely on extensive professional and scientific communities, which are also nationally based, but much more internationalized than the institutions in which they work.

These trends are valid both for developed and developing countries, but it is not certain that all developing and transition countries will be able to build and maintain viable and relevant higher education institutions – this will depend, in part, on the contributions of international cooperation, but ultimately, on the country’s on ability, and that of their professional and academic communities, to sustain and care about their academic and educational institutions.

Regarding international cooperation and outreach, in 1994 I had the privilege of giving the keynote presentation to the ORSTOM/UNESCO Conference on "20th Century Science: Beyond the Metropolis" (published in French in Schwartzman 1995), on scientific international cooperation, and I believe that the summary and conclusions I presented fifteen years ago are not different from what I would present today.
The new international context is leading to deep changes in the actors involved in both sides of the cooperation link, and in their interpretation of what is taking place. In one extreme, hard-nosed government and business-oriented organizations seek to bypass the academics and link to productive, profit-making partnerships with local business interests. On the other, social-minded government agencies and militants of nongovernmental organizations associate with local leadership willing to carry the banners of anti-poverty, minority rights and social empowerment.

The new actors, and some of the old ones in new robes, have their agendas shaped by social movements which are relevant to their own societies, and work to press their views and perspectives on other countries, in issues like human rights, poverty, population control, racial and gender equality, environment protection and grass-roots political participation. Most of these issues are universal today, and organizations such as International Amnesty and Greenpeace play important roles in making them more central to anyone’s agenda. But the promoters of the new forms of cooperation do not know, and do not care much anymore, about long-term issues like institution building, scientific and technological development, educational reform and many others of the previous years.

In both cases traditional scientific communities are bypassed, and the new theory is that this is as it should be. Among policy makers, inspired in the "Asian miracle", the old linear model of science production and diffusion, from basic to applied research, is now being replaced by a "reverse linear" perspective, which assumes research and higher education to be a byproduct of industrial modernization. For the militants on both sides, academics are at best irrelevant to their societies, and at worse users of scarce resources, and an obstacle to the empowerment of the dispossessed.

It is unlikely that these new forms of international cooperation will produce better results than in the past. The South Asian countries developed as they did not primarily from the way they introduced technology in their productive system, but because broader factors, such as the active role of government,
heavy investments in basic and secondary education, externally oriented economies and deep social reforms, introduced in some cases during or after periods of war. Without such conditions, industrial modernization in developing countries is likely to be limited to small and even shrinking enclaves of modernization, with little spillover to the rest of society. If the internal conditions are not appropriate, even the best-intended programs of assistance and knowledge transfer can backfire, and wind up strengthening local structures of inequality and stagnation.

North-South International cooperation has to be placed on a different footing, and there are indications that this is may be beginning to happen. The basis for the new forms of cooperation is the growing interdependency and proximity between the countries in the world. The South always depended on the North for many things, from trade to technical assistance and access to knowledge and information. But, for the North, poor countries in the South were often treated as distant entities, sources of raw materials and cheap labor, markets for export goods, infidels in need of conversion, nasty governments in need of containment, or poor people in need of help. For good and bad reasons, this situation is changing dramatically. Economic dynamism has moved from the US and Europe to Asia and Latin America, the population of poor countries in Africa and the Middle East spills over to the developed world, deforestation contributes to global warming, local crises can affect international trade, and situations of misery and violation of human rights are present in anyone's living rooms through global television.

The task for the promoters of new forms of international cooperation is to find the areas and issues where true interdependency exists, and try to build institutions, programs and activities which addresses these issues, and attracts the interests of all parts involved. Institutions geared to international cooperation should get acceptance and respectability, and this requires that they steer away from the two extremes that still sets the tone in this period of transition: the ill-disguised advocacy of local interests and the ideologically-minded, interventionist approach. It is not that self-interests are illegitimate, or
that the ideological issues are irrelevant. What is wrong with these approaches is their ethnocentrism, which leads to the inability to perceive the others, and to establish fruitful, long-lasting and trusted relations of partnership.

Truly cooperative undertakings require stable, competent and reliable patterns on both sides, recreating the global epistemic communities which could provide the basis for their permanence, The task for countries in the South willing to participate in this new pattern of cooperation is to create and guarantee the quality and competence of the institutions and groups that should become the local basis of international exchange. Given the differences in wealth and competency, these North-South links will never be fully symmetrical regarding resources and knowledge transfer, but they should be as symmetrical as possible in terms of the genuine effort of each side to understand the needs, the conditions and the perspectives of the other.

This new partnership should be much more modest in its ambitions than in the past, and based on a deeper knowledge of the social and cultural characteristics of the nations involved. Nobody believes anymore on the power of scientific and academic knowledge to change societies alone, when broader economic, political and social conditions are not present. When these conditions exist, however, access to world-class knowledge and technical cooperation can be crucial. Ultimately, the key to success in the whole adventure of international cooperation lies not in the hands of the givers, but in those of the receivers.

References


Landscape. The Hague: Nuffic - Netherlands organization for international cooperation in higher education.


Fallis, George. 2007. Multiversities, ideas and democracy: University of Toronto Press.


Fincher, Cameron. 1996. The Influence of British and German Universities on the Historical Development of American Universities. Athens, GA University of Georgia, Institute of Higher Education.


Stepan, Erica Nancy. 1971. *Scientific institution-building in a developing country the Oswaldo Cruz Institute of Brazil.*


Wagner, Peter , Carol Hirschon Weiss, Bjorn Wittrock, and Hellmut Wollman. 1991. *Social sciences and modern states national experiences and


