

THE IMAGES OF INTERNATIONAL STRATIFICATION IN LATIN AMERICA*

A Reputation Study based on Social Science Students

By

SIMON SCHWARTZMAN and MANUEL MORA Y ARAUJO

International Peace Research Institute, Oslo

1. Introduction

A survey of the perception of international stratification in Latin America was launched among Latin American students of social sciences in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and other Latin American countries during the first semester of 1965. The sample, which was non-representative, included 327 Latin Americans plus a control group of 35 Norwegian students. In this article, the major results of this survey are given, preceded by a short discussion of its theoretical framework. The general characteristics of the sample may be seen in Table 1¹.

Stratification is a key concept for the nomothetical approach to international politics. This concept, basic in classical

political sociology, may be employed in international politics with in principle the same theoretical relevance as well as the same methodological problems.²

Theoretically, the main point is that the units tend to distribute themselves in the social setting according to rank-dimensions; and this distribution, which is differential, has specific and systematic consequences for the unit's internal processes, for the patterns of interaction between units, and for the dynamics of the system as a whole. In political sociology, the social setting is countries and the units individuals or groups; in international sociology, the social setting is the international system, and the units, countries. At the national level, the structure of

Table 1. *The sample, general characteristics*

	Argentina	Brazil	Chile	Nationality		Norway	Total
				America	Total Latin America		
<i>Place of interview</i>							
1. University of Buenos Aires	97%	—	—	23%	37%	—	122
2. Catholic University of Chile	—	—	30%	—	5%	—	16
3. University of Minas Gerais, Brazil	—	68%	—	3%	26%	—	84
4. Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences (FLACSO), Chile (students)	3%	4%	15%	28%	8%	—	26
5. FLACSO-applicants	—	28%	55%	44%	24%	—	79
6. University of Oslo	—	—	—	—	—	100%	35
Total (N)	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	—
	117	121	54	35	327	35	362
<i>Sex</i>							
Male	34%	62%	60%	50%	50.5%	60%	51%
Female	66%	38%	40%	50%	49.5%	40%	49%
<i>Average age</i>	20.6	23.8	23.6	24.7	22.7	22.8	

stratification influences individual psychology and behavior, the patterns of interaction between individuals, and the dynamics of the whole national system. And correspondingly, for the international system, the stratification of countries is of consequence to the dynamics of the national processes, the interaction patterns between countries, and the dynamics of the international system as such.³

The parallel does not stop here. As in classical studies on stratification, the concepts of 'class' vs. 'feudal' societies can be profitably applied to the international

the market, while in a feudal system some values are the privileges of some statuses.

As far as interaction is concerned, in the feudal system this is concentrated at the top level; the low-rank units are connected with the top ones, but not among themselves. This kind of structure implies rigid boundaries between strata, with no mobility or passage from one stratum to another.

If we consider interaction structure as an indication of degree of accessibility to high-rank positions, a simple typology of stratification systems could be the following (Figure 1):

A typology of stratification systems:




Fig. 1.

system. The question of whether the Latin American subsystem falls in one or another of these two concepts is the first theoretical problem confronting us.

We can discuss these two types of stratification system in terms of two dimensions, one referring to the value system and the other to the structure of interaction between the units.

The existence of a common set of scarce values is a pre-condition for the existence of any system of stratification, since stratification means precisely that some units are 'high' whereas others are 'low' in these values. What differentiates the feudal system from the class system is that, in the former, there is general acceptance of the inequal distribution of the scarce values, while in an open-class system there is general agreement that any unit can aspire to and eventually reach the high levels of stratification. Or, as Max Weber defines it: in a class system all the values can be obtained in

The general hypothesis is that there is a clock-wise evolution, starting at the upper-left corner of this Figure. From the open-class systems on, we can think either of a regression to new feudal systems based on new status criteria, or of a disappearance of consensual values, perhaps leading to disintegration.

The international system is today in the transitional phase. The existence of the common value 'development', and the general assumption that any single country should develop, is the sign of the end of a feudal era. But the degree of accessibility to the high-rank positions is very low, as expressed by the feudal interaction structure we have seen for Latin America.⁴ And this is, after all, what the problem of underdevelopment is about: the diffusion of values that cannot be reached by the low-countries because of the rigid stratification of the international system; this brings tension, conflicts and numerous kinds of violent possibilities.⁵

This article is not the place for a full development of this point, but we can point out some consequences of feudal stratification, as traced by the stratificational approach to international politics.

First, the lack of egalitarian interaction among the rank-and-file countries impedes the drive towards regional integration, which is supposedly needed more at this level than at any other. A correlated consequence is the increase or stabilization of patterns of subordination, dependence and exploitation from the high-rank countries towards the rank-and file.⁶

Second, real or perceived rank-position seems to be relevant for the countries' internal political processes. The general consequences of the center-periphery theories regarding the formation of absolutist vs. gradualist ideologies seem to apply equally well to individuals and nations.⁷ Nationalism itself, ideologies of development, and different forms of symbolic participation are all influenced not only by the absolute rank of the countries but also by the special types of equilibrium between their many rank-dimensions.⁸

Finally, the rank-congruence (similarity of rank-profiles) between any pair of countries seems to be a decisive variable for the prediction of the development of stereotypes, sympathy or antipathy, etc., between them.⁹

The parallel between the international and national systems holds true also at the methodological level. The structure of international stratification can be established either *objectively* by measuring the relative position of the countries on some theoretically relevant rank-dimensions (power, economic development, modernization of the social structure, health, etc.), or *subjectively*, by trying to grasp the images of stratification actually present in the minds of the countries' inhabitants. A third approach could consist of a sociometric technique where the rank of the countries would be defined by the

differential selection these make of each other, this selection being expressed, for instance, by the establishment of embassies or other diplomatic legations.¹⁰ As far as the Latin American subsystem is concerned, these three approaches lead to very similar results; thus we may conclude that this rank-order is independent of the techniques used to measure it.

2. The 'subjective' rank-order

The major aim of this survey was to get an independent check on the image of stratification that emerged from our provisional objective measurement. The objective measurement consisted of an additive index of 10 items considered to be relevant rank-dimensions. These rank dimensions belonged to two non-correlated clusters, one of size, or power (Gross National Product, population, area); the other of average development (urbanization, industrialization, communications, literacy, relative size of middle and high strata, percentage of white population). Per capita income occupied a middle position. The rank-order that emerged from the survey was strongly correlated with this index, as predicted by the hypothesis that in a feudal-like system there is a social image of generalized rank-roles played by the units. Our findings show that the rank-position of a country is the result of the combination of the two above-mentioned clusters. Differences between the two rank-orders can be explained by the fact that the objective measurement gave more relative weight to the average indicators than to the absolute ones.

The resulting rank-order for the 20 Latin American republics is given in Table 2, together with objective rank-order. The subjects were asked to place the 20 countries in either of three groups of high, middle and low levels of prestige or importance, to which the values 3, 2 and 1 were assigned, and the average was then calculated for each country. Three of

Table 2. *The rank positions of the Latin American republics*

<i>Objective index*</i>	<i>Subjective index**</i>				
	<i>Total Latin Americans</i>	<i>Argentini-ans</i>	<i>Brazilians</i>	<i>Chileans</i>	<i>Norwegians</i>
1. Argentina	2.78	2.68	2.78	2.98	2.96
2. Chile	2.38	2.11	2.37	2.79	2.77
3. Cuba	2.13	2.09	2.21	2.10	2.18
4. Venezuela	2.23	2.16	2.20	2.33	2.50
5.5 Brazil	2.70	2.56	2.77	2.84	2.89
5.5 Uruguay	2.35	2.36	2.25	2.65	1.82
7. Colombia	1.70	1.63	1.66	1.90	1.97
8. Mexico	2.77	2.73	2.75	2.94	2.64
9.5 Peru	1.79	1.84	1.61	2.07	2.03
9.5 Costa Rica	1.38	1.25	1.28	1.77	1.25
11. Panama	1.40	1.42	1.38	1.43	2.24
12. Ecuador	1.32	1.39	1.27	1.38	1.64
13.5 Bolivia	1.25	1.24	1.35	1.04	1.88
13.5 Paraguay	1.21	1.16	1.25	1.23	1.60
15. Dominican Republic	1.20	1.29	1.14	1.13	1.35
16. El Salvador	1.11	1.10	1.09	1.20	1.19
17.5. Guatemala	1.18	1.26	1.14	1.14	1.62
17.5. Nicaragua	1.18	1.21	1.16	1.18	1.25
19.5. Honduras	1.11	1.13	1.10	1.12	1.38
19.5. Haiti	1.08	1.07	1.07	1.04	1.49

* Rank-position.

** Average class position: High: 3 middle: 2 low: 1.

them (Argentina, Mexico and Brazil) were almost unanimously placed as high class, and a group of Central American countries, as well as Bolivia and Ecuador, consistently placed as low class countries.

A complementary aspect of the subjective rank order is the size of each stratum, as shown in Table 3. It is clear from this Table that Latin American students tend to limit the size of the high class group and to perceive an extensive low stratum; while the Norwegians, whose knowledge of Latin America is extremely scanty (as we shall see later on), tend to project on Latin America the ideology of a welfare, middle class society which is their own. Furthermore, we can see that students in

Argentina and Brazil tend to limit the high strata to these two countries and to Mexico, occasionally including one more, while the Chileans tend systematically to include their own country at the top level, sometimes bringing along a fifth one.

While in 'The Latin American System of Nations — A structural analysis' we were concerned with the effects of stratification, measured by rank-order of the countries, on the international and national systems, here our main concern is with what could be the determinants of this rank-order as perceived by our respondents. In other words, our independent variable in that article becomes here the dependent one.

Table 3. *Average number of countries in the three classes, by nationality*

	<i>Argentini-ans</i>	<i>Brazilians</i>	<i>Chileans</i>	<i>All Latin Americans</i>	<i>Norwegians</i>
High class	4.47	4.30	5.15	4.70	5.08
Middle class	5.10	5.90	5.46	4.96	8.84
Low class	9.6	9.20	8.10	9.10	6.00

3. *The ideology of stratification*

Let us first examine the reasons students gave for their ranking of the countries. They were confronted with a list of 16 possible reasons, or criteria, which they could consider more or less relevant for this purpose. The technique of questioning was a combination of 'rating' and 'ranking', and the results reduced to a 5 point scale. The average values for each item, according to national groups, can be seen in Table 4, where more than 3 indicates strong approval, around 2 indifference, and less than 1 strong disapproval.

Table 4. *The explicit criteria of stratification (range: 0 to 4)*

	<i>Latin Americans</i>	<i>Argentini- ans</i>	<i>Brazilians</i>	<i>Chileans</i>	<i>Norwegians</i>
1. Industrialization	3.60	3.60	3.62	3.20	3.14
2. High average education	3.15	3.07	2.96	3.30	2.95
3. Literacy	3.03	3.25	3.00	2.86	3.05
4. Scientific development	3.00	2.93	3.00	3.13	2.77
5. Per capita income	2.74	2.87	2.55	2.75	2.76
6. Political stability	2.63	2.70	2.45	2.70	2.20
7. Economic stability	2.61	2.70	2.45	2.61	2.17
8. Independent foreign policy	2.58	2.76	2.61	2.44	1.70
9. Standard of living	2.52	2.65	2.31	2.72	2.79
10. Strongly organized working class	2.50	2.73	2.35	2.18	1.59
11. Urbanization	2.32	2.59	2.27	2.20	1.88
12. Representative political system	2.17	2.20	2.15	1.92	2.46
13. Extensive middle class	2.00	2.04	1.91	2.14	1.90
14. Size	1.38	1.50	1.36	1.04	1.56
15. White population	0.39	0.48	0.29	0.42	0.46
15. Leadership in sports	0.28	0.27	0.31	0.20	0.26

What emerges from Table 4 is that prestige is identified with development, and above all, with industrialization. On the other hand, factors like size, racial composition and sports are systematically refused as possible criteria of stratification.

Viewing this Table from the perspective of the class vs. feudal alternative mentioned earlier, we might say that the ideology is purely classist, oriented towards mobility, emphasizing the dimensions that stand for achievement, and denying the significance of what could imply ascription, or of what is not connected with development.

Although this is the general ideology, there are some variations among the national groups that are worth examining.

1. For the Norwegians, industrialization is clearly seen as contributing to the achievement of a high standard of living and political freedom for the whole population; and achievements in these spheres are also seen as important determinants of international rank-position: the Norwegians place literacy and standard of living immediately after industrialization, followed by 'representative political system'. On the other hand, political

factors that could be seen as important for the achievement of these goals are considered irrelevant. In short, what matters are the already existing achievements.

2. While the Norwegians stress existing achievements, Brazilians and Argentini-ans regard as most important the possibilities of mobility the countries have. Industrialization, then, is by far the main criterion, followed by education, economic and political factors.

3. The ideology of the Chileans is peculiar in this respect. They rank education higher than industrialization, and what

is connected with industrialization, which is negatively correlated with average education. On the other hand, urbanization is connected with standard of living, which correlates positively with per capita income. This seems to be a kind of leftist ideology concerned with economic development, while the variant opposing the relevance of average educational level seems to correspond to a more 'pure' leftist group.

2. 'Democratic' ideology is expressed by the cluster that connects political stability, economic stability and representative political system. In contrast with the first group, this one does not view the process of development as a political struggle against the high rank countries, but rather as a process implying a higher commitment to the rules and values of the high levels of the international system.

3. 'Technocratic', or 'scientific', ideology is represented by those who stress the level of scientific and technological development, by-passing political stability, per

extensive middle class, white population, etc., enter in the graph with equilibrated cycles, which indicates precisely this lack of consistency.

A third insight in the ideologies can be obtained if we look at the distribution of the ideologies according to nationality. We made two additive indices of ideology, one for the 'democratic' group (items: representative political system, political stability, economic stability) and another for the 'leftists' (independent foreign policy and organized working class). Only few cases show high values on both indices, and they were excluded, together with those with low or middle values on both indices (see Table 6). As for the technocratic group, we took those who are in the upper third of the 5 point scale for this criterion. The distributions can be seen in Table 7; we should notice the slight overlap between the 'technocratic' group and the other two.

Table 6. 'Leftists' and 'Democrats' (only Latin Americans)

		Index 'Democrats'				Total of 'pure' leftists
		high	middle	low	Total	
Index 'Leftists'	high	25	30	22	72	52
	middle	64	48	35	137	
	low	24	46	31	101	
	TOTAL	113	124	88	325	
Total of 'pure' democrats		88				

Table 7. Nationalities and Ideologies (only Latin Americans) — percent

	Leftists	Democrats	Technocrats	Total
Argentiniens	22.3	31.5	25.0	100%
Brazilians	19.0	20.0	37.0	100%
Chileans	4.0	35.0	48.0	100%

capita income, middle class and racial elements.

4. While these three ideologies are internally consistent and non-correlated among themselves, the other criteria do not form any consistent ideology, as far as this concept implies a logical and coherent articulation of attitudes and values. Items like standard of living,

It appears reasonable to organize these ideological orientations by means of three dimensions of concern: 1) *process* of development vs. *achievements* already attained; 2) political vs. non-political elements; and 3) the differing degrees of concern with the low strata of the society. This may then be mapped as follows:

*A typology of ideologies of stratification:
Concern with the countries' low strata*

	High		Low	
	<i>concern with the process</i>	<i>concern with achievements</i>	<i>concern with the process</i>	<i>concern with achievements</i>
<i>focus on political elements</i>	'leftists' (Argentinians, Brazilians)		anti-imperialists (nationalists)	democratics (Chileans)
<i>focus on non-political elements</i>		(Norwegians)	technocrats (Chileans)	(no ideology)

This typology is obviously tentative and does not correspond fully to what we got from our previous analysis. The pure anti-imperialist orientation, without leftist components, does not appear in our sample, even if we could distinguish two variants in the leftist-anti-imperialist group. As for the democratics, it is possible to argue that they are also concerned with the process of development, while we could also say that the technocratic group should rather be placed in the last column. But there is no doubt that the democratic group is much more concerned with the 'problems' of underdevelopment as something that could spoil the international image of the countries, than with the process of development, or even with achieving this development for their low strata, which would place them in the empty space in the upper row.

We shall not try to indicate all the possible determinants of these ideologies here. These obviously depend very much on background characteristics of the subjects, a kind of data we are not dealing with here. If we consider that there is not very much difference in this respect, since we are dealing with the same social strata, we should conclude that the contextual variable 'nationality' is the main determinant of the attitudes. We shall develop this point further on, but first we must see how the ideologies and other factors actually influence the students' perceptions of the system of stratification.

4. *Determinants of the perception of stratification*

1. So far we have examined what could be called the attitudinal level, that is, what the students say they do when ranking the countries. Let us now pass on to the level of actual behavior, and see whether ideologies and values really determine the assignment of class positions or not.

That expressed ideology does not correspond to actual behavior we can see from the fact that the three big countries are systematically placed at the top in spite of the fact that two of them, Brazil and Mexico, have relatively low levels of average development, while small but relatively well developed countries, like Uruguay, Costa Rica and Chile, are ranked lower. Size has obviously a strong impact on the ranking of the countries, in spite of being contrary to values at the conscious level.

How far the three main ideological orientations mentioned above influence the perception of stratification can be seen in Table 8. There are some differences between the two first groups for Cuba, Brazil, Bolivia, Argentina, Chile and Costa Rica, which are all consistent with the ideologies. The leftists tend to place Cuba in a high position, while Bolivia, with its historical revolution, also finds a better place among them. The independent foreign policy of the Chilean government, among other things, seems to help elevate its status among the leftists, the contrary holding for Brazil. And the

Table 8. *Rank of countries and ideologies*

	'Demo- cratics'	'Leftists'	'Techno- crats'
1. Argentina	2.83	2.68	2.64
2. Bolivia	1.18	1.41	1.21
3. Brazil	2.70	2.58	2.68
4. Chile	2.39	2.46	2.41
5. Colombia	1.78	1.69	1.74
6. Costa Rica	1.44	1.24	1.46
7. Cuba	1.97	2.53	2.17
8. Dominican Republic	1.15	1.25	1.17
9. Ecuador	1.39	1.35	1.45
10. El Salvador	1.17	1.06	1.15
11. Guatemala	1.22	1.19	1.15
12. Haiti	1.08	1.02	1.10
13. Honduras	1.05	1.04	1.12
14. Mexico	2.83	2.83	2.80
15. Nicaragua	1.24	1.08	1.17
16. Panamá	1.46	1.35	1.42
17. Paraguay	1.24	1.20	1.26
18. Peru	1.74	1.84	1.88
19. Uruguay	2.39	2.30	2.30
20. Venezuela	2.35	2.08	2.22

democratics give some value to the high levels of political and economic development of Costa Rica.

But, in general, the differences are very small. In spite of the fact that there is a clear and consistent image of international stratification for our respondents, there seems to be no explicit or conscious ideology to explain or determine this image — as if the respondents had this perception in spite of themselves. We shall leave the level of the expressed values and look for some less explicit determinants.

2. As expected, perception of stratification does not differ very much from the scale that emerges from the additive index we made from 10 objective measurements (see above). The 'objective rank' of a country determines very much the rank people attribute to it. The Spearman rank-correlation coefficient between the subjective and objective index is as high as .94 for all the Latin American group.

On the other hand, we can split the additive index into its items, and see which of them are more correlated with the subjective ranking (Table 9).

We can see that the attribution of high class position is related to high positions in the rank dimensions corresponding to large modern sectors in the countries (industrialization, urbanization, and GNP). It is much less related to other indicators of development, or only the size-factor (area and population). Clearly, when our respondents think of prestige, they are thinking not only of development, but of development in countries that *really matter*, in terms of potential international participation. The image of international prestige appears to be shaped by messages of different kinds, transmitted by channels of diffusion, depending on the existence of large modern sectors in the countries. Thus, in spite of their high levels of development, countries like Uruguay and Costa Rica are unable to be perceived in the international scene in the same way as Mexico and Brazil.

3. Let us now consider how much knowledge the students have about Latin America. The knowledge questions in the questionnaire were of two kinds. First, the respondents were asked to give the name of the capital, a population estimate and the name of the head of state of the 20 republics. Secondly, they had to check one among three possible values of per capita income, literacy, percentage of population

Table 9. *Rank correlations of the subjective index with objective data*

	Spearman correlation coefficient
With:	
1. industrialization	.86
2. urbanization	.86
3. GNP	.82
4. percent of middle class	.80
5. communications (news- papers per population)	.76
6. area	.74
7. literacy	.73
8. GNP per capita	.71
9. total population	.65
10. percent of white popu- lation	.65
With all the index:	.94

in industries (as an indication of industrialization) and the percentage of white population, for each country. With these items a general index of knowledge was made.¹⁴

Table 10 shows the different perceptions of stratification for each level of knowledge. It would seem that, the higher the level of knowledge, the clearer is the idea of a stratification system: the students with high knowledge are more consistent in attributing high rank to the three big countries, and also in attributing low rank to the small ones. In general, students with low knowledge discriminate less, so they give higher prestige to low prestige countries and lower prestige to high prestige countries.

Table 10. *Rank of countries and general knowledge (Latin Americans)*

	General knowledge			<i>effect of low knowledge on prestige</i>
	<i>high</i>	<i>middle</i>	<i>low</i>	
1. Argentina	2.91	2.79	2.69	loss
2. Bolivia	1.15	1.20	1.35	gain
3. Brazil	2.75	2.71	2.67	loss
4. Chile	2.63	2.40	2.20	loss
5. Colombia	1.86	1.64	1.67	loss
6. Costa Rica	1.62	1.29	1.30	loss
7. Cuba	2.25	2.15	2.02	loss
8. Dominican Republic	1.14	1.15	1.30	gain
9. Ecuador	1.24	1.32	1.40	gain
10. El Salvador	1.14	1.11	1.14	none
11. Guatemala	1.13	1.18	1.24	gain
12. Haiti	1.03	1.07	1.13	gain
13. Honduras	1.05	1.10	1.18	gain
14. México	2.91	2.82	2.64	loss
15. Nicaragua	1.05	1.21	1.23	gain
16. Panamá	1.24	1.38	1.54	gain
17. Paraguay	1.13	1.20	1.29	gain
18. Peru	1.96	1.77	1.71	loss
19. Uruguay	2.45	2.40	2.20	loss
20. Venezuela	2.36	2.18	2.20	loss

But the differences are really very small. If we compare the subjective ranking for each level of knowledge with the objective scales, we find only small variations, the most salient of which can be seen in Table 11.

Table 11. *Rank correlations between some objective rank-positions and subjective rank of groups of knowledge*

	high knowledge	low knowledge
with: area	.70	.76
industrialization	.89	.84
percent of middle classes	.79	.73
percent of white population	.59	.62

A possible inference is that those with low knowledge, when they have different perceptions from those of high knowledge, tend to guide themselves mainly by elements of an ascriptive nature, whereas the latter tend to orientate themselves by more accessible elements.

4. Another possibility is to see whether the assigning of general rank-position is correlated with the perception the students have of the position the countries occupy in some specific rank-dimensions. The students had to pick one among three values of per capita income, industrialization, literacy and percentage of white population for each country, from which we could establish the rank-order according to each of these rank-dimensions. The rank-correlations between these rank-orders and the class-rank order show that, when a country is perceived as having high class position, it is also perceived as having high levels of industrialization (.94), per capita income (.90) and literacy (.76), and, to a lesser degree, of white population (.47).

It is also possible to compare the answers with the actual figures, and see whether there is underestimation or overestimation of the countries' positions in these rank-dimensions. If we do so, we can get the general tendency to over or underestimate Latin America for each of these dimensions, with a simple additive index.

Table 12 shows the matrix of inter-correlations between the measures of estimation. Interestingly, overestimation (or underestimation) of industrialization

is correlated with the other three dimensions, but these are not inter-correlated. We could interpret this result as a kind of halo effect from industrialization to the other dimensions, that does not go from one of the others to another.


Table 12. *Indices of general level of perceived industrialization, per capita income, literacy and white population: Intercorrelations*

(Only Latin Americans. 'Gamma' correlation coefficient)

	industrial- ization	income	literacy	white population
industrialization	—	.27	.26	.25
income		—	.00	.00
literacy			—	.07

Another interesting fact is that the subjective rank-order is more correlated with the perception of industrialization than with the objective rank-order of industrialization, as we saw in Table 9.

We may now describe how the perception of stratification is formed along general lines; its graphic features can be seen below.



The image of stratification is determined by the generalized rank-roles played by the countries as a combined function of their potentialities of power and levels of development. Since this is a general role, knowledge of the countries' rank position does not depend on knowledge about specific facts concerning the countries. But the ideology of achievement does not allow our respondents to see the contradiction between their ideology and their actual perceptions; this cognitive dissonance is solved by attributing relatively higher levels of industrialization to the countries that are also big and powerful. And now it is possible to transfer this

perception of industrialization to other, less important, rank-dimensions.

As we have noted, other factors, such as political ideologies and general level of knowledge, also have some impact on the formation of the image of stratification, causing, however, only minor variations in the general picture. But there is one factor that seems to have a relatively more important effect, namely the *nationality* of the respondents. We shall dedicate the last section of this article to investigating the effect of this contextual variable.

5. *The effect of nationality*

If we look again at the typology of ideologies established in section 3, we can see that these ideologies are very similar to political orientations towards national, rather than international, affairs. Nor is this surprising, since internal political problems of underdeveloped areas tend to be formed by the perception of the ways and possibilities of mobility the countries have in the international system. These are, for our respondents, mainly in-

dustrialization and education. A strong determinant of the selection of ideological orientations is, of course, the position the subjects occupy in the national stratification structure. We could expect a conservative ideology if they belong to the high strata, a leftist one if they belong to the rank-and-file, and different forms of nationalist and 'developmentist' ideologies if they are rank-disequibrated. But another determinant is the perception of the relative openness or closedness of the international channels of mobility; this depends strongly upon the achievements the country has already attained in some relevant rank-dimensions.

In this respect, Chile differs significantly both from Brazil and Argentina. The latter have not only almost endless natural resources, but have also already reached high levels of economic development and internal dynamism. Brazil differs from Argentina in that the former shows much stronger internal differentiations and inequalities, lowering its average figures of development. But on the whole Brazil and Argentina occupy, together with Mexico, an unquestioned high position in the Latin American system. Only the Chileans perceive themselves as belonging to this high group. In comparison, Chile is a small country, where the potentialities of an autonomous economic development are much smaller. As a compensation, Chile shares with Argentina high levels of educational and cultural development.

We can expect that, in a relatively low position, and with strong aspirations of mobility determined by their high position on education, the Chileans will be much more interested in the Latin American system than the other two — and in fact they know much more about Latin America than the others do (Table 9-A), and more about Brazil and Argentina than these countries do about Chile (Tables 15, 16, 17).¹⁵

Three factors seem to be working here: the under-dog effect, which makes them more interested in their position in the system than the top countries are; the rank-disequilibrium effect, which accentuates their concern with their low position; and the relative closedness of the main channel of mobility, industrialization, combined with the scarcity of the main ascriptive element of prestige, power. Having reached high levels of education, their low international position is regarded unfair, and this feeling combined with the ascriptive nature of the international system is enough to create a kind of anxiety regarding the national place in the international system. The Chileans are more aware than any about

the high places that Argentina, Brazil and Mexico occupy (Table 2), but it is they who refuse most strongly the relevance of size as a criterion of international prestige (Table 4).

The different ideological orientations of the three national groups, and also the different concern with Latin America they have (as indicated by knowledge) can be seen in Table 13. And the effect of nationality can be still more clearly seen in Table 14, where ideology and knowledge are kept constant.

Table 13. *Nationality, ideology and knowledge*

	Argentini-ans	Brazilians	Chileans
a) Ideology:			
Democratic	37	23	19
Leftists	27	21	2
b) Knowledge:			
High	20	12	28
Middle	44	56	19
Low	51	50	4
Total*	117	121	54

* The total is greater than the sums, since the two ideological groups do not include all respondents, and the 'knowledge' information is incomplete.

What Table 14 shows is that all the three variables have some impact on how international stratification is perceived, but the effect of nationality is greater than the other two. In fact, nationality seems to interact negatively with the other variables, since ideology and knowledge practically do not influence the perceptions the Chileans have of Brazil and Argentina. In other words, what Table 14 says is that the best predictor of perceptions of rank-positions is, after the combination of power and development the country has, the nationality of the perceiver.

Although we cannot infer from Table 13 that the students in Argentina, Brazil and Chile have really different ideological orientations, due to the non-representative character of our sample, we have nevertheless some indications that this is so. If

Table 14. Rank of countries by nationality, ideology and knowledge: Argentina, Brazil, Chile*

	national groups			
	Argentini- anians	Brazil- ians	Chileans	All Latin Americans
<i>Rank position of:</i>				
1. Argentina				
a) Knowledge				
high	2.80	2.93	2.95	2.90
middle	2.70	2.79	2.95	2.87
low	2.60	2.74	—	2.80
b) Ideology				
democrats	2.80	2.90	2.95	2.85
leftists	2.63	2.67	—	2.67
TOTAL	2.68	2.78	2.98	2.78
2. Brazil				
a) Knowledge				
high	2.65	2.75	2.93	2.71
middle	2.50	2.81	2.85	2.81
low	2.60	2.70	—	2.78
b) Ideology				
democrats	2.55	2.90	2.85	2.70
leftists	2.50	2.62	—	2.57
TOTAL	2.56	2.77	2.84	2.70
3. Chile				
a) Knowledge				
high	2.40	2.57	2.80	2.63
middle	2.06	2.47	2.75	2.50
low	2.00	2.40	—	2.53
b) Ideology				
democrats	2.10	2.45	2.75	2.40
leftists	2.35	2.50	—	2.53
TOTAL	2.11	2.37	2.79	2.38

* The N's correspond to Table 13.

we calculate the perceived distances between the rank-positions in industrialization, per capita income and literacy, in Tables 15, 16 and 17, we can obtain some idea about how the groups perceive the problems of their own country.

Table 14-A. Perceived distances between industrialization, income and literacy

	distances between;		
	Industrial- ization and income	Literacy and industrial- ization	Literacy and income
Argentini- anians	.64	.28	.92
Brazil- ians	1.02	-.75	.27
Chileans	.45	.18	.63

These figures can be discussed only in relative terms, since the definition of what is 'high' or 'low' income, literacy and industrialization was established more or less arbitrarily in the questionnaire. But we can see nevertheless that the Brazilians locate their biggest gap in the difference between industrialization and income, and they also perceive a gap between industrialization and literacy that does not exist in the cases of Argentina and Chile. Both Argentini-ans and Chileans, on the other hand, locate their biggest gap between income and literacy, and for Chileans the gap between industrialization and income does not seem to be so important.

If we combine these perceived disequilibria, which correspond quite well with the known facts, with the characteristics of the countries' positions in the structure of stratification we discussed before, we get the following picture:

	Argentina	Brazil	Chile
top position	X	X	—
potentialities of international mobility through industrialization	X	X	—
rank-disequilibrium with high education	X	—	XX
rank-disequilibrium with high industrialization (or low education)	—	X	—

The hypothesis, developed by Peter Heintz, that when the individual's rank-disequilibrium coincides with the countries' disequilibrium the subject identifies his own problems with those of his country, seems to hold quite well. Chile has practically no leftist students, and the proportion of democratic subjects among the Argentinians is greater than among the Brazilians. A leftist outcome can be expected when the subject's rank-disequilibrium (education higher than economic and political power) is contrary to that of his country; this is the case in Brazil. And, as a matter of fact, it is well known that leftist groups are much stronger among Brazilian students than among Chileans, where Christian Democrats predominate. Argentina lies in between. Our limited data reveal the same picture.

Disproportionately high education has another consequence. In Brazil and Argentina, there exists potential mobility through industrialization, whereas in Chile this is not the case. We might think, then, that Argentinians, and especially Brazilians, view education as but one of several means for development; but the Chileans would consider it as the very definition of a country's rank-position. And a curious

transformation occurs here. Education is a classical example of an accessible status. For the Chileans, however, it seems to work as an ascriptive criterion of international rank-position, giving them high international status despite their lack of power and their low potentialities of development. That this contradictory use of ascriptive elements is not a simple

Table 15. *Argentinians' perceptions of Argentina, Brazil, Chile*

	Argentina	Brazil	Chile
a) Class position	2.68	2.56	2.11
b) Rank position in*			
1. Industrialization	2.37	2.17	1.86
2. Per capita income	1.73	1.71	1.48
3. Literacy	2.65	1.85	2.03
4. White population	2.85	1.73	2.60
c) Knowledge of			
1. Head of state	100%	59%	79%
2. Population	81%	16%	15%

* As for class positions, the figures indicate an average value going from 1 to 3 as maximum.

Table 16. *Brazilians' perceptions of Argentina, Brazil, Chile*

	Argentina	Brazil	Chile
a) Class position	2.78	2.76	2.37
b) Rank position in:			
1. Industrialization	2.11	2.67	1.86
2. Per capita income	1.70	1.65	1.60
3. Literacy	2.80	1.92	1.90
4. White population	2.85	2.05	2.18
c) Knowledge of			
1. Head of state	37%	100%	64%
2. Population	10%	71%	7%

Table 17. *Chileans' perceptions of Argentina, Brazil, Chile*

	Argentina	Brazil	Chile
a) Class position	2.96	2.84	2.77
b) Rank position in:			
1. Industrialization	2.54	2.23	2.45
2. Per capita income	2.28	2.10	2.00
3. Literacy	2.78	2.03	2.63
4. White population	2.85	1.77	2.85
c) Knowledge of			
1. Head of state	91%	72%	100%
2. Population	37%	33%	74%

speculation of ours we can partially infer from the fact that it is the Chileans who place more importance on race. They have an image of their own racial composition completely out of proportion with both the actual figures, and the perceptions of Brazilians and Argentinians, as we can see in Tables 15, 16 and 17.¹⁶

These Tables present the reciprocal perceptions in the triangle Argentina–Brazil–Chile. Let us summarize the findings:

1. Argentinians perceive themselves as white, literate, industrialized and with low income. They place themselves in a lower class-position than do the Brazilians and Chileans, but still consider themselves a top country. They perceive Chile as having the same rank-profile (also white, literate, with low industrialization and lower income, in this order), but lower in each of these values than Argentina. Among the three, it is the Argentinians who place Chile lower in class-position.¹¹ Argentinians perceive Brazil as industrialized, low literacy, low income and non-white population, in this order. They rank Brazil lower than do the other two.

2. Brazilians perceive themselves as industrialized, mainly white, more literate than the Argentinians think, and with low income. They perceive Argentina the same way as Argentinians do, and tend to agree with the Argentinians' perceptions about Chile.

3. Chileans perceive themselves as white, literate, industrialized and with a fair level of income, in this order. But they tend to increase the values of all these elements, and the perceptions they have of themselves do not coincide with the perceptions the other two have about Chile. They rank Argentina higher on income than the others do; Brazil, higher on income and lower on white population than themselves.

4. As to knowledge, Chileans know more about Argentina and Brazil than Brazilians and Argentinians know about Chile; Chileans know more about Argentina than about Brazil.

We shall not comment in detail on these Tables. They are generally con-

sistent with what we have developed thus far. Rather, we shall close this article with some general hypotheses regarding the determinants of reciprocal perceptions between countries.

Taking pairs of countries, we may ask whether they have the same total rank-position in the structure of stratification (or *rank-equivalence*), and also whether their rank configuration (or rank-profiles), are similar or not: that is, whether they are high or low on the same rank-dimensions (*rank-congruence*). A simple typology will be, then,

		<i>rank congruence</i>	
		yes	no
	yes	I	II
<i>rank equivalence</i>	no	III	IV

With respect to perceptions, according to Tables 15 to 17, or according to actual figures, Argentina–Brazil corresponds to II, Chile–Argentina to III, and Brazil–Chile to IV.

The hypotheses relative to each cell of this Table run as follows:

I. A sympathetic and cooperative relationship demands *both* rank congruence and rank equivalence, a demand none of our pairs fulfills. And since these interactions are low at the bottom in a feudal-like structure, only in a high-ranking pair like Brazil–Mexico could an intense and stable pattern of cooperation be expected, even if the political differences between these two countries put them very far from each other today.

II. Rank incongruence implies lack of a common ground of contact. The combination of rank-incongruence and rank equivalence, as the combination of poor white and rich Negro, tends to be the most potentially explosive situation. The fact that Argentinians reduce the levels of Brazilian literacy and whiteness more than the others do seems to indicate a competition that might be stronger if

these two countries were not oriented mainly *out* of the system.

III. Having two similar rank-profiles in different rank-positions forms the basis for a stable asymmetrical relationship, unless an element of rank-disequilibrium is introduced in the low-rank unit of the pair. In other words, a significant distance must be kept between them on *all* rank dimensions. When rank-inconsistency is introduced, the low-rank unit may become aggressive, depending on the ascribed or accessible nature of the relevant rank-dimensions. If we accept our interpretation of the Chilean high position in education as an ascribed position, we can interpret the well-known hostility of Chileans towards Argentina, which also appears in our data, as similar to the authoritarian syndrome: accepting the high position of the other, over-evaluating one's own position, excessively emphasizing ascribed elements, and explaining the high position of others by elements different from those on which one's own country scores high.

IV. This case is typical of non-interaction, and this pair is indeed the one with least mutual knowledge. This lack of actual interaction can be the basis of a harmless reciprocal sympathy. As a case in point, Brazil (and also Mexico) are often perceived by Chileans in a positive way, and vice-versa. But the development of interactions in this pair can lead to a configuration similar to II, with all its potential conflicts.

It is therefore a rather pessimistic picture that emerges from this analysis, since the possibilities of a positive cooperation are one out of four, and only part of this one. It is obvious, nevertheless, that the interactions between countries are not only or even mainly, determined by the stereotypes and images held by their populations, and that these images are determined by many other factors than those we infer from the hypothesis above. The only thing we can say thus far is that, although not decisive, the perceived image is a factor of international relations well worth studying.

NOTES

* A Spanish version of this article is being simultaneously published in the *Revista Latinoamericana de Sociología* n. 2, 1966, under the title 'Imágenes de la Estratificación Internacional en América Latina'. Portions of this paper were presented at the Second Nordic Conference on Peace Research, Hillerød, Denmark, February 11-13, 1966. This study is part of Program 21, *The Structure of the World Community*, now in progress at the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, under the direction of Johan Galtung, and can be identified as PRIO Publication 21-3. The authors are indebted to Johan Galtung for the administration of the questionnaire to the students of the Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences (FLACSO), Santiago de Chile, to applicants to this Faculty in different Latin American countries, and to students of the University of Chile. We are also indebted to Professor Fabio Wanderley Reis for the administration of the questionnaire to the students of sociology at the Faculty of Economics, University of Minas Gerais, Brazil.

¹ Needless to say, our sample is biased and is not to be taken as representative of the countries where the questionnaire was applied. A survey like this one — and this article, as a consequence — is mainly concerned with the detection of relevant hypotheses, and much less with strict proofs and generalizations, which belong to another phase of research. We could expect different results if we had taken our sample from different social strata, or from different countries. On the other hand, our technique of analysis consists of exploring all possible implications of the small variations that an article concerned with stringent proofs would perhaps consider non-significant. Less than by random sampling techniques, we think that our results should be generalized by replications of the study to other social groups in different countries.

² For a full development of the use of rank-analysis in international relations, see Galtung, Johan: *International Relations and International Conflicts: A Sociological Approach*, PRIO Publication 21-7, Oslo, 1966 (mimeographed).

³ That is to say, the international system of stratification has its consequences for the national

systems, and its processes. And conversely, a nation's participation in the international system, in terms of drive towards mobility, for instance, depends on the characteristics of the national stratificational system. The interplay between these two stratificational systems is being developed by Peter Heintz, from whom many of the theoretical points of this article are taken, of course without his responsibility for our interpretations. See *Un Paradigma Sociológico del Desarrollo*, ed. Eudeba, Buenos Aires (forthcoming). Our quotations are from the preliminary draft.

⁴ Cf. Galtung, Johan; Mora y Araujo, Manuel; Schwartzman, Simon: 'El Sistema Latinoamericano de Naciones: Un Analisis Estructural', *América Latina*, Rio de Janeiro, 1, 1966 ('The Latin American System of Nations: A Structural Analysis', English version forthcoming in the *Journal of Social Issues*, 1966).

⁵ Peter Heintz states this as follows: 'If such a value (development) really existed we could characterize these structures, specially the international structure, as a class-type structure. Furthermore, we define the specific problematic of underdevelopment as a consequence of the transformation of the international structure towards a class-type structure.' (Op. cit., p. 21.)

⁶ Cf. Schwartzman, Simon: 'International Development and International Feudalism', *Proceedings of the Inaugural Conference of the International Peace Research Association*, Groningen, Netherlands, July 1965 (forthcoming).

⁷ Cf. Galtung, Johan: 'A Structural Theory of Aggression', *Journal of Peace Research*, 1964, pp. 95-119.

⁸ 'there can be some correspondence between some individual statuses and some societal statuses. The relations between them is established (. . .) through the individual status with reference to the societal unit which belongs to the international structure. This national status incorporates the rank and the status configuration of the nation in the international structure and at the same time is used for the interpretation of other individual statuses which correspond to societal statuses' (Peter Heintz, op. cit., p. 22). We should notice that Heintz calls 'status' what we call 'rank-dimensions'.

⁹ We shall see this point in the last section of this article.

¹⁰ The sociometric technique was used by Singer, David: 'The Composition and Status Ordering of the International System, 1815-1940', *World Politics*, 1966, pp. 236-282. He determines the countries' rank-positions by the number and rank of the diplomatic legations, in a historical study that goes up to 1940, when the sociometric network becomes too saturated.

¹¹ For the details of this index, see Galtung, J.; Mora y Araujo, M.; Schwartzman, S., op. cit.

¹² We used the 'gamma' correlation coefficient, working with tricotomies of the combined index of ranking and rating for the 16 items (for Table 4 we had used this index with 5 values). Since some items have in general high values, and others low, we cut the original scales in three groups of more or less the same size. The consequence of this technique is that the negative correlation between, let us say, industrialization and average education, does not mean that the people who think education is important also think that industrialization is not important, but simply that they give relatively less importance to this factor than to the other.

¹³ This graph analysis was originally developed by Rubem Kaztman, of the Bariloche Foundation, Buenos Aires. Only correlations greater than .20 were used. See the corresponding 'Research Note' in *Revista Latinoamericana de Sociologia*, n. 2, 1966.

¹⁴ Each item was tricotomized. The percentage of subjects with high knowledge is the following, for the different national groups:

Table 9A. Knowledge

	Argentini- ans %	Brazilians %	Chileans %	All Latin Americans %	Norwegians %
High knowledge of:					
a) capitals (more than 17 countries)	25	27	61	37	3
b) population (more than 2)	43	26	80	45	26
c) head of state (more than 7)	18	6	53.3	23.5	0
d) per capita income (more than 13)	18	24	48	28	9
e) literacy (more than 13)	19	9	42.5	21	6
f) industrialization (more than 13)	31.5	38	38	34	14
g) white population (more than 9)	18	37	27.5	30	32
Total Index, upper third	18	10	55.5	23	—

¹⁵ This finding is consistent with the results obtained from a comparative study between Norway, France and Poland, which showed that the lower the position a country has in the international system, the higher is the interest it has in its own as well as others' place in the system: this we call the 'under-dog effect'. In this study, based on Gallup sampling, it appeared that Norway knows more about Poland and about France than these two know about Norway: and Poland knows more about France than France about Poland. Cf. Elvang, Birgit: *Social Position and Foreign Policy Knowledge in France, Norway and Poland: a comparative study*, paper presented to the Second Nordic Conference on Peace Research, Hillerød, Denmark, February 11-13, 1966.

¹⁶ This distortion in the perception of the racial composition is common for the three countries, although most marked in the Chilean group. It seems that, because of the difficulty of obtaining more accurate knowledge on the subject, this item is especially subject to the projection of stereotypes, in spite of the fact that it is strongly rejected as a relevant criterion of prestige, at the manifest level. Table 14-B, extracted from Tables 15, 16, and 17, shows how this projection works.

Table 14-B. *Perception of rank-position in white population*

	countries perceived		
	Argentina	Brazil	Chile
groups of perceivers:			
Argentinians	2.85	1.73	2.60
Brazilians	2.85	2.05	2.18
Chileans	2.85	1.77	2.85

¹⁷ There is a tendency for each country to have its favorite under-dog. Argentinians rate Chile down: Chileans, Bolivia; and Brazilians, Uruguay. The favorite under-dog must be a smaller, competitive neighbor, who answers this kind of treatment with some nationalistic aggressiveness. Although not so clear for Brazil and Uruguay, this is striking for the pairs Argentina-Chile and Chile-Bolivia.

S U M M A R Y

A questionnaire about the perceptions of international stratification in Latin America was applied to a non-representative sample of 327 Latin American students of social sciences, and also to a control group of Norwegian students. The students had to distribute the Latin American republics in three levels of prestige and importance, and a general image of stratification was then inferred. Other questions were concerned with knowledge about Latin America, perceptions of the countries' rank positions on some relevant rank-dimensions, and the criteria used to distribute the countries on levels of prestige and importance.

The analysis of the determinants of the image of stratification showed that this derives from the generalized rank-roles played by the countries as a function of their power and development, and does not depend on specific knowledge about the countries. At the conscious level, nevertheless, there is an exclusive concern about accessible elements, mainly industrialization and education, and a strong refusal of ascribed rank-criteria. This contradiction between values and actual behavior is interpreted as related to the transition of the international system from a feudal-like to a class-like structure.

Some minor variations in the perception of stratification are due to ideological orientations, general level of knowledge and nationality of the respondents, the last factor being the most important. The effect of nationality was explained by an interplay between the country's rank-profile and the place the country occupies in the international structure, as well as the place the subject occupies in the national structure of stratification. It was indicated that the reciprocal perceptions between pairs of countries can be explained by the degree of rank-equivalence and rank-congruence the pair has.

Краткое содержание.

Анкета, касающаяся понятия о международной „стратификации« стран Латинской Америки, была предложена небольшой группе студентов, представителей этих стран. Группа охватывала студентов, изучающих общественные науки. Для контроля подобная же анкета была предложена и соответствующей по количеству группе норвежских студентов. Студенты должны были разделить латино-американские страны на три группы в зависимости от уровня их международного престижа и значения. На основании этого деления был сделан вывод об общей картине „стратификации«. Другие пункты анкеты касались уровня познаний о странах Латинской Америки, обращали внимание на понятие об их удельном весе в некоторых относящихся к делу сравнительных измерениях, и предлагали рассмотрение критериев, примененных при делении этих стран на группы в зависимости от уровня их международного престижа и значения.

Анализ доминант модели „стратификации« показал, что она ведет свое начало из обобщенного понимания того удельного веса, который та или иная страна имеет вследствие своей мощи и уровня развития. Картина или представление о „стратификации« не зависит от специальных познаний опрашиваемых о такой стране. Тем не менее, сознательные ответы опрашиваемых на поднятые анкетой вопросы показывают их чрезвычайный интерес к наиболее заметным и, поэтому, легко доступным фактам, главным образом, к индустриализации и просвещению. С другой стороны замечается резкий отказ от критериев приписываемого удельного веса той или иной страны. Это противоречие между ценностями и действительным поведением истолковывается, как фактор, связанный с превращением международной системы феодальной структуры в структуру классовую.

Некоторый незначительный разницей в восприятии и понимании „стратификации« вытекает из идеологической ориентации, общего уровня знаний и национальной принадлежности опрашиваемых. Это последнее обстоятельство является наиболее важным. Воздействие национальной принадлежности на занимаемую позицию объясняется взаимодействием между удельным весом страны и тем местом, которое эта страна занимает в международной системе государств. Кроме того это зависит и от того положения, которое опрашиваемый занимает во внутригосударственной структуре „стратификации«. В конце отмечается, что взаимные, указывающие друг на друга восприятия и понятия в странах, взятых попарно, могут быть объяснены степенью эквивалентности и совпадения удельного веса этих двух стран.